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  introduction
Facing a no-confidence vote in November of 1990, V. P. Singh, 
India’s eighth prime minister, posed a resounding question to an audience of 
MPs: “What kind of India do you want?” With this question, Singh signaled 
the irony of a secular nation-state indulging the Hindu nationalist demand to 
demolish the Babri Masjid, a small sixteenth-century mosque. The ultimate 
aim of this endeavor, known as the kar seva (service), was to build a Hindu 
temple in place of the mosque to simultaneously mark the birthplace of the 
god Ram and symbolize Hindu political resurgence. In fact, the plan was no 
longer just being debated and was gaining noticeable traction among upper-
caste Hindus and Lok Sabha parliamentarians. Singh himself gave a straight-
forward answer to the question of what kind of India he wanted: a secular, 
democratic country based on the rule of law. He thus resolved to protect the 
small mosque at all costs because that was simply what he, the leader of the 
world’s largest secular democracy, was charged to do. Unlike the Congress 
Party governments before and after him, Singh did not waver in his com-
mitment to the protection of the Muslim minority and its built heritage. To-
ward this end, he had L. K. Advani, the organizer of the planned demolition, 
arrested. He then deployed security forces to surround the historic Mughal 
mosque and thwart its planned destruction. The prime minister’s principled 
stance to protect the space of the mosque enraged Hindu nationalists and 
compelled their political arm, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to pull support 
for Singh’s coalition government. This eventually cost Singh his post.
What is often overlooked by writers of the now well-studied series of events 
that culminated with the destruction of the Babri Masjid in December of 1992 
was that Singh’s question —“What kind of India do you want?”— signaled an 
ethical approach to the kar seva controversy.1 Asserted here is the notion that 
the kind of India one wanted could be shaped by how one reckoned with its 
architectural and national landscape: that with the destruction of this small, 
inactive historical mosque the promise of Indian secularism could die and 
communalism could come to reorder the country.2 More crucially, it sug-
gests that with the proper perspective on its built environments, India could 
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repel the demagoguery shaping its public space. What Singh implied with 
his question constitutes the central premise of this book: monuments matter. 
Monumental environments materialize power relations, influence the social 
ordering of a nation, produce us as subjects, and finally, and more positively, 
provide us with a critical space to create, resist, and endure in our everyday 
lives. As such, monuments are not stable and unchanging but dynamic spaces 
that can help us understand how political movements and social identities in 
India have been forged through the imperatives of power, subjectivity, and the 
spatial practices they influence.3
To begin thinking of Indian monuments as dynamic spaces shaped by the 
contending concerns of nation-making, identity, and social survival, I ask 
the reader to imagine a thirteen-year-old Muslim girl entering the sixteenth-
century Tomb of Humayun in Delhi today. In the course of a single hour, she 
will occupy several subject positions in this public space: she is a child under 
the guardianship of her parents; an Indian citizen visiting the monuments of 
her nation’s history; and a member of the global culture of humankind, as the 
monument is on UNESCO’s list of World Heritage Sites. She is also a young 
woman aware of her personal space and the gaze of others. Finally, she is a 
Muslim who can recognize the forms of the architecture as similar to those 
of her local mosque and who witnesses her parents proudly proclaim that this 
is how her Muslim ancestors used to build. This example shows the space of 
the monument as far more multivalent and active than unified and static. It is 
also unpredictable and constantly shifting in meaning according to the subject 
position and identity of the visitor. This volatile aspect of space seems intoler-
able to state powers and their apparatuses, which require one public subject 
position to be assumed and monitored at all times. Hence the state deploys 
a spatial framework based on the simple binary of the national self and the 
other as it removes from view the multiplicity of monuments and the reality 
of their instability. More critically, such a framework also conceals the fun-
damental reason why monuments have mattered throughout modern Indian 
history. Put simply, because of their multiplicity, instability, and our desire to 
learn about ourselves through them, monuments both have been subjected to 
the ordering of power and, as this book will reveal, are often the chosen sites 
to challenge such power.
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The monument in India is today a social fact. There are currently over 
five thousand officially registered monuments throughout the nation, and 
they range from ancient to modern, religious to secular, and rural to urban. 
Indian monuments, and especially Mughal monuments like the Taj Mahal, 
are also famous, drawing millions of tourists to their doorsteps every year. 
Despite their omnipresence and allure, these sites continue to be the most 
misunderstood, mystifying spaces of our social landscape. Most of us are able 
to sense the power monuments have in shaping our reality, yet few of us can 
(or want to) express what lies behind this influence. Ordinarily, this condition 
of mystification does not require urgent action or analysis. However, every 
now and then irreplaceable buildings are threatened or, like the Babri Masjid, 
destroyed, tearing apart the national landscape. Thousands of lives have been 
claimed over monumental matters.4 Such events provoke questions regarding 
the role that monuments play in identity formation, national heritage, and the 
topographical landscape of the contemporary nation-state; but only a few of 
these questions have been critically investigated.
The movement to destroy the Babri Masjid is a case in point. Both the 
perpetrators of the destruction and those opposed to it have written hundreds 
of books and essays to give sense to the seemingly nonsensical. The discourse 
surrounding the contingency of monumental destruction that has arisen over 
recent years can be divided into two groups: the historiographic and the social 
scientific. The former focuses on the symbolism, historical imperatives, and 
rhetorical logic of the parties involved in the destruction of the mosque.5 The 
latter has focused on the social changes the events leading up to the destruc-
tion and the destruction itself have wrought in secular India.6 While both 
approaches have provided rich and nuanced analyses of the political, ideo-
logical, and social conditions of the mosque’s destruction, neither considers 
the mosque itself, in its material presence and excesses, as another important 
player in shaping the events that unfolded between 1989 and 1992. What is 
also critically missed is that by 1989 the Babri Masjid actually had a monu-
mental profile dating back to the eighteenth century, shaped by the spatial 
practices of the declining Mughal Empire and the ascending power of the 
British. The contestation and later destruction of the Babri Masjid were there-
fore episodes in a longer history of practices of representation, repression, and 
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renewal that signify the Indian landscape through its monuments. The pres-
ent volume is concerned with broadening the analysis of Indian monuments 
by making their genealogy, radical physicality, and spatial practices the central 
focus of study.
Why Mughal Monuments?
With so many officially recognized monuments in India to choose from, I 
want to clarify why I limit the scope of this study to the Mughal monument. 
First, there are practical reasons, as it is impossible to systematically or criti-
cally examine the diversity of all Indian monuments. Second, of all these mon-
uments, the set of majestic palaces, tombs, mosques, forts, and gardens of the 
Mughal emperors (1526–1857) has mattered more than any other. Since their 
construction in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, monuments like the 
Taj Mahal, Fatehpur Sikri, Delhi’s Red Fort, and Jami Masjid have captured 
the imagination of poets, artists, political leaders, and ordinary people. Their 
ineffable beauty, grandeur, and association with one of the most powerful em-
pires ever to rule India have contributed to their long history of representation 
and preservation. The Mughal monument has also been the setting of wars of 
conquest, rebellions, death, independence, and national celebration. In this 
book I demonstrate how its distinctive qualities and history order the Mu-
ghal monument as an ambivalent site and, more crucially, animate a spatial 
dynamic defined by crisis and its repression through political ideology and 
other intellectual practices.
Almost everyone who has visited them has experienced the sublime, am-
bivalent, and uncanny qualities of Mughal monuments; the more sensitive 
of these visitors have recorded the experience on sketch pads, in verse, travel 
journals, letters, and on postcards. These records reveal the multiplicity of 
encounters with these sites and provide an array of visual and literary data 
that enables me to trace the production of the Mughal monument from the 
first anxious encounters of Indian poets and British artists in the eighteenth 
century to the present. They offer insight into the spatial practices of the Mu-
ghal monument, and through their narrative contradictions reveal how the 
underlying ambivalence of these spaces shaped the subjectivity and desires of 
visitors and promoted creativity and resistance. This sort of spatial-subjective 
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reading enables the present study to move beyond style and ideology to exca-
vate the recursive and hidden trauma of the space, which also gives meaning 
and order to the monument. In this endeavor I do not take power, identity, 
or space as fixed objects but rather demand that they be calibrated with the 
specific dynamics and contingencies of Indian history.
At this point I should explain how history functions in this book. First, his-
tory helps trace the shifting meaning of the monument as a temporal function. 
By choosing to order the chapters chronologically I do not imply that the his-
tory of the monument moves in an evolutionary fashion with a definite point 
of origin. Instead, following Michel Foucault’s concept of genealogy, I write a 
history of the monument that results from the contradictory and contingent 
rather than the providential.7 Yet it cannot be denied that the Indian monu-
ment was radically transformed by certain critical events, such as the Upris-
ing of 1857 and independence, and by personalities such as Lord Curzon and 
Gandhi. By using these events and personalities as anchoring points, I trace 
how the monument changes in meaning and spatial ordering through sym-
bolism and around the dialectics of conflict and creativity. While the book 
follows chronology, the analysis of the monument that takes place within its 
chapters is framed synchronically, and the monument’s ordering and mean-
ing are presented as shaped by its particular historical context and the vectors 
of power, subjectivity, and space.8 I will now explain how these three vectors 
function at the monument.
The Power of Monuments
Indian monumental discourse commonly understands power as acting on the 
monument without internal resistance; if contestation is seen to take place, it 
originates from external sources. For example, as the recent agents of violence 
against Indian monuments, radicalized Hindus are often represented as cross-
ing the political and cultural parameters of the nation-state, instead of in fact 
emerging from within the same power network. Using terms like sickness and 
virus to describe radical movements, writers on the crisis of monumentality 
represent Hindu nationalist resistance as arising from the margins of secu-
lar society and as giving “testimony to the weakness in practice of secularism 
in India.”9 Yet this strategy of representing resistance at the monument as 
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exterior to power distances the space from the contingencies of history and 
contributes to the monument’s mystification. The first step in addressing this 
predicament is to incorporate a model of relational power into the analysis of 
Indian monumentality.
I thus examine the monument as a terminal point of power that is ordered 
and signified through the spatial practices both of the state and of those 
which resist it. This understanding of the expression of power is derived from 
Foucault’s theory of power relations, which posits that power and resistance 
emerge from the same place: “Where there is power there is resistance and yet 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to the power.”10 
Therefore power is not wielded from a singular and centralized position but 
“is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and 
mobile relations.”11 Foucault further explains that in modern times, power has 
had a more efficient economy based on “procedures which allowed the effects 
of power to circulate in a manner at once continuous, uninterrupted, adapted, 
and ‘individualized’ through the entire social body.”12 Dispersed like a web 
over time and space, power reveals itself not as one locus of law or sovereignty, 
or through several nodal points, but through the myriad power relations that 
emerge everyday and everywhere along the power network. They become ap-
parent to us at those points of resistance or crisis.13
In the late 1980s and 1990s scholars of colonial studies adopted Foucault’s 
theory of power relations to argue for a view of European culture as imbricated 
with the colonial other.14 More recently, scholars seeking to assert the materi-
ality of place in colonial analysis, after years of examining placeless texts, have 
used Foucault’s theory to explore those spaces, like cities and towns, in which 
power and resistance shape each other.15 Taking this relational understanding 
of power as the starting point for the study of the Indian monument, a very 
different story of its past and current status can be told, one that originates 
from the point of crisis. This theory of power as relational allows for a metho-
dology that moves beyond the examination of the narrative of the triumph of 
reason over unreason to the stories of constant, internal resistance actuating 
power and causing the monument’s spatial practices to evolve and transform 
over time. In framing the Indian monument as the terminal point of power 
and as informed by relations of power, this book follows the example of South 
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Asian histories that concentrate on points of cognitive failures and procedural 
crisis.16 Through a focus on the frictional dynamics of power relations, the In-
dian Mughal monument is revealed as both a contradictory space of the state 
and a radically open space where new possibilities of power are expressed and 
alternative social orderings and better futures imagined.
The Subject of Monuments
In the Hindi film Lal patthar (1971), the narrator’s opening lines prepare the 
audience for an unusual story of love, loss, and historical monuments: “This 
is Fatehpur Sikri founded by King Akbar. There is a strange appeal in its si-
lence and desolation. A kind of magic. That is why I keep getting drawn here, 
and still don’t feel satisfied.” As the opening credits roll, we accompany an 
Indian family on a typical tour of Akbar’s palace complex, Fatehpur Sikri. 
When the family comes to rest in a quieter area of the monument, one of the 
women walks off alone to study the surrounding structures. She puts her hand 
on a nearby building, whereupon an angry voice shouts, “What right do you 
have?” Startled, the woman screams, and the other visitors rush toward her. A 
disheveled old man supporting himself on a cane explains that he called out 
to her only to prevent her from touching the bloodied stone, and proceeds to 
ask the group if they have heard the story of the red stone, the lal patthar. One 
of the visitors answers that they have not, as the guidebook does not mention 
it. “To hell with your guidebook!,” the old man retorts (tellingly, he switches 
to En glish for this outburst). Reverting to Hindi, he lists the text’s crucial 
omissions: “Does the guidebook mention how many conspiracies, how many 
murders were committed here? How many lovers met here and parted ways? 
But does that make it a lie? Will that make it a lie?” He offers to tell “the his-
toric story of the red stone,” and his audience, spellbound at this point, listens 
eagerly. The old man’s tale, which makes up the bulk of the movie, tells of the 
machinations of a jealous prince who has his wife killed at Fatehpur Sikri by 
the man he suspects to be her lover. As she lies dying on the red sandstone 
floor, the prince learns too late that she was in fact faithful to him. The bur-
den of guilt causes him to compulsively return every year on the full moon 
of the Hindu month of Magha to clean the once bloody stone. The film thus 
reveals in its opening and closing scenes the multiplicity of the monumental 
8 | monumental matters
space, containing hundreds of stories of love, betrayal, and power. More criti-
cally, it also exposes the dynamics of subjectivity that recursively and uncon-
sciously draw individuals to monuments.
I recall the story of Lal patthar to demonstrate that the question of monu-
mental multiplicity cannot be adequately answered through the study of the 
discourse and practices of power alone, but that it has to move more deeply 
into the consciousness of people interacting with the monument. Why ex-
actly are they drawn to these sites, and what do they gain from their visits? 
Ultimately, any study of monuments must have at its core a practical under-
standing not only of the psychical connection the modern individual forges 
with the site but also of the processes governing the constitution of a subject’s 
identity through her or his interaction with it.
 To gain a deeper understanding of the social significance of monuments, 
we must first outline the cognitive processes that emerge from an encounter 
with a monument. I argue that any encounter with a monument is always split 
between three registers of subjectivity: the visual-imaginary, the ideological-
symbolic, and the unconscious-Real. In the first order of an encounter, the 
monument serves as a mirror, reflecting back to us an ideal and objectivized 
image of ourselves as complete and unified subjects.17 In other words, the 
monument functions as the other that reflects an ideal image of who we are 
while veiling the drives and needs that fragment our perception of self. The 
effect of this visual register is revealed when we take pictures of ourselves with 
monuments to display to friends and family. Our presence at the monument 
says something about, if not who we are, then who we aspire to be. The need 
for alignment with the perceived meaning of the monument is by no means 
the exclusive domain of the so-called common citizen or tourist: artists, poets, 
viceroys, nationalists, and prime ministers of India are united in their desire to 
see an ideal picture of themselves reflected in the monumental mirror. In the 
present study the imaginary register of subjectivity is presented as the primary 
draw of the Mughal monuments from the beginnings of sightseeing in India 
in the late eighteenth century to the present day.
The process of subjectivity at the monument begins with the need for an 
ideal picture of the self in the visual-imaginary encounter, but it is then fur-
ther structured and differentiated by the dialectics of desire. In the second, 
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ideological-symbolic register, the monument itself is imagined as lacking 
something that only the subject can complement.18 This desire to satisfy the 
monumental lack draws us even closer to the monument and the pleasure 
of anticipating its completion. Just as the monument bestows something on 
us — the affirmation of ourselves as the idealized subject — we feel that the 
monument deserves our veneration, that our proper, prescribed perception 
of it in turn constitutes an affirmation of it and what it stands for. Like good 
children who perceive their goodness corresponding to a need for it on the 
part of their parents, we abandon our subjectivity in the ideological-symbolic 
register as we seemingly fill the lack in the other and shape ourselves into what 
we imagine its desire for us to be.
Through the fantasy of desire we become ideological subjects, subjected to 
the codes and symbols of the monumental space. At the Red Fort in Delhi, 
for example, an Indian tourist may come to the monument because she feels 
it needs to be seen by her, but while there, she is called on to take the subject 
position of a citizen of secular India through the signage, the government tour 
guide’s descriptions of the fort’s history, and through other mechanisms that 
interpellate or “hail forth” the subject through a national ideology.19 There-
fore, due to the fantasy of monumental lack — without us it has no meaning 
— we end up in a state of subjection to its ideological order.
The visual-imaginary and ideological-symbolic registers do not operate 
independently of each other, but constantly circulate through the monu-
ment and the subject, suturing them together while constituting the subject 
as complete and stable and giving order and meaning to the monument. It 
is, however, important to recognize that the functionality of these registers 
does not go uninterrupted. The third and final register of the monument, the 
unconscious-Real, at times breaks through both the first two orders, question-
ing their truth. The Real is the unnamable part of the monument that is not 
readily apparent to us but that, as Jacques Lacan explains, “has to be sought 
beyond the dream — in what the dream has enveloped, hidden from us, behind 
the lack of representation of which there is only one representative.”20 Many 
have discovered that behind the fantasy of lack that binds us to the monu-
ment there is a more horrifying and powerful truth: that nothing lies beyond 
the matter of the monument. This other truth belongs to the monumental 
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Real, which becomes apparent in moments of crisis such as war and social 
trauma, when ideology and social identities are rendered ineffectual and the 
orderly world is inundated with unruly signs and non-sense. In this book, the 
monumental Real reveals itself in the wars of colonial expansion of the late 
eighteenth century, after the Uprising of 1857, Partition in 1947, and the de-
structive rise of Hindu nationalism in the 1990s. The monumental Real and 
its disruptive truth are embedded in travel and tourist writings, speeches, and 
art produced after crises. Its unsettling presence is indicated in the repetition 
of stereotypes, tropes, and other rhetorical devices that cover up its truth, and 
it is in these reiterations that I locate the influence of the monumental Real 
and the stain it leaves behind on the ideological order and meaning of Mu-
ghal structures, much like the disconcerting and indelible blood stain of Lal 
patthar.
In the following chapters, the stain of the monumental Real is shown 
to structure British, Muslim, nationalist, and secularist spatial practices. It 
haunts William Hodges’s eighteenth-century paintings of Mughal monu-
ments in the form of the suppressed colonial trauma, and nineteenth-century 
tourists see it when their vision is disrupted by the native non-sense of recal-
citrant tour guides. Lord Curzon experiences its effects in the sublime and 
haunting beauty of Mughal monuments, prompting him to attempt, unlike 
more repressive British administrators, to address the Real openly and di-
rectly. Finally, Muslim and secular leaders will grapple with the national stain 
of Partition and try to order the Mughal monuments around its disruptive 
truth. As we will see, all these moments of crisis not only order the experience 
of the Mughal monument but also reflect how the impossibility of its truth 
generates the repetition of ideological formations: “That is why I keep getting 
drawn here, and still don’t feel satisfied.”
The crucial point of this discussion of the three registers of subjectivity is 
that at the core of every monument lies a cognitive failure caused by the dis-
connect between imaginary and symbolic orderings and the Real. Yet the re-
alization of such a failure does not signal the dissolution of symbolic or visual 
orderings but rather strengthens them and sometimes compels their transfor-
mation, ushering in a new chapter for the Mughal monument.
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The Space of the Monument
The third vector that shapes the monument is space, or more precisely the 
dynamics of space. In light of the discussion of the Real and its disruptions, 
it can be argued that all monumental space is unstable space due to the gap 
between the physical matter of the monument, encountered in brute sensu-
ousness, and the monument’s imaginary and symbolic ordering, which matter 
eludes. The instability of a monument prompts some to redouble their efforts 
to pin down its meaning to an ideal view or ideology. This process ends with 
a totalitarian schema of monuments as singular symbols of a state. For oth-
ers, the gap is seen as a radical opening for critique, creativity, and imagining 
alternative possibilities for a better society. The following nasheed, or song, 
exemplifies the creative innovation that monumental space offers.
Oh Babri Masjid! We are guilty
We claimed we would save you
Would win you back from the Unbelievers
Would bear the blows and bear the bullets
We never dreamt we would bear this pain
Oh Babri Masjid! We are guilty
We attacked our own people
And confused them with rhetoric
Meanwhile we created ruckus
And basked in our false pride
Oh Babri Masjid! We are guilty21
The verses express not only a lamentation for the loss of the mosque but also 
offer a rare glimpse into the complexity of Muslim reactions to the destruction 
of the site. There is nostalgia for the past and criticism of fellow Muslims for 
ignoring the importance of the mosque. But above all, the nasheed signals an 
important shift in disposition: it suggests a return of the imaginary signifi-
cance of architectural space for Muslim identity after years of viewing these 
sites as purely functional prayer spaces. In the song, the mosque also serves as a 
restorative space in which Muslim subjectivity can be re-empowered: the pro-
gressive weakening of the Muslim social body is described with the implied 
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hope of seeing the reversal of this trend. Through song the Babri Masjid is 
thus turned into what Henri Lefebvre called a differential space.
To expose the creative potential that grows out of the inherent instability of 
the Mughal monument, I utilize a little considered aspect of Lefebvre’s theory 
of the production of social space: differential space, the productive space that 
arises out of the contradictions of power and ideology to offer something dif-
ferent. As differential space, the materiality of the Mughal monument, in all 
its excesses, plays an integral part in the generative process of the subject’s 
transcendence of everyday contradictions, alienation, and suffering. In this 
capacity, differential space provides a critical space of creativity and a new 
ethics of monumentality.
Differential space, as demonstrated in the nasheed’s construction of the 
space of the Babri Masjid, arises from the contradictions of abstract space, 
or the conceived space of ideology, “where the tendency to homogenization 
exercises its pressure and its repression.”22 In the example of the Babri Masjid, 
the mosque became an abstract space when the government had it locked in 
1949 after Hindu idols were surreptitiously installed inside. Fearing commu-
nal violence, the state thus erased the religious history, memory, and practices 
formerly associated with the mosque’s functioning. The state’s role in allow-
ing the mosque to fall into ruin and disuse is kept behind the veil of secular 
idealism reordering the Babri Masjid into a monument of Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
commitment to secularism. By abstracting the mosque into an ideological 
space, however, contradictions develop. As Lefebvre elaborates: “To the de-
gree that there are traces of violence and death, negativity and aggressiveness 
in social practice, the monumental work erases them and replaces them with a 
tranquil power and certitude which can encompass violence and terror.”23 Ab-
straction is thus just a part of the process of transforming a social space into a 
monument, and it is also where most writers conclude their exploration of the 
meaning of monuments. They therefore remain aligned with the same cate-
gories and practices of power that abstracted the monument in the first place.
Lefebvre urges us to not accept the representations of space produced by ide-
ology, but to go further and seek contradictions within the illusory existence 
of abstract space. The material, poetic, and sensual in space then becomes an 
essential locus for recovering contradiction and ambivalence: “The more care-
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fully one examines space, considering it not only with the eyes, not only with 
the intellect, but also with all the senses, with the total body, the more clearly 
one becomes aware of the conflicts at work within it, conflicts which foster 
the explosion of abstract space and the production of a space that is other.”24 
As one becomes attuned to the sounds, rhythms, movements, disjunctive 
practices, art, and poetry — that is, the “other” — more creative practices of 
the monument come to light. Crucially, these disruptive practices make space 
creative and productive of change: “Spatial practice is neither determined by 
an existing system, be it urban or ecological, nor adapted to a system, be it 
economic or political. On the contrary, thanks to the potential energies of a 
variety of groups capable of diverting homogenized space to their own pur-
poses, a theatricalized or dramatized space is liable to arise. Space is liable to be 
eroticized and restored to ambiguity, to the common birthplace of needs and 
desire, by means of music, by means of differential systems and valorizations 
which overwhelm. . . . An unequal struggle, sometimes furious, sometimes 
more low-key, takes place between the Logos and the Anti-Logos.”25 Abstract 
spaces such as national monuments will contain within them this underlying 
creative potential — which arises as differential space and on which an eth-
ics of the subject can be built. By ethics of the subject I mean an ethics that, 
rather than suturing a unified but alienated subject out of fragments, is built 
on the universality of difference, not in the multicultural sense but in the 
radically open sense that guarantees the right to difference. The ludic and 
adventurous, the artistic and erotic, the destructive and violent are all aspects 
of social space that lead individuals to their self-empowerment. These creative 
possibilities, which emerge from the material realities of the monument, from 
power relations and subjectivity, are productive of differential space. In this 
book I examine the differential aspect of the Mughal monument as the basis 
for the creative and resistant acts that take place in and around it. Whether 
in the form of art, poetry, or conservation, I examine these acts to reveal how 
the monument is at its core a site of radical openness.
Making Monuments Matter
The triangulation of power relations, subjectivity, and differential space gives 
shape, order, and meaning to the Mughal monument in a dynamic manner. 
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Each chapter of the present book studies this integrated process through a 
focus on specific events and persons that reckoned with the monument either 
creatively or through ideological policy. In my focus on the monumental en-
counters I have chosen the most representative events and actions from each 
era of history, beginning in the late eighteenth century. This study will help 
readers understand two important facts about monuments. First, that monu-
ments are essential spaces of the public sphere because they provide the vital 
ethical space needed to resist the homogenizing influence of the state. Sec-
ond, that monuments matter to people because they simultaneously and con-
tradictorily constitute them as good citizens and critical agents of imagined 
alternatives. At stake in my analysis of Indian monuments are three critical 
shifts in view: a reconsideration of monuments as merely the effects of the 
urgencies and contingencies of power relations; an account of monuments as 
vital factors in the social formation of the subject; and the consideration of the 
tactical, nondiscursive, artistic, and sublime aspects of the monument that are 
constitutive to its order and meaning. In other words, each of the following 
chapters seeks to expand the study of monuments beyond their formal and 
ideological registers to examine how the interplay of power, subjectivity, and 
creativity produce the monument recursively and radically as one of the most 
critical and unstable spaces of modern India.
The turbulent context of the late eighteenth century provides the setting 
of chapter 1. At this time, Mughal power continues to assert itself across the 
landscape through the spatial practices of regional rulers and in the Urdu 
poets’ recollections of life under Mughal rule. Also at this time, British power 
begins to cast its net over larger expanses of Northern India through wars of 
expansion. I begin this chapter with a discussion of the Urdu poetry called 
shahrashob, or the “laments of the city,” and consider how the ruins of the 
Mughal city provided poets, like Mir Taqi Mir, with the space to comment 
on Muslim society and understand its violent decline. At the same time, the 
British landscape artist William Hodges looked to Mughal structures and 
ruins to give meaning and order to an Indian landscape upended by Brit-
ish wars of expansion and a fathomless desire for enrichment. The chapter 
closes with the poetry of Nazir Akbarabadi and the picturesque writings of 
the traveler Fanny Parkes. Both see in the Mughal city and its monuments a 
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space of change, which is celebrated for its ushering in of new possibilities for 
the social order.
In chapters 2 and 3 I examine the Mughal monument during the period of 
high imperialism and Indian nationalism. After a discussion of the attempts 
made by the Archaeological Survey of India to classify and order the Mughal 
monument, I consider how Lord Curzon, the eleventh viceroy of  India (1898–
1905), enacted an entirely new strategy of preservation to reckon with these 
sites. His efforts transformed the Mughal architecture of India, and especially 
the Taj Mahal, from ruins and curiosities into veritable monuments. Curzon, 
I argue, did not seek to hide the sublime power of the monument, but instead 
strove to yoke it to British power. In chapter 3 I discuss the practices of tour-
ism and the constitution of the British imperial subject at the Mughal monu-
ment. I conclude with an examination of how the tourist narrative offered 
in guidebooks structured tours of the Mughal monument, and how Indian 
nationalists inverted the British narrative strategy to critique power and offer 
their own structured tour based on nationalist ideology.
In chapter 4 I trace the changing relationship of the Indian Muslim com-
munity to the Mughal monument. I begin with Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan’s 
great work on monuments and the implications of the Uprising of 1857 on the 
built environments of Delhi. Subsequently, I demonstrate how the Mughal 
mosques of Delhi became critical spaces to resist British power and assert a 
new Muslim identity in the public sphere. Through their representation in the 
Urdu press, all mosques were transformed from regional historical spaces into 
spaces expressing a common Indian Muslim identity. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of Hali’s and Iqbal’s poetic representations of the Indian 
landscape and the ideological birth of Pakistan. I examine how the imagined 
space of a separate Muslim nation proposed by writers, as well as by Muham-
mad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and Pakistan’s first prime 
minister, restructured and resignified the Mughal monument as antithetical 
to Muslim empowerment and statehood.
Chapter 5 considers how Mughal monuments were again brought into the 
public sphere after independence and Partition in 1947. I examine the ideo-
logical rhetoric of Nehru and how it failed to frame these historical sites as 
secular spaces in the wake of the traumas of Partition and communal violence. 
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I next turn to Gandhi’s public efforts to put an end to the volatile situation 
and to violence by turning the Mughal monuments of Delhi into symbolic 
spaces of the Congress Party’s secular ordering. Gandhi managed to force this 
transformation through his final fast and various public events. However, his 
rhetoric and spatial practices, I argue, also indirectly veiled the truth of the 
social traumata facing both Hindus and Muslims, which remain a stain on 
the nation to this day.
How the resistant force of the stain returns to disrupt the national space of 
the Mughal monument is examined in chapter 6. I am concerned here with 
how the government’s practices of economic development, tourism, and pres-
ervation have functioned to sublimate the trauma of independence that these 
sites contain. The universal ethics of Indian secularism, best encapsulated by 
the motto “unity in diversity,” are rendered contradictory by the historicity of 
matters of preservation, corruption, and the critical spatial practices currently 
introduced to make these sites differential, egalitarian, and truly ethical.
I want to conclude here by stating that the study of the Mughal monument 
also tells an important secondary, indicative story. This is the story of Indian 
Muslim social identity and how it has been forged through its ambivalent 
relationships with the Mughal built environments since the decline of Mu-
ghal power. The epilogue provides a mise-en-scène of a lesser-known Mughal 
monument, the Fatehpuri Masjid of Old Delhi. Ordered by the material con-
tradictions of today’s India and the social struggles of the Muslim commu-
nity, the Fatehpuri Masjid has become what bell hooks calls a “homeplace,” 
the most ethical form of monument ordering.26 Beyond speaking to history, 
preservation, and tourism, this Mughal mosque stands as a monument to dif-
ference and creativity, one in which social pain is not sublimated but becomes 
an accepted force shaping the present realities and choices of people.
The study of Mughal monuments, and monuments in general, is essential 
to achieving a more complete grasp of Indian politics, society, and culture. 
For it is at these Indian sites that power seeks to legitimize itself time and 
again, but where it is also radically challenged, where new identities are forged, 
and alternate imaginings of the nation put forward. By providing a critical 
under standing of how the spaces of Indian heritage functioned in history, the 
current work adds to the historiographic and social science accounts of the 
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communal and secular ordering of today’s national landscape. The critical 
interrogation of the monument I perform here offers key insights into the 
complex ways we reckon with monuments and shows how this encounter af-
fects our lived reality. Without such knowledge we will forever be returning 
to these monuments, not knowing why, and leaving somewhat dissatisfied 
with the experience.
Fig 1: William Hodges, View of Benares with Aurangzeb’s Mosque, ca. 1781–82. Oil on 
canvas © British Library Board, Foster 94
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In late April of 1788 William Hodges exhibited his paint-
ing, View of Benares with Aurangzeb’s Mosque, in the Royal Academy (figure 
1). It can be seen in the famous print of the exhibition’s opening, hung “above 
the line” in the Great Room of Sommerset House (figure 2). In the center of 
the print stands the royal family, with King George III looking over to the left 
wall (figure 2a). If we follow his line of vision, it might take us to Hodges’s 
riverfront scene. Exhibited in the most prestigious space of the London art 
world, the painting presented a picturesque view of the never-before-seen In-
dian landscape, its architecture, nature, and people. The subject of the print, 
however, is obviously not Hodges’s work, but the spatial dynamics of the Great 
Room in which it was viewed. It was one of many paintings hung from floor 
to ceiling, creating a dizzying quilt of floating frames. Adding to the unruli-
ness of the exhibitionary space was the frenzy of the new art-going public to 
see, and to be seen viewing, the nation’s most eminent art. In this context the 
deeper meaning of the art would easily have been lost to the spectacle. To pre-
vent this sort of obfuscation and to fix the contingency of the exhibition to the 
national principle, the surveying eye/I of the king becomes operational. As the 
embodiment of the British people and the exemplar of tasteful viewing prac-
tice, his magisterial gaze and confident stance fix both the art and the subject 
into the greater symbolic order of the nation. It is through this context and 
this viewing practice that Hodges’s View of Benares with Aurangzeb’s Mosque 
comes to be signified as a British painting.
There is, however, another more submerged component to this visual expe-
rience. A person’s viewing of a picture is far from stable and unopposed, but 
is instead a highly fraught exercise of identification that occurs between the 
desiring eye and the lacking gaze. The beholder of Hodges’s Indian landscape, 
while considering the color, form, and control of the artist’s hand, would have 
sensed something more in a far-off corner: a dark spot or an unrecognized 
Fig 2: (Above) Pierre Antoine 
Martini, The Royal Family 
at the Royal Academy Exhibi-
tion, 1788. Engraving © V&A 
Images/Victoria and Albert 
Museum, London
Fig 2a (detail): (Right) Detail 
of Pierre Antoine Martini, 
The Royal Family at the Royal 
Academy Exhibition, 1788. 
Engraving © V&A Images/
Victoria and Albert Museum, 
London
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figure. To the late eighteenth-century British public this discordant element 
would have had the same resonance as the nefarious energy that possessed the 
newly minted “nabobs” as they tore through the social fabric of Great Britain. 
The picture contained a stain of the repressed knowledge of British aggres-
sion in India that rendered fictitious the transcendent and universal claims 
of its national ethos. In the picture, this stain is what Lacan called the “gaze,” 
the returning vision (of India) that transfixes the (British) subject and quietly 
devastates it with the truth that “there is no there, there.” Such voiceless forms 
of resistance are rarely represented in writing, historical or otherwise, subse-
quently causing a distorted picture of the unobstructed movement of power 
and its knowledge.
The study of the Mughal monument is informed by a similar conceptual 
predicament, in which only the ideological practices of its spatial ordering are 
critically considered and the resistance of the monument to this symboliza-
tion is left unexamined. I argue that this is a matter of the limited perspective 
of the full ontology of monumentality. In this chapter I examine poetry, pic-
turesque painting, and travel writings to reveal how, in the eighteenth century, 
new symbolic orders vied for the domination of Indian reality at the Mughal 
monument. I also reveal how the realities of subject formation and monumen-
tality resisted this ordering, causing crisis and conflict in the representations 
of the monument.
The Persistence of Memory and the Poetics of the Mughal Ruin
At the time the British obtained their territorial power in India in 1765, the 
Indian landscape was still feeling the effects of the political entropy of the 
Mughal state that had started after the death of the last great Mughal em-
peror, Aurangzeb, in 1707. Struggles over succession, the secession of terri-
tories, the corruption of nobles, and the torpidity of later emperors are the 
often-cited principal causes of the decline of Mughal authority. Hastening 
this decline were the periodic invasions of the Mughal capitals of Agra and 
Delhi. Between 1739, starting with the invasion of Nadir Shah, and ending 
in 1787 with Ghulam Qadir’s attack, Delhi was sacked by the armies of the 
Persians, Afghans, Marathas, Jats, Sikhs, and Rohillas. The residents of the 
northwestern empire, and particularly those of Delhi, were massacred, and 
those not killed were left impoverished. The Mughal Empire shrunk from an 
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area that stretched from Kashmir to the Kaveri River to the extent of  land be-
tween Palam and the Red Fort. The material conditions of the forts, palaces, 
mosques, and shrines the Mughals had built in their capital cities served as an-
other important index of their declining power. Some religious structures lost 
their imperial endowments (awqaf ) and fell into disrepair; others continued 
as they were, but without imperial oversight, they too lost the splendor of past 
centuries. The ruins and decay of these imperial buildings would become the 
principal subject of artists reflecting on the changing power relations in the 
Indian landscape and their place within it.
By the mid-eighteenth century power relations in India were no longer 
based on an imperial configuration but on provincial sovereignty. Power con-
tinued to be measured by the maintenance of armies and revenue collection, 
but it was dispersed among the regional kingdoms that took advantage of Mu-
ghal weakness. In 1765 the British East India Company became one of these 
regional rulers after accepting the diwan of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa from the 
Mughal emperor.1 All these new rulers in one way or another adopted aspects 
of Mughal culture and political procedure to legitimize their new power. In 
architectural terms this manifested in the grand building projects of the re-
gional rulers that outpaced the concomitant ruination of Mughal structures. 
In establishing their seats of power, these rulers abandoned old capitals, let 
them fall into ruin, or repurposed their stones. In the new capitals they com-
menced public works like bridges, roads, caravanserais, and markets to en-
sure the efficient movement of trade in their territories. The rulers also built 
palaces, congregational mosques, and shrines and laid down public gardens. 
The new built environments found in the capitals of Bengal, Hyderabad, and 
Oudh often combined Mughal spatial rituals and design with local ornamen-
tation, which helped indicate the ruler’s independence. This can be seen most 
clearly in the inclusion of the distinctive jharoka, or raised platform topped 
by a cupola, in the public audience halls of new palaces. The Mughal emperor 
sat in such an elevated seat for his daily durbar, or public audience, a practice 
essential to performing the political order and making visible relationships 
of power.
In addition to architectural emulation, Mughal power continued to be as-
serted through the nostalgic themes of Urdu poetry. When the finances of the 
Mughal court in Delhi began to dwindle, court poets sought new patronage 
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from regional rulers. Lucknow, the capital of Oudh, for example, became the 
foster city of poets, artisans, scholars, and Muslim jurists fleeing the devastat-
ing invasions of Mughal Delhi. Among the poets were Mir Hasan, Mir Taqi 
Mir (known as Mir), Mirza Muhammad Rafi’ Sauda, and Khan-i Arzu who 
found refuge in Nawab Asaf-ud-daula’s court. Poetry, art, and architecture 
flourished in Lucknow in the eighteenth century, and the city remained a 
religious and cultural center until the British annexation of Oudh in 1856. 
While other artists settled into their new employment in Lucknow, the poets 
of the Mughal court never accepted the city as the empire’s legitimate heir. 
Their resistance to the changing power structure expressed itself through the 
poetry of the shahrashob, or “lament of the fallen city.” The poets’ evocation 
of the memory of the Mughal city as a perfected space is nostalgic, and the 
description of its present state is maudlin in tone. When heard in the royal 
court setting, it would have produced a striking contrast to the well-known 
and more exuberant verse of the Persian poet Abu Talib Kalim (d. 1651), who 
wrote of the unequaled beauty of the Mughal cities a century earlier. For ex-
ample, in describing the Red Fort of Shahjahanabad, Delhi, Kalim writes:
How splendid is the tall fortress, its foundation in the skies!
The earth is honored in your shadow.
Such radiance your beauty has bestowed
That your shadow made a mirror of the ground.
Through you the land has come to know the heavens,
If not [for you], where would one be, where the other?
Through you the land has come to be revered in the world;
At times the father gains his name from the son.2
Kalim’s verse describing Delhi’s Red Fort is an indirect tribute to the great-
ness of Shah Jahan. It also brings the Mughal Empire into the orbit of the 
larger Persianate world, where it surpasses the progenitor of its culture, the 
Safavid court of Isfahan. The Red Fort is therefore a space that permits the 
Mughals to take their place among the greatest powers of  Islamic civilization. 
The shahrashob, a result of turbulent eighteenth-century India, represents the 
Mughal palace and greater city in a very different state. As a product of the 
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declining times it provides a richly textured picture of how the cultured Mus-
lim elite imbued the Mughal city with poetic symbolism to resist obliteration 
and to spiritually survive amid the shifting power relations of northern India.
The shahrashob came to India from Ottoman Turkey and Persia and be-
came an active genre after 1739, the year Nadir Shah sacked Delhi and turned 
what was then still a city of peace and prosperity into a scene of dystopian 
horror. In India the shahrashob was written in Urdu, which with the decline 
of the Mughal power displaced Persian as the language of court poetry. The 
turn to Urdu signaled India’s turn away from pan-Islamic or Persian culture.3 
The subject matter of shahrashob also changed after its adoption in India. 
In Persia and Turkey it was a humorous genre that used the city merely as a 
backdrop for mocking descriptions of urban youths and their occupations. In 
the Urdu variation of shahrashob the focus is directly on the city, the tone is 
more somber, and the verse is written in a direct and simpler style. The con-
tent of the Urdu shahrashob is characterized by an exaggerated nostalgia and 
despondency over the desperate state of the world. In the poetic figuration 
of Delhi, for example, the city’s former greatness is juxtaposed to its current 
state of ruin, evidenced by decrepit homes, empty mosques, decaying palaces, 
and dirty streets. The ruin in the shahrashob serves as a central metaphor of 
decline. Written by poets suffering through the material conditions of loss of 
status, wealth, and Mughal patronage, the shahrashob offers a view into how 
the Mughal city and its parts were reordered by the demands of eighteenth-
century social reality.
Most articulate on this theme of decline was the poet Mir, who left Delhi 
after Ahmad Shah Abdali, an Afghan invader, sacked the city in 1757. Taking 
up residence in Lucknow, which he found lacking in the stateliness of Delhi, 
Mir wrote of his beloved Mughal city: “A hard time I spent in Delhi — stiffen-
ing my heart to stone / No honor, no grace, no glory — ignominy [i]ntoned / 
I did not have a friend to counsel or console — desolate every home / Barren 
wastes stared in the face, I felt benumbed — weary and forlorn.”4 Earlier in 
the poem Mir elaborates on the city’s past perfection: “Delhi’s streets were 
not alleys but pages of a painting / Every face that appeared seemed like a 
masterpiece.”5 Having taken us on a walk through the beautiful streets of 
Delhi, which he likens to walking through a perfected miniature painting, 
Mir shows us what has become of this picture in the next few verses: “Thy gift, 
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that picturesque life / The heavens’ lack of sympathy has effaced all those im-
pressions.”6 The poet’s evocation of painting to describe Delhi’s streets is not 
just an elegant symbol but also functions as a framing device of the material 
conditions of a devastated city: the beauty of a miniature painting, whose per-
fection eludes words, signifies the vibrancy that was Delhi, now all but gone.
Another major poet who wrote on the ruins of  Delhi is Sauda. His verse 
has a satirical edge and is critical of the social and political decline of Delhi 
after the Persian invasions.7 Like Mir, he too witnessed Delhi’s ruin and uses 
the same metaphor of the erased picture: “Delhi, did you deserve all this? Per-
haps at one time, this city was the heart of a lover / It was wiped out as if it had 
been an ephemeral drawing.”8 The city is here cast as the lover, whose betrayal 
has cost the people the social order and cultural excellence they were used to.9 
Sauda’s satire focuses on the emptiness and ruins of the city.
If I would begin to do speech/poetry about the desolation of the city,
Then having heard it, the wits of the owl would take flight.
There is no house in which the jackal’s cry would not be heard.
If anyone goes in the evening to the mosque for prayers.
There’s no lamp there, except the “lamp of the ghoul.”
In no one’s house does a grinding-wheel or even so much as a stove  
  remain,
Among a thousand houses, perhaps in one house there burns a lamp.
It’s hardly a lamp! [Rather,] that house has a wound of grief for all the  
  [other] houses.
And among those houses, in every direction asses bray.
Where in the spring we used to sit and hear the hindol [raga].
They are ruined, those buildings — what can I say to you? — 
The sight of which used to remove hunger and thirst.
Now if we look, the heart would become disaffected with life.
Instead of roses, in the flower-beds there’s waist-high grass.
Here a pillar lies fallen, there an archway lies.
 . . . 
When did Jahanabad deserve this oppression?
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Not even a lamp is lit there, in a place where there was a chandelier,
The pride of mirror-chambers now lies fallen in ruins,
Tens of millions of hearts full of hope, became despairing.
From the houses ladies of the nobility have emerged,
They didn’t get an ordinary palanquin — they who used to be possessors 
   of fancy litters.10
Yet the representation of the ruin in the shahrashob provides more than docu-
mentary information about the decline of Delhi in the eighteenth century. 
The ruin also functioned in this poetry as a space of the poets’ subjective 
desire to preserve their Mughal identity and worldview and thus resist the new 
regional power structure.
In the poetical representations of Mir and Sauda the ruins of the Mughal 
city elevated the architectural space to an object of fantasy. More than an 
index of the political conditions of the period, the ruin also operated in the 
symbolic register to transform the subjectivity of the defeated Muslim com-
munity and to help it find its way back to order and reason. The principal cause 
of their suffering was attributed to God’s displeasure with the community of 
the faithful. For example, Sauda writes of empty mosques and of how they 
were now less valuable than mule posts.11 Carla Petievich explains his signifi-
cation of the empty mosque: “That Muslims should fail to say their prayers, 
thereby declining to identify themselves as the slaves of Allah, was the most 
fundamental breach they could make in their contract with the Almighty.”12 
Having once been the ruling class of most of India, a status bestowed by God, 
the elite Muslims now had to share this position with Hindus, Sikhs, and for-
eign Christians. A parallel loss of power had occurred internationally, as India 
could no longer claim an eminent place in the pan-Islamic world.
To help stay this rapid decline and loss of identity the poet introduced the 
nostalgic motif of the ruined Mughal city. The ruin in the shahrashob func-
tions to give order to the chaotic world, thus in much the same way as the 
Lacanian point de capiton, or “quilting point,” that holds down the floating 
signifiers of chaotic times and gives them an order and meaning.13 The poem 
uses the ruined Mughal city to center and stabilize the disoriented subject of 
eighteenth-century India. In this regard the shahrashob and its reiteration 
of the perfected city frames Mughal space as more than an empty ruin. It 
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instead stands as a symbolic site that thoughtfully veils the contradictions of 
the period through nostalgia and reaffirms Mughal power relations. The Mu-
ghal ruin in the shahrashob is thus a space helping the poet and his audience 
sublimate the traumas of the declining Mughal Empire and find meaning in 
and give structure to their lives.
Na’im Ahmad further explains that the representations of the shahrashob 
had social importance and states that although the poet identifies with the 
general sorrow and pain of the times, he is not powerless. Ahmad explains 
the restorative possibilities of shahrashob and tells what it can teach us about 
the worldview and historical struggles of Indian Muslims: “A look at the genre 
as a whole does not give an impression of throwing down one’s weapons in the 
face of difficulties, but rather evokes the courage to stand up firmly against 
unfavorable circumstances. The shahr-ashob teaches us forcefully about man’s 
ability to endure sorrow, and his unconquerable power of repelling disas-
ters.”14 Ahmad thus importantly suggests here that the ruins of  Mughal India 
were never completely abandoned. In the poet’s efforts to make sense of tragic 
times, preserve the memory of Mughal power, and offer a space to imagine a 
stable Muslim identity, the ruin becomes a pivotal space. More precisely, the 
ruined Mughal city serves to restore the fragmented and traumatized subject 
through an imagined relationship with the glorious past.
Not all Muslims agreed with the backward-looking poets and their long-
ing for the old ways of the Mughal city. While they shared with the poets the 
notion that Mughal decline resulted from God’s disfavor, they found differ-
ent solutions. Instead of identifying with the lost glories of bygone days, they 
sought religious reform. One such movement, led in the eighteenth century by 
the Sufi philosopher Shah Waliullah (1703–62) and his sons, was influenced 
by the reforms the Wahhabis had initiated in the Hijaz of the Arabian Pen-
insula. Waliullah called for the careful study of the Qu’ran and the hadith, or 
the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Mohammed. He also wanted the Indian 
Muslim community to identify solely with the ummah, or universal com-
munity of Muslims. Like the Wahhabis, Waliullah criticized the corruption 
of  Islam by the introduction of non-Islamic beliefs and rituals. His followers 
would translate this spatially by disavowing the veneration of the heterodox 
Sufi saints and the pilgrimage to their shrines.
In the eighteenth century many Sufi leaders lost Mughal financial support, 
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or awqaf, for the shrines and either sought alternative support from local rul-
ers or became self-sustaining through reformist programs. It was at this time 
that Waliulla, a follower of the Sufi order of  Naqshbandi, initiated his re-
structuring of Indian Islam. The schools founded after this movement, such 
as the Deoband and the Ahl-i Hadis, and the ulema or legal scholars they 
produced, increased their suspicion of the cult of shrines, casting them as seats 
of corruption and duplicity. Social unruliness was particularly associated with 
the festival of the urs, the commemoration of the death anniversary of the 
saint.15 In this context of reformist Islam, the ruination of the Sufi shrines 
and the decaying city signaled not the end of a golden age but the end of the 
era of Mughal debasement of Islam and heterodoxy: the shrines and decaying 
city were spaces at which to imagine Muslim renewal and a reorientation to 
the pure religion of the Arabian Peninsula.
The Sufi shrines, however, did not altogether go away in the eighteenth 
century. The descendents of the orders continued to attend to the spiritual 
needs of local worshippers, both Muslim and Hindu. Some, like the Chishti 
order, went through their own revival, placing a new emphasis on the shariat, 
or Islamic law.16 By the end of the eighteenth century, two general perspectives 
existed in Indian Islam regarding the Mughal era and the Sufi shrines built 
during Mughal rule. The reformists saw the shrine as an obstacle to their 
ultimate goal of uniting Indian Muslims with the international umma and 
cleansing it of all non-Islamic customs. The Sufi orders, on the other hand, 
continued to emphasize cultural syncretism and preserved the shrines of saints 
as the spatial axis on which their Islamic teachings and practice turned. Like 
the Mughal city and its architecture presented in the shahrashob, the shrines 
of Sufi leaders were also rendered critical spaces whose symbolization helped 
the Muslim community survive the tumult of the times and reorient itself.
Subject and Subjection: Hodges’s Encounter  
with the Mughal Monument
As the eighteenth century wore on, the poets of the shahrashob began to share 
the spaces of Mughal architecture with British artists. For the new British 
rulers, both the ruins and the still functional palaces, tombs, gardens, and 
mosques of the Great Mughal became spaces of desire, parallactic objects that 
continuously vacillated between affirming the ethics of colonial subjectivity 
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and rejecting its very possibility.17 Emerging from the gap between the two 
points of identity, the monument simultaneously represented the colonial 
Real — with its terror, unrestrained expansion, and unethical actions — and 
the colonial imaginary based on the natural progress of civilization, divine 
providence, and moral duty. Sara Suleri identifies the gap as the Indian sub-
lime, whose articulation she finds in the speeches of Burke. His speech in Par-
liament in support of Fox’s East India Bill that sought to place the East India 
Company under parliamentary control, for example, offers image after image 
of colonial terror and epistemological failure, making India unrepresentable by 
the usual methods of cataloguing, mapping, and inventory. As Suleri explains 
his rhetorical representation of the Indian sublime: “India as a historical real-
ity evokes the horror of sublimity, thus suggesting to the colonizing mind the 
intimate dynamic it already shares with aesthetic horror; such intimacy pro-
vokes the desire to itemize and to list all the properties of the desired object; 
the list’s inherent failure to be anything other than a list causes the operation 
of sublimity to open into vacuity, displacing desire into the greater longevity 
of disappointment.”18 It is important to note here that in Burke’s rhetoric the 
sublime sanctions rather than negates colonial expansion. His pointing out 
of the current failure to know India does not mean that the British should 
stop trying to know it, and indeed he wanted the British not to leave India 
but to govern it more ethically. Burke’s strategy of colonial rule was one orga-
nized around the essence of failure and lack. The Mughal ruin arises from this 
epistemological tension of wanting to understand, control, and rule India and 
from the knowledge that behind these efforts always lies the impossibility of 
Real, that will not underwrite the symbolization of colonial representations 
but that nonetheless sanctions the effort to find ever more precise operations 
of knowledge as ethical endeavors. The void or gap that results from the Real’s 
objection to the symbolization of Indian architectural spaces will thus be per-
ceived by the colonial artist as the monumental lack, which only he or she can 
complete through picturesque imagery and writing.
The clearest representation of the volatile encounter with Mughal monu-
ments occurs in the pictorial and written representations of  William Hodges. 
The son of a blacksmith, Hodges apprenticed with Richard Wilson, the land-
scape painter and founding member of the Royal Academy. His first impor-
tant appointment was as the commissioned artist of Captain Cook’s second 
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voyage to the South Pacific. On his return he applied to the East India Com-
pany to travel to India, hoping to find similar success in depicting foreign 
landscapes and people there. He arrived in Madras in 1780 and one year later 
came to work under the patronage and protection of Warren Hastings, the 
governor general. For the following three years he toured northern India, 
sketching its landscape and noting geographic details. The paintings he made 
from these sketches would later earn him membership in the Royal Acad-
emy, but he was quickly eclipsed by more objectively disposed picturesque 
artists like the uncle-and-nephew team, Thomas and William Daniell. Art 
historians who have studied Hodges focus on establishing the nascence of a 
colonial aesthetic in his art and often represent his Indian landscapes as the 
visual and ideological translation of the English picturesque landscape style.19 
My aim is different. I want to examine Hodges’s encounter with the Mughal 
monument as it was informed by the material realities of eighteenth-century 
British India and the ideological process of framing the Indian landscape. The 
questions I seek to answer are how the monuments structured his reckoning 
with the Indian Real, and, more critically, how the process of identification 
and symbolization of his art produced a fundamentally different perception 
of the Mughal monument from that of Burke.
Hodges spent four years in India, from 1780 through 1783, but most of 
the firsthand information we receive about his tours of the country comes 
from his travel journal, published in 1793. It is vital to note that the book, 
written ten years after his return to London, speaks directly to the current de-
bates of colonial policy and the trial of Hastings for committing high crimes 
and misdemeanors while governor general in India. The style of the text is 
divided between the spontaneous, ethnographic, topographic, and reflexive 
writing of the monumental encounter and the distant, philosophical, and dis-
interested meditations of an artist-philosopher. The two written modes are 
structured by the parallactic view through which the nondiscursive encounter 
with the Mughal monument is first mediated in its material existence; only 
later — ten years later, in fact — does it become signified by colonial ideology. 
That Hodges preserves both moments in his published book renders his nar-
rative disjointed and difficult. At the same time this disorderly text provides 
us with a rare glimpse into how Mughal monuments were produced between 
the artist’s encounter with their raw or sublime state, causing awe and desire, 
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and his idealized encounter when he retroactively inserts himself and the sites 
into the symbolic order of colonial rule.
The Terror and Tyranny of a Mughal Mosque
Among the many sites that Hodges visited, the one that most exemplifies the 
parallactic view of the Mughal monument is Aurangzeb’s mosque in Benares. 
After destroying the Vishvanath temple in 1669, Aurangzeb, the last of the 
great Mughal emperors, ordered the Gyanvapi mosque to be raised in its place. 
The original temple, built by Raja Man Singh of Amber, provided the founda-
tion and building materials for Aurangzeb’s monumental construction. The 
mosque was meant to project across the otherwise Hindu cityscape the power 
of the Mughal state and the religion that it identified with and in whose name 
it ruled. But the choice of destroying a Hindu temple to construct a mosque 
was most certainly made to psychologically punish Jai Singh II, the grand-
son of Raja Man Singh, for offering succor to Maratha Shivaji, the Mughal’s 
archenemy.20
The morphology of the mosque, defined by tall minarets and domes, thus 
had two principal imperatives: to proclaim the presence of Mughal rule in 
India and to identify this rule with Islam. When Hodges came to Benares, 
the mosque, which continued to be used by local Muslims, proclaimed to the 
new British power the unsettling fact of continued Mughal influence over the 
landscape. Hodges’s paintings and subsequent writing of the mosque done 
in London veil this reality and represent the British as ethical actors in an 
un ethical landscape, and Aurangzeb’s mosque, while awe inspiring, was ulti-
mately symbolized as an example of Muslim depravity. This well-ordered rep-
resentation of the Mughal mosque, however, belies the truth of how Hodges 
originally encountered it. Shortly after his arrival in Benares, Hodges wit-
nessed the trauma of war that followed Governor General Hastings’s arrest of 
Raja Chait Singh, the zamindar of Benares, for not paying the extra tribute 
above the amount agreed on in a prior treaty. The raja’s troops came to rescue 
him, killing British soldiers and Indian sepoys. A war quickly ensued that 
eventually led to the absorption of Raja Chait Singh’s lands into the Com-
pany’s dominion. Hastings would later be tried and impeached for this and 
other similarly impulsive acts that would be described in dramatic detail for 
the British public.
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In light of these events, Hodges’s representations of Benares are informed 
by his aesthetic goals of capturing the Indian geography in the idiom of Brit-
ish landscape art and the sublimation of his experience of a war instigated by 
his patron. In his journal he states his great desire to see the sacred Hindu 
city, for here he would for the first time be “able to contemplate the pure Hin-
doo manners, arts, buildings, and customs, undepraved by any intermixture 
with the Mahomedans.”21 Hodges then notes that “the unhappy events that 
immediately succeeded frustrated, for the present, those designs.”22 These 
words present the basic outline of British perception of India and the inter-
nal crisis of such perception that will come to destabilize any representation 
of the Mughal monument. The symbolic ordering of the Indian landscape, 
traumatically interrupted by the realities of colonial rule and war, will shape 
Hodges’s encounter with Aurangzeb’s mosque and inform the painting and 
writings that follow with ambivalence. After another ill-fated battle in the 
town of Ramnagur, the raja’s soldiers turned against the British in Benares, 
and Hodges was ordered to evacuate, “leaving behind me the whole of my 
baggage, excepting my drawings, and a few changes of linen.”23 He remained 
in Chunar — a town twenty miles upriver from Benares — until peace was 
restored. Hodges devotes the remainder of his first two Benares chapters to 
descriptions of the fighting, records of the number of deaths, and an account 
of the Company’s final victory.
What Hodges elides in this written report, however, is the cause of the war 
and the fact that it resulted from economic urgencies wrought by the shifting 
power relations in India that saw British influence spread without reason or 
restraint outside the territories of the presidencies. Spurred on by the demand 
to draw a profit for the Company after the costly wars with Hyder Ali,’ Hast-
ings demanded extra tribute from allied zamindars or landholders. Back in 
London, politicians like Charles Fox, William Pitt, and Burke saw in these 
acts evidence that more government oversight of the East India Company 
was needed. Interestingly enough, when making his case, Burke entered his 
view of the Indian monument as an ethical sign to contrast the arbitrary and 
spontaneous misjudgments of the British in India. As he stated in 1783 in sup-
port of Fox’s East India Bill: “Every rupee of profit made by an Englishman 
is lost forever to India. With us are no retributory superstitions, by which a 
foundation of charity compensates, through ages, to the poor, for the rapine 
Breathing New Life into Old Stones | 33
and injustice of a day. With us no pride erects stately monuments which repair 
the mischiefs which pride had produced, and which adorn a country out of 
its own spoils. England has erected no churches, no hospitals, no palaces, no 
schools; England has built no bridges, made no high roads, cut no navigations, 
dug out no reservoirs. Every other conqueror of every other description has left 
some monument, either of state or beneficence, behind him.”24 Burke might 
easily have been referring to the practice of religious endowments or awqaf of 
Muslim rulers, which he saw as still operative and as a testament to the endur-
ance of Mughal authority and its spatial practices. Company rule, in contrast, 
based on unethical commercial practices and power gains, ruined the land-
scape and erected no monuments or other structures to serve the public good.
Hodges saw the same monuments very differently. Due to his emplacement 
in the power relations of British India and to his unquestioning support of 
Company rule in India, he regarded the monument not as an ethical symbol 
of Indian rule but as a sign of Indian lack (civilizational, political, economic, 
etc.).25 He allocated an entire separate chapter to this perception, in which he 
locates the Mughal monument as the principal site to fathom this lack. All 
around the monument Hodges delineates the limits of colonial perceptibility 
and presents his own symbolic meaning of the various forms he encounters 
in the landscape now under Company rule. In his paintings and prints of the 
monuments, the real terror of war, the unbridled use of power, and resulting 
suffering will be suppressed and sublimated in the Mughal ruin. Conversely, 
the same suppressed reality becomes evident in Hodges’s prose when it appears 
in the illogical turns the narrative takes as he attempts the impossible inser-
tion of Indian architecture into the symbolic order of  British colonialism.
At the start of chapter 4, Hodges reintroduces Benares as a city that is inter-
esting for only one reason: “The same manners and customs prevail amongst 
these people at this day, as in the remotest period that can be traced in history: 
and in no instance of religious or civil life have they admitted of any innova-
tions from foreigners.”26 This idea of timelessness is pictorially represented 
in the painting he exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1788 (figure 1). The 
Hindus are presumably the small figures moving about on the ghats above 
the river, engaged in everyday activities; the architecture itself is crumbling 
and reveals no trace of modern improvements. More telling is the rendering 
of the climate; as one reviewer in the Morning Post noted: “This picture is 
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stiff and hard; there is no appearance of air throughout, and it is full as cold 
and heavy as anything we have seen of this artist.”27 The lack of life and im-
provement that Hodges projects onto the cityscape of Benares is represented 
as climatic stagnation. In this view British power is cast as not arbitrary but 
ethical. It is destined to fulfill Indian lack by protecting India from the forces 
of unethical tyrants and by ushering in the winds of progress. The illegal an-
nexation of the city from the Hindu Raja Chait Singh is thus transformed in 
Hodges’s painting into a fantasy of the Hindu city’s desire for British presence 
and protection.28
Having set up the temporal frame, Hodges then begins to describe the 
physical attributes of the city distinguished by tall buildings and horizontal 
ghats lining the river. He interestingly mentions the construction of gardens 
along the river that were meant for enjoying the cool breeze of the evening air. 
These structures, Hodges explains, were “erected by the charitable contribu-
tions of the wealthy, for the benefit of the public.” The positive observation of 
the construction of public gardens is then quickly mitigated by the introduc-
tion of “a considerable Mahomedan mosque” raised “by the most intolerant 
and ambitious of human beings, the Emperor Aurungzebe, who destroyed 
a magnificent temple of the Hindoos on this spot, and built the present 
mosque, said of the same extent and height as the building he destroyed.”29 
Hodges proceeds to describe the streets and houses of Benares. He completes 
his description of the city with the outlying areas. Amid the distant rubble he 
spies the remains of a Hindu temple and takes the opportunity to iterate his 
core assertion about Muslim culture: “Surrounding the city are many ruins of 
buildings, the effects of Mahomedan intolerance.”30 Hodges’s framing of the 
ontological field of northern India now becomes clear. It is structured around 
the Mughal monument: the Gyanvapi mosque becomes a point de capiton that 
interpellates the British subject, who then retroactively signifies the mosque 
by way of colonial ideology. After the process is complete, Hodges becomes 
an ideological subject of the mosque, and for its part the mosque is turned 
into a fantasy space of Indian loss that desires fulfillment through the British 
subject. The mosque and the man are now connected and mutually signifying.
Yet this retroactive process of signification produces its own residue, what 
Slavoj Žižek calls “the objectal remnant of the signifying operation.”31 In 
Hodges’s text and paintings of the Mughal monument the objectal remnant 
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is the excess of its materiality that cannot be represented yet points out the 
truth of British colonialism: that the current activities of the British — the 
ousting of native rulers — ultimately do not differ from those of the Muslim 
tyrants of the past; and that greed and ambition can be found in all people 
no matter their place of birth, skin color, or religious identification. It is this 
unspeakable truth that haunts Hodges’s images and texts and renders them 
ambivalent representations of the Mughal monument. 
The Melancholy and Horizons of Mughal Agra 
The vicissitudes and shifting power relations of the eighteenth century also 
shaped the Mughal city and architecture of Agra, where the poets of the shah-
rashob and the artists of British colonialism intersect. Like Delhi, Agra suf-
fered loss of trade, violence, and ruin at different times in the eighteenth cen-
tury. As the poet Nazir Akbarabadi (1735–1830), known popularly as Nazir, 
writes of the city’s status between 1780 and 1781: “Be they Noblemen or ar-
tisans, all are helpless for want of livelihood / The wind of disaster seems to 
have blown away everything.”32 Of the city’s once beautiful riverfront gardens 
he writes: “All the gardens in Agra are lying desolate / Without thorns, not 
to speak of fruits and flowers / Fruit trees stand scorched and dried and alleys 
covered with dust / In short, all are in the grip of devastating autumn.”33 The 
desolation Nazir describes followed the great famine of 1780 that lasted to 
1784. Additionally, the decline of the noble classes of Agra is indexed in his 
verse about the dried-up gardens, as it was they who planted these gardens and 
built pavilions along the Jumna River. The trading classes and bankers actu-
ally prospered during this period of unrest, and commerce continued to grow 
in Agra. Only the mosques and tombs that had imperial endowments contin-
ued to function and meet the needs of the local population and of pilgrims. 
The shifting demographics, Agra’s marginal status, the material ruin of the 
built environments of the old Mughal noble classes, and the new growth in 
trade made the city a heterogeneous urban landscape, defined simultaneously 
by decline and productivity.
Hodges and Mir both represent Agra through their respective artistic idi-
oms, Hodges through the picturesque and Mir through the shahrashob. This 
section will consider how Hodges’s and Mir’s encounters with the city were 
structured according to their respective tropes of decline. Their writing and 
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art veil the multiplicity of Agra’s Mughal monuments. As Lefebvre describes 
the effects of the symbolic operation that they enact: “The world of images 
and signs exercises a fascination, skirts or submerges problems, and diverts at-
tention from the ‘real’ — i.e., from the possible. While occupying space, it also 
signifies space, substituting a mental and therefore abstract space for spatial 
practice — without, however, doing anything really to unify those spaces that 
it seems to combine in the abstraction of signs, so the produced differences 
are supplanted in advance by differences which are induced — and reduced to 
signs.”34 As we will see, in their encounter with the diversity of the Mughal 
city of Agra, Mir and Hodges abstract its monuments into signs of decline and 
ruin that veil the spatial practices of the mosques, shrines, and tombs they seek 
to describe. This is why their representations meet resistance both internally, 
from the monument’s refusal of the symbolic ordering of both colonialism 
and the shahrashob, and externally, from the contending aesthetic practices 
that emphasize and celebrate the productive, differential nature of Agra and 
its spatial practices.
Hodges reached the outskirts of Agra on 23 February 1783 in the company 
of Major James Brown and his troops. At this point the artist had been in 
India for almost four years. He had trekked back and forth across the terri-
tory in and around the British diwan, but it was not until his tour with Brown 
that Hodges ventured into a land peripheral to British influence. Brown was 
sent into the Mughal heartland by Hastings to gain a foothold in the emperor 
Shah Alam’s greatly divided court and to drive out Maratha influence there. 
The power of the Great Mughal, while nominally honored, was understood 
as fragmented along many factions and open to intrigue. Along with the Jats, 
Marathas, and Afghans, the English circled the court in Delhi, ready to make 
use of any clear opening to gain influence. It was in the accompaniment of 
this mission that Hodges came to Agra, and once again his actions and goals 
would be informed by the demands of military conquest and the desire to 
expand British colonial power. The attempt to weaken the emperor’s power 
would be represented by the British back home as unethical. Of the twenty-
two charges Burke and his colleagues brought against Hastings, the second 
charge concerned the continuous mistreatment and impoverishment of Shah 
Alam that began with Hastings’s denial of imperial tribute in 1772.35 Hastings 
for his part defended his actions as appropriate to the context and claimed 
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that he performed them to protect the Company’s territorial and business 
interests, which the ineffectual Mughal emperor jeopardized.
Hodges would help Hastings build this case through the exhibition of 
his representations of the Mughal heartland with its monuments in ruin. 
However, as in Benares, these representations must be understood as retro-
actively signified by the ideology of British colonialism. While on the ground 
in Agra, standing in the midst of the Mughal monuments, Hodges would 
have witnessed the material decline of the Mughal Empire, but he could not 
have missed the concurrent continuation of its culture in the activities at the 
tombs, mosques, and other shrines that continued to be visited by both Hin-
dus and Muslims. In his representations of the Mughal monuments, he sup-
pressed the spatial practices in the sign of ruin, fragmenting the landscape 
along the lines of the Mughal past and the empty present and foreclosing on 
the possibility of the city’s rebirth. These practices do not totally disappear 
but leave traces in the text. As Michel de Certeau explains: “But whatever this 
new understanding of the past holds to be irrelevant — shards created by the 
selection of material, remainders left aside by an explication — comes back, 
despite everything, on the edges of discourse or in its rifts and crannies: ‘re-
sistances,’ ‘survivals,’ or delays discreetly perturb the pretty order of a line of 
‘progress’ or a system of interpretation.”36 Therefore the spatial practices that 
kept Agra’s monuments animate were not definitively erased from Hodges’s 
representations. The indelible ambivalence of the monumental sign threaten 
to expose the history imposed by colonial power as a fiction, as no more than 
a rhetorical device holding no claim to the truth. In Hodges’s text this threat 
manifests itself in the iteration of the Mughal monument as nothing more 
than an empty space of a distant and irretrievable past.
This spatial operation, whereby the multiplicity of Agra is submerged 
under the sign of ruin, is demonstrated in Hodges’s visit to and subsequent 
representation of Akbar’s tomb in Sikandra. His visit begins with his enter-
ing the garden through the main gateway, a monumental structure decorated 
with multicolored marble and two stories of arched windows. He descends 
into the garden and sees Akbar’s tomb through the trees lining the pathway 
leading to it. Hodges describes the hot sun and its blazing rays on the tomb’s 
surface as producing a sublime and ineffable effect, “a glare of splendour al-
most beyond the imagination of an inhabitant of these northern climates to 
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conceive.”37 The tomb is then described in great detail, lending credibility to 
his representation. Desirous to see the sarcophagus, he meets “an old Mol-
lah,” presumably the mutawalli (caretaker) of the tomb, who unlocks the en-
trance for him. This man leads Hodges into the inner chamber, where he is 
confronted with the truth of Akbar, “an Emperor, whose great actions have 
resounded through the world” and whom Hodges, in contradiction to his 
usual tropes of ruin and decay, acknowledges to be “still held in veneration.”38 
The persistence of the memory of and reverence for Akbar in the everyday 
life of Agra, which Hodges is forced to recognize, resists the historicizing 
gaze that would otherwise render the site a ruin. But he is quick enough to 
cover the gap between his own symbolism and the spatial practices of the tomb 
through an immediate moralizing description of what he sees after climbing 
to the top of the tomb’s gateway minaret and looking out across the landscape: 
“From the summit of the minarets in the front . . . a spectator’s eye may range 
over a prodigious circuit of country, not less than thirty miles in a direct line, 
the whole of which is flat, and filled with ruins of ancient grandeur: the river 
Jumna is seen at some distance, and the glittering towers of Agra. This fine 
country exhibits, in its present state, a melancholy proof of the consequences 
of a bad government, of wild ambition, and the horrors attending civic dis-
sensions; for when the governors of this country were in plenitude of power, 
and exercised their rights with wisdom, from the excellence of its climate, 
and some degree of industry, it must have been a perfect garden; but now all 
is desolation and silence.”39 This sorrowful description of the monumental 
landscape of Agra, one of the oldest Mughal capitals, along with a graphic 
representation of the monumental gate of Akbar’s tomb (figure 3), veil the 
spatial practices at the site under the trope of ruin. Although figures are pre-
sented walking into the tomb and sitting around it, that they are diminished 
by the broken architectural ornaments reaffirms Mughal demise rather than 
survival — forestalling any onset of guilt over British trespasses on the realm 
of the emperor’s authority.
The Taj Mahal produces a deeper crisis in Hodges’s narrative of  Mughal ruin-
ation. With money coming from revenues of land endowed to the tomb by Shah 
Jahan himself, the site did not fall into ruin like other structures in its vicinity. 
At the Taj Mahal the spatial practices of prayer, veneration, and monument pres-
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ervation put in place by Shah Jahan continued. The caretakers Hodges describes 
“appear most orderly and decent,” differing from others he had encountered.40 
The efficient custodians, working fountains, well-maintained gardens, and 
the architectural masterpiece of the tomb itself produced a tableau of sublime 
beauty that resisted Hodges’s symbolic order of Mughal decline and decay more 
than any other monument he encountered. The tomb’s undiminished presence, 
Hodges remarks, was due to “the lands allotted for the support of the building 
not being dismembered from it,”41 a clear acknowledgment of the endurance 
of Mughal charitable endowments. The striking beauty of the tomb cannot be 
contained by Hodges’s architectural categories and thus forces him to abstract 
it even further from the surrounding landscape, signifying it as an exceptional 
space, separate from all other Mughal monuments. As he writes: “The center 
building is in a perfect state; but all those which surround it bear strong marks 
of decay.”42 The spatial practices that explain the persistence of the Taj Mahal’s 
Fig 3: J. Brown after William Hodges, A View of the Gate of the Tomb of the Emperor 
Akbar at Secundrii, 1786. Engraving © British Museum
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preservation (that it was attached to the charitable lands left by a munificent 
Muslim ruler to maintain his memory) is again suppressed, and the ethereal 
beauty of the monument is all that comes to signify its space in Hodges’s text.
Both Akbar’s tomb and the Taj Mahal could be said to contain within their 
space the monumental Real that refused Hodges’s symbolization of decline. 
The Real and the survival of Mughal spatial practices work to “discreetly per-
turb the pretty order of a line of ‘progress’ or a system of interpretation” in 
the artist’s text and image.43 Spatial practices that menace the text also mark 
the place of the differential; as Certeau further explains, they “symbolize a 
return of the repressed, that is, a return of what, at a given moment, has be-
come unthinkable in order for a new identity to become thinkable.”44 Thus the 
ideological impossibility of Mughal spaces rendered them to be more than ab-
stract spaces of Mughal decline, as a pure ideological reading of  Hodges’s art 
would have them appear. On the contrary, Hodges’s pictures and writing were 
inflected by the heterogeneity of Agra, where materiality intersected with 
memory to produce the city as a differential space, a space of corporal experi-
ence. Through his visit to Agra, his march up the minarets, his treks through 
the ruins, and his visits to tombs, Hodges confronted the spatial practices of 
Mughal India. Traces of that contradictory confrontation suppressed in his 
representations return in the anxious iteration of the trope of Mughal ruin.
A similar practice of the suppression of the spatial practices of Agra and of 
its monuments takes place when Mir comes to the city in 1763. He too uses 
melancholy and memory to perceive the city, much as he did with Delhi, in a 
state of decline. As he writes of his impression of the city in his autobiography:
Two or three times I walked through the city end to end and met with 
its scholars, Sufis and poets. But I did not find any person to talk to who 
could comfort my restless heart. I said to myself, “Allah be praised! This is 
the same city whose every street once had [its share of] Gnostics; perfect 
masters; scholars; poets; writers; sages; jurists; dialecticians; philosophers; 
Sufis; scholars of the Hadith; school teachers; dervishes; spiritual men-
tors; mullas; Qur’an memorisers; Qur’an reciters; imams of mosques and 
those who called to the prayers, as wells as madrasas, mosques, hospices, 
abodes of faquirs, inns for travellers, family homes and gardens. But now I 
see not one place where I can sit and enjoy myself, and I find not one man 
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whose company I may share.” All I saw was a terrifying wasteland. And so 
I grieved and returned [after] I had spent four months in the city of my ori-
gin. I left with my eyes awash with tears of longing and reached the forts of 
Suraj Mal.45
In Mir’s description, Agra’s ruins serve the same function as the ruins of 
Delhi, to keep the memory of the city’s former greatness alive as a means to 
resist the spatial practices and power relations of the present. The extent of 
Mir’s suppression of Agra’s life, its flux and energy under his trope of decline, 
will be observable when I discuss the poetry of  Nazir below. The crucial point 
I am making here is that both Hodges’s and Mir’s representations are aligned 
with the powers of the eighteenth century, and both want to present their 
patrons, the East India Company and the Mughals, respectively, as ethical. 
To create a pleasing prospect, the spatial practices of Agra — the brutal truth 
of power, of Mughal decline and British ascendancy — were suppressed in the 
poetic and pictorial representations of the landscape.
Fanny Parkes: Performing Difference in Agra’s Mughal Spaces
Both Hodges and Mir erase the multiplicity of Agra through the tropes of 
Mughal ruin and nostalgia. Their creative processes, shaped by the distinct 
power relations and processes of identification of Delhi and the British diwan, 
veiled the antagonism between their symbolization of Mughal space that frag-
ments the built environment into past and present, as well as the spatial prac-
tices that continue to unify and signify it. Hodges work in Agra has been 
critiqued as aesthetically unsuccessful due to the difficulty of representing the 
monument in the style and mode of British landscape art. Giles Tillotson 
remarks that the awkwardness of Hodges’s scenes of the Taj Mahal resulted 
from the limitations of the picturesque style he employed: “Quite apart from 
the symmetry and formality which it shares with many other Mughal build-
ings, every salient quality of the design powerfully disqualifies it: the material 
is smooth, the colour unified, large surfaces are plain, and its perfect finish is a 
defiant challenge to decay.”46 While this stylistic conflict is certainly present, 
a crumbling ruin being much better suited for the picturesque style, the prob-
lem of representing the Taj Mahal must also be linked to the persistence of 
Mughal spatial practices that contradicted Hodges’s symbolism of the decay 
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of Mughal India. The Taj Mahal functioned as a social space whose practices 
and ordering were maintained indefinitely by the emperor’s charitable endow-
ment that had supported the veneration of the tombs, regular prayer, garden-
ing, and restoration of the Taj Mahal since the structure was completed. Both 
the Taj Mahal and even Akbar’s tomb were living monuments whose space 
not only ensured the persistence of these sites in the lives of Agra’s inhabit-
ants but also connected them to the economy, rhythms, and everyday life of 
the rest of the city. As such, they refused to lend themselves to picturesque 
perceptions and categorizations.
Not all artists reduced the multiplicity of Agra into signs of ruin and lack. 
Some saw the waning status of Agra not as a difficulty but as an opportunity 
to explore the creative possibilities its sites held. They used the spaces of the 
Taj Mahal, the gardens, the bazaar, and other sites to recreate themselves, to 
celebrate everyday life, and to engage with the spatial practices that informed 
it. Two artists that offer such a view of the multiplicity of Mughal monumen-
tal space are Parkes and Nazir.
Fanny Parkes was the wife of a lower-level servant of the East India Com-
pany and lived in India between 1822 and 1846. Not taking to life in the 
company’s service, Parkes routinely struck out on her own and crossed India 
on horseback and by riverboat. Fluent in Urdu, respectful of Indian history 
and customs, and constantly in pursuit of picturesque scenery, she entered 
the space of Mughal palaces, tombs, and gardens, joining in native practices 
whenever possible. Writers of women’s space in British India who have studied 
Parkes’s travel narratives focus principally on her text and its symbolic order-
ing of space.47 These writers abstract the geographical and monumental mate-
riality of the landscape that Parkes reckoned with into an idealized construct 
of gender and colonialism. Sara Suleri, for example, views Parkes’s encounter 
with the Indian landscape in this way: “Parks’s picturesque dehistoricizes the 
subcontinent into an amorphously aesthetic space.”48 The starting point of 
most postcolonial writing on gender and colonial space is the symbolic or tro-
pological constitution of this space, that is, space that already comes disposed 
as a picturesque art object for the subject. Suleri’s assessment that “the shrines 
that Fanny Parks seeks out are already relics, experiences to be represented 
with an elegiac acknowledgment of their vacated power,”49 is predicated on 
this assumption. However, Parkes’s accounts of her visits to the Mughal pal-
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aces and tombs not only contradict such a representation but also provide us 
with a chance to see how these sites can become radically open spaces of social 
ordering and resistance in the colonial era.
Parkes’s visits to the women’s quarters, or zenana, of the Mughal palace 
in Delhi and to the Taj Mahal were, as we will see, unique for her time and 
gender, and her description of these visits resists the symbolization of colo-
nial or even postcolonial ideological orders. Unafraid to point out — and at 
times celebrate — the lived spaces of these monuments, or to grieve their slow 
decay, Parkes’s writings provide a striking contrast to Hodges’s and should 
certainly not be regarded as the repetition “in diminution proportions of the 
male sublime.”50
Parkes’s vision of Indian life focuses strongly on the status of women, the 
present state of architectural ruins, and religious customs. Her writings offer 
a rare blend of visual description, historical explanation, and social critique. 
This triangulated narrative is apparent in Parkes’s portrayal of the zenana in 
the Red Fort in Delhi. She describes the women’s quarters as “mal propre [not 
very clean],” the fountains of a “superb hall” as not working and filled with 
black water from the kitchen drains. She then remarks on the relative beauty 
of the women in the zenana, “there be two or three handsome women and all 
the rest remarkably ugly.”51 Finally she writes of the gifts she received as she 
departed: two necklaces of jasmine flowers and a bag of spices. Parkes was later 
chastised by the British authorities for accepting these presents, but she knew 
that this gift giving was a custom, and she herself offered one gold mohur, or 
coin, in return. What she goes on to write about her time in the palace is very 
telling of her particular sensitivity to the pathos of the exchange: “Look at the 
poverty, the wretched poverty of these descendents of the emperors! In former 
times strings of pearls and valuable jewels were placed on the necks of depart-
ing visitors. When the Princess Hyat-ool-Nissa Begum in her fallen fortunes 
put the necklace of freshly-gathered white jasmine flowers over my head, I 
bowed with as much respect as if she had been the Queen of the universe. 
Others may look upon these people with contempt, I cannot; look at what 
they are, at what they have been!”52 Unlike Company servants and British 
historians, who looked down on the Mughals in their declining years, Parkes 
acknowledges their authority, which in her eyes remains undiminished. The 
Red Fort and the private quarters of the palace are represented as spaces 
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enlivened with the memory of Mughal culture and practices. They are not the 
dominated spaces of British power or the empty shells her male counterparts 
represent.53
Parkes’s visit to the Taj Mahal in 1835 illustrates more precisely how her 
participation in the spatial practices of the Mughal monument structured her 
understanding of these spaces. Her written narrative is a heterogeneous rep-
resentation comprising a description of the tomb and its history as well as of 
its present use by the Muslim community: “The Musulmans who visit the Taj 
lay offerings of money and flowers both on the tombs below and the cenotaphs 
above; they also distribute money in charity, at the tomb, or at the gate, to the 
fakirs.”54 She represents the relationship of the Taj Mahal with the rest of Agra 
in her portrayal of the festival of Eid held both outside the great gateway and 
inside the first courtyard of the tomb complex. She describes the diversity of 
the scene: “Crowds of gaily-dressed and most picturesque natives were seen in 
all directions passing through the avenue of fine trees and by the side of the 
fountains to the tomb: they added great beauty to the scene, whilst the eye of 
taste turned away pained and annoyed by the vile round hats and stiff attire of 
the European gentlemen, and the equally ugly bonnets and stiff and graceless 
dresses of the English ladies.”55 Parkes is struck by the oddity of the British 
in this scene, where it reveals their estrangement from such lively contexts in 
which tradition, history, and religion commingle. The spatial practices that 
give meaning to the space unsettle the ideological symbolization of the monu-
ment as an empty ruin that Hodges and other picturesque artists represented 
in their work.
The radical dimension of the Taj Mahal that Parkes captures is described 
by Lefebvre as a monument’s open horizon of meaning, “a specific or indefi-
nite multiplicity of meanings, a shifting hierarchy in which now one, now an-
other meaning comes momentarily to the fore, by means of — and for the sake 
of — a particular action.”56 Through her sensory experience with the space, 
Parkes was in sympathy with the spatial practices of the monument itself. In 
the context of the festival and party at the Taj Mahal, the monument becomes 
a differential space whose lived realities and practices contradict the ideologi-
cal ordering of the dominant power.
Parkes’s writing of the physical upkeep of the Taj Mahal and its constant 
renewal by its caretakers also resists the symbolic order of British power and 
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the trope of Mughal ruin. “The marble is cleaned every year and kept in a 
state of perfect purity and repair. Constant attention is requisite to remove the 
grass and young trees that shoot forth in any moist crevice: the birds carry the 
seeds of the peepal tree to the roof, and the young trees shoot forth, injuring 
those buildings that are in repair while they impart great beauty to ruins.”57 
Parkes does not end her visit to the Taj Mahal without performing an act 
of communion with its female occupants. She goes to the less visited tombs 
inside the Taj Mahal complex, the tomb of Akbarabadi Begum, from which 
she takes away a piece of the fallen red stone, and of Fatehpuri Begum, made 
of white marble. As a parting gesture she follows the local custom, practiced 
by both Hindus and Muslims, of leaving rupees and roses at the cenotaph of 
Shah Jahan’s wife, Mumtaz Mahal. This gesture, she points out, brought her 
in “favour in the eyes of the attendants.” To express their respect they in turn 
offered Parkes bouquets of flowers and turned on the fountains as she walked 
through the gardens and kept them on until she left. The sight of a British 
woman showing deference to the customs of the tomb and recognizing it as a 
historical Muslim space, while others of her kind used it for lunch parties, no 
doubt touched the attendants. Her experience at the Taj Mahal sets Parkes 
apart from her social group and caused her to realize that she occupied a space 
different from theirs: “Can you imagine anything so detestable? European 
ladies and gentlemen have the band to play on the marble terrace, and dance 
quadrilles in front of the tomb!”58
Parkes ends her description of the Taj Mahal by asserting that the tomb is 
first and foremost an Islamic space where the memory, rituals, and religion of 
the Mughals are still alive and renewed daily: “I cannot enter the Taj without 
feelings of deep devotion: the sacredness of the place, the remembrance of 
the fallen grandeur of the family of the Emperor . . . , the solemn echoes, the 
dim light, the beautiful architecture, the exquisite finish and delicacy of the 
whole, the deep devotion with which the natives prostrate themselves when 
they make their offerings of money and flowers at the tomb, all produce deep 
and sacred feelings; and I could no more jest or indulge in levity beneath the 
dome of the Taj, than I could in my prayers.”59 Parkes’s writings offer us a view 
of the Mughal monuments of Delhi and Agra through the prism of spatial 
practice. Although she may share the same picturesque aesthetic and historical 
disposition as Hodges, her marginal status as a woman allowed her a certain 
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freedom to express her awareness of realities that contradicted the images of 
the British colonial project. In her writings, Mughal monuments are accorded 
a greater horizon of meaning and represented as spaces pulsating with Mughal 
culture and power.
The Contingent Poetry of Agra by Nazir Akbarabadi
The other example of nonauthorized representations of the Mughal monu-
ment come in the poetry of  Nazir. Celebrated for their catholic reach, greater 
than even that of the shahrashob, Nazir’s poems are concerned not only with 
the nobility but also with the wider social fabric of Agra. What further dis-
tinguishes Nazir’s poetry is the level of creative freedom he enjoyed due to his 
employment as a teacher (rather than being a court poet). Although he was 
invited repeatedly to work at the court of the nawab of Oudh, he remained 
in Agra to live a life of austerity. His writings are focused on the subject of 
everyday life in the Mughal city, its nature, festivals, games, rituals, lovers, 
climate, and space.60 He writes about Muslim festivals like Eid-ul-Fitr and 
Shab-i Barat as comfortably as he does about the Hindu holidays of Holi, 
Diwali, and Basant.
When Nazir’s poetry focuses on the subject of the city, it provides a new 
perspective of the tumult of the end of the eighteenth century, or more pre-
cisely, of the resulting creative opportunities to restructure society based on 
the ideal of egalitarianism. As Ishrat Haque writes, “Nazir’s writings present 
a refreshing response to the ‘times of troubles,’ instead of expressing a sense 
of nostalgia or frustration for the world that was no more, he faced the chal-
lenge of the age by exploring the present and by seeking inspiration for his 
poetry from the common man.”61 In his satirical poem “Life Is a Great and 
Varied Show,” he outlines the many wonderful contradictions of his world: 
“The whole scene seems to have been created by one great spell of magic.”62 
Although he produces an inventory of oppositions — the weak are strong, the 
strong weak, the poor are rich, and the rich poor — each stanza ends with 
the euphoric surrender to the great show. Unlike Mir and Sauda, whose verse 
resists the perceived decline in the Mughal social order, Nazir takes an ironic 
and almost giddy tone as he explores the possibilities of a new social order that 
this decline offers. The built environments of Agra, its palaces, river, gardens, 
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and mosques, are suffused with Nazir’s awareness of the radical reordering of 
society spurred on by the challenging times.
In his poem “Swimming in Agra,” the banks of the Jumna, once a leisure 
space for Mughal nobility, are transformed into a free public space.
In the swimming season in Agra, the beautiful ones go to the river. 
Some spectators go to watch them, but others are genuinely interested 
in watching the performance of expert swimmers. However, it is mainly 
a festive occasion for the majority of the crowd. The young boys, the 
grown-ups, even old people love to join in the fun. The crowd extends  
for miles along the bank of the river.63
The rest of the poem describes the integrated crowd constituted by the young 
and old, the handsome and ugly. The rich in their fancy houses and on their 
barges play music and drink. They are presented as enjoying the swimming 
presentations with “ordinary folk.” Everyone is in the moment, and for a time 
the sensuality of the swimming festival overtakes the burdens of everyday life 
and turns the banks of the Jumna River into the differential space of play and 
enjoyment. If one juxtaposes this lively scene with Hodges’s view of the ruins, 
the contradictions inherent in the latter’s perception become clear: while the 
decay of built environments may signal a change in power relations, the social 
landscape continues to be abundant and vital in Agra.
When Nazir writes of the Taj Mahal, he criticizes the extravagant outlays 
made by the rich to maintain the architecture of the Taj Mahal, but in the 
end he agrees that the money is well spent, pointing to the Taj Mahal’s global 
fame. The poem is not among his best, as his verse is better attuned to descrip-
tions of the lively scenes of Agra than to outlines of architectural form, but in 
its relative simplicity it affords us a glimpse of the entire complex of the tomb 
through Nazir’s eyes. He describes the beauty and perfection of the tomb, its 
color, decoration, and parts, and he even recognizes those that maintain the 
complex: “The care-takers who live in [the few other buildings] are fortunate. 
The smell of jasmine and roses in the flower-garden around the buildings is 
all-pervading.”64 Nazir presents the monument as embedded in the living 
fabric of its environment — a stark contrast to Hodges’s perspective, which 
abstracts the Taj Mahal from its social meaning and cultural context.
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The poetry of Nazir and the travel narrative of Parkes, alongside the 
shahrashob and Hodges’s paintings, reveal the eighteenth-century and early 
nineteenth-century Mughal monument as a parallactic object that is not 
simply a ruin of history but an unstable space defined by multiplicity. For 
Hodges and the shahrashob poets it was the impossible object of desire that 
also signified the shifting power relations of Mughal India. Nazir and Parkes, 
free of ties to the courts or governments in power, were at greater liberty to 
experience the Mughal monuments on a visceral level that defied the logic and 
logos of such power.
After these poets and artists, the Mughal monument would remain to defy 
all those that came next to impose a symbolic order on it. This is the impos-
sibility of the parallactic object that, as Žižek explains, “eludes the symbolic 
grasp and thus causes the multiplicity of symbolic perspectives.”65 By tracing 
the Mughal monument’s condition of multiplicity back to the late eighteenth 
century I have shown how the symbolization of the Indian landscape was 
marked by failure and frustration, but also by radical openness and creativity. 
The failure, however, does not mean that artists and officials would stop try-
ing to make sense of the Mughal monuments. Indeed, it ignited their desire to 
find other and better strategies of reckoning with these spaces, as the ensuing 
chapters will reveal.
 2 from cunningham to curzon
  Producing the Mughal Monument  
  in the Era of High Imperialism
Between 1803 and 1857, some Mughal structures in Agra, 
Fatehpur Sikri, and Delhi continued to function as palaces, mosques, forts, 
and shrines. However, since revenues from land controlled by the British gov-
ernment supported their operations, they faced several disruptions in their 
spatial practices. First, the Islamic institution of awqaf, the charitable and 
tax-free endowments of land made by the emperors and nobles for the upkeep 
of Islamic structures, was altered. Soon after the territory of the Upper Prov-
inces came under British rule, local governments assumed custodianship of 
the charitable lands and rescinded their tax-free status. In 1816 the pensions 
of the khadims, the keepers of the Taj Mahal, were discontinued, “and the 
fruit grown in the gardens was sold for the benefit of Government.”1 The state 
allocated funds for the repair of major monuments only when it desired. For 
example, in 1808 Lord Minto appointed a Taj committee to oversee the repairs 
of the tomb and provided a stipend.2 In 1818 Lord Hastings provided funds 
for and directed repairs of Akbar’s tomb in Sikandra and the Sufi tombs of 
Fatehpur Sikri. Then in 1847 this trend of monument protection ended when 
Lord Hardinge directed the collector to discontinue the revenue-free status 
of the villages connected with the dargah (shrine) of Sheikh Salim Chishti at 
Fatehpur Sikri, hastening its decay.3 The Mughal monuments of Delhi faired 
better. In 1822 all waqf properties held for the emperor in a British govern-
ment trust were transferred to a special magistrate called a daroga.4 Unlike in 
the district of Agra, it seemed that revenues from the waqf lands were used to 
repair and clean Delhi’s mosques.5 Yet even as the religious spaces were con-
served, other structures like palaces and gardens fell into a state of shocking 
disrepair.
The noncommittal relationship of the British government with the Mughal 
monuments came to a sudden halt after the calamitous events surrounding the 
Uprising of 1857.6 Ignited by the sepoys (Indian soldiers), who feared that the 
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British army was planning their collective religious conversion, the rebellion 
quickly developed into a mass uprising that drew support from other groups 
of society. Among these were native aristocrats, who felt their independence 
arbitrarily rescinded, and Hindus and Muslims who saw their social practices 
threatened by Christian missionaries and British academic curricula.7 Fueled 
by these intersecting grievances, the Uprising constituted a desperate attempt 
to stay the forces of change by overthrowing the British ruler. Touching all 
classes, castes, and religious communities, the Uprising proved that the new 
social order arising from British reform policies and the cultural arrogance of 
the first half of the nineteenth century did more to alienate the rulers from 
the ruled than to bind the two closer together.
While the Gangetic plains served as the theater of the insurgency, the city 
of Delhi was center stage. Here the Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah II — or 
as the British depreciatively called him, the King of Delhi — still held court. 
Rallying to the shout of “Chalo Dilli!,” or “let’s go to Delhi!,” the sepoys of 
Meerut turned in the direction of the Mughal city. They arrived on 10 May 
and headed straight for the Red Fort, and from there to the palace of the em-
peror. Their actions there would mark the climax of the Uprising. First, they 
forced their way through the Lahore Gate, killing several British residents 
en route. Next, they entered the diwan-i amm, the public audience hall, and 
called for the emperor to appear. When he did, the sepoys demanded that 
he, the reigning sovereign of India, take his position as their leader. The aged 
emperor demurred at first, but faced with the threat of further killings, he 
eventually agreed.
British retaliation did not begin until July, and the fighting lasted for sev-
eral months. In September, after the British had regained Delhi, they captured 
the emperor and his sons in Humayun’s tomb, where they had taken refuge. 
Bahadur Shah was forced to stand trial in the Red Fort. He was found guilty 
of treason and exiled to Burma, where he lived out the rest of his days. His 
sons Mirza Mughal and Mirza Khizr Sultan, as well as Bahadur Shah’s grand-
son, Mirza Abu Bakr, were shot dead by a Captain Hodson upon capture. 
Thus ended the Mughal line.8
After calm returned to Northern India, the power relations between Brit-
ish rulers and Indian subjects were recalibrated in light of Indian resistance to 
the British state’s reforms. Part of this recalibration consisted of a change in 
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the identity of British rule itself. The East India Company was relieved of its 
administrative duties and replaced by the crown, known in India as the Brit-
ish Raj. British rule over India thus received royal sanction, and the Mughal 
emperor was supplanted with a British empress who was to be the new “focus 
of Indian loyalty and the fountain of Indian hope.”9 The state also gained a 
new understanding of its function in India. Unlike the preceding Utilitar-
ian government of Lord Bentinck and Thomas Babington Macaulay, which 
saw Indians as subjects capable of reform, the British Raj eschewed this view, 
citing biological and cultural differences.10 Rudyard Kipling wrote of this un-
sentimental abandonment of social reform: “Asia is not going to be civilized 
after the methods of the West. There is too much Asia and she is too old.”11 
After the traumas of the Uprising the British required a new master-signifier 
to restore order and give meaning to their presence in India.12 This master-
signifier would be race. As Ann Laura Stoler describes its structural function 
in the era of modern imperialism: “In the nineteenth century . . . race becomes 
the organizing grammar of an imperial order in which modernity, the civi-
lizing mission and the ‘measure of man’ were framed. And with it ‘culture’ 
was harnessed to do more specific political work; not only to mark difference, 
but to rationalize the hierarchies of privilege and profit, to consolidate the 
labor regimes of expanding capitalism, to provide psychological scaffolding 
for the exploitative structures of colonial rule.”13 This signifying power of 
race enabled Kipling’s articulation of the new ethics of British Indian power 
relations — “the white man’s burden.” Race also underwrote the governmental 
discourse of cultural protection and preservation. It was the new point de capi-
ton, pinning down the nondiscursive and floating signifiers of imperial India 
and arranging them into a presentable tableau of reason and munificence.
The power relations that developed in this late nineteenth-century context 
between the ruler and the ruled had profound effects on the spatial ordering of 
the Mughal monument. This chapter begins by examining the government’s 
agonizing scheme of suppressing the sublime monumentality of Mughal 
architecture through the practices of the archaeological survey. It will then 
consider how the discourse of monumentality displaced the discourse of sci-
ence when Viceroy Curzon took control of the Archaeological Survey of India 
(ASI) and reinstated Mughal architecture as imperial monuments. I argue that 
rather than trying to hide the contradictory lived realities of the monument 
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behind the discourse of science — the strategy of the surveyors — Curzon en-
couraged a certain fear of and fascination with the unknowable other, the 
monumental Real, in these spaces. At the same time Indian nationalist ide-
ology reordered the Mughal monument that rendered the dominant order 
paradoxical and ambivalent.
Setting up the Survey of the Mughal Monument
In the years following the Uprising, the British government took several dis-
jointed and discrepant steps toward ordering the Mughal monuments. The 
first of these was the establishment of the ASI in 1861. Lord Canning’s memo 
outlining the mission statement echoes the ethical imperative of the archaeo-
logical survey: “To place on record for the instruction of future generations, 
many particulars that might be rescued from oblivion and throw light upon 
the early history of England’s dependency.”14 Although race is not mentioned 
here, the metaphor of “light” and the state’s paternalist responsibility for its 
“dependency” resonate with Kipling’s injunction, “Take up the White man’s 
burden / Send forth the best ye breed.”15 In the field of archaeology, Britain 
sent forth Alexander Cunningham, the first director of the ASI, who based his 
archaeological practice on the trigonometrical survey and limited his work on 
monuments to information gathering.16 Between 1862 and 1872 Cunningham 
and his assistants compiled data on the historical remains of Delhi and Agra; 
the activities of taking measurements, making drawings, ascertaining dates, 
and noting locations marked the parameters of their investigational practice. 
The government then published the data as annual reports of the ASI. These 
texts represent the Mughal monument as a museological artifact, one excised 
from the landscape and placed in the religio-historic category of Islamic 
architecture.
The ASI’s categorization of architecture along religious divisions was not 
novel; rather, it continued the parsing practices of the architectural historian 
James Fergusson and the historian James Mill. Both scholars placed Mughal 
monuments under the rubric of “Saracenic” or “Mahomedan.”17 Their label-
ing may seem a minor analytic operation, but it determined the framework 
for all later investigations into Indian architecture and persists uncontested 
to this day in the art historical study of Indian architecture. This new mode 
of ordering was fundamental to the supposedly objective and dispassionate 
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study of India. Counterpoised to the subjective mode of  Romantic study with 
its personal flourishes and philosophic embellishments, the new analytic, as 
described by Mill, offered the most effective means of uncovering the univer-
sal truths of this country: “But the mental habits which are acquired in mere 
observing, and in the acquisition of languages, are almost as different as any 
mental habit can be, from the powers of combination, discrimination, classifi-
cation, judgment, comparison, weighing, inferring, inducting, philosophizing 
in short; which are the powers of most importance for extracting the precious 
ore from a great mine of rude historical materials.”18 Fergusson applied this 
method of study to the Mughal monument and radically transformed its rep-
resentation from the sensuous and melancholic space of Hodges’s text into an 
object of British will and authority. In the appendix of the expansion to his 
Illustrated Handbook of Architecture, he explains that the scientific method 
allowed him to read architecture as a trace of past races and to arrange these 
traces into a discernable and universal order: “And when these [traces] are 
read, — when all the phenomena are gathered together and classified, we find 
the same perfection of Order, the same beautiful simplicity of law pervading 
the same complex variety of results, which characterise all the phenomena 
of nature, and the knowledge of which is the highest reward of intellectual 
exertion.”19 Fergusson and Mill both operated under what Lefebvre calls the 
“illusion of transparency,” a kind of perception that reduces the space of archi-
tecture to an elegant design or code. For the architectural scholar transfixed 
by its genius there is nothing beyond this design that needs further inves-
tigation; the representation appears “free of traps or secret places.”20 By the 
same token Lefebvre explains, “anything hidden or dissimulated — and hence 
dangerous — is antagonistic to transparency,”21 and thus left outside the field 
of vision. The spatial practices of Indian temples, shrines, and mosques, the 
rituals, recitations, redolence, and revelry that Fergusson encountered in his 
travels in the 1840s, were cast into the shadows, from where they antagonized 
his illuminating text.22
After the events of 1857, when Fergusson was writing his architectural his-
tories in London, he realized how his work could intersect with the interests 
of the state. As Tapati Guha-Thakurta explains: “The empire in India was 
crying out for the institution of discipline. The subject nation, as Fergusson 
was all too aware, could best be kept in control ‘by the superiority of our 
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knowledge and the perfection of our organization.’ ”23 In its service to the 
government — a government that wanted to suppress or deny the persistence 
of other authorities, especially that of the Mughals — the ASI would adopt 
Mill and Fergusson’s methodology. Consequently, the ASI reports continued 
the agonizing process of fragmenting the Mughal monument from the land-
scape, veiling its spatial practices and its connection to the material realities 
of its surroundings.
The categorization of Mughal architecture as Islamic, coupled with the 
“objective” mode of analysis, I argue, must be understood in terms of the 
overall political aim of reducing its very monumentality. Lefebvre describes 
monumentality as informed by “all the aspects of spatiality”: the ideological, 
the material, and the creative, or “the spaces proper to each faculty, from the 
sense of smell to speech; the gestural and the symbolic.”24 But because the 
ASI’s practices suppressed knowledge of the religious and of other unquan-
tifiable spatial practices, they restricted the view of what made a monument 
monumental. The codification of its space produced a certain kind knowledge 
of the monument that essentially countermanded its inherent multiplicity. As 
Lefebvre explains: “The codifying approach is quite unable to cover all facets 
of the monumental. Indeed, it does not even come close, for it is the residual, 
the irreducible — whatever cannot be classified or codified according to cate-
gories devised subsequent to production — which is, here as always, the most 
precious and the most essential, the diamond at the bottom of the melting-
pot.”25 This “diamond” was precisely what gave the Mughal monument the 
power to awe; it moved Indians to identify with it and to imagine new futures 
through it. That the sepoys amplified their resistance to Company power at 
the monumental Red Fort took the British administrators by surprise. The 
ensuing program of retaliation thus aimed to suppress the power of these sites 
and to prevent the imagination of the Indian people from regaining entry. In 
the period immediately following the Uprising, many Mughal-era structures 
of Delhi such as river pavilions and mansions were reduced to rubble, while 
the larger monuments, like the Red Fort and the Jami Masjid, were held in the 
government’s possession, and Mughal urban practices were replaced by mod-
ern urban practices. The Islamic practices of prayer, festivals, and veneration 
that made these sites living monuments were thus arrested, hollowed out, or 
forced into the private space of the home.
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The ASI, instituted four years after the disfigurement of Delhi, completed 
the emptying out of the Mughal site’s spatial practices. Through the codifica-
tion of the sites into dates, measurements, and history, the ASI’s reports made 
the Mughal monument appear controlled and transparent. The textual act, 
as postcolonial theory has argued, was how power took possession of a non-
discursive entity like space, though only partially and violently. As Lefebvre 
outlines the logic and limits of this intellectual enterprise: “And, indeed, they 
[those with the words] do posses them [these spaces] up to a certain point — a 
terrible point. As a vain yet also effective trace, the sign has the power of de-
struction because it has the power of abstraction — and thus also the power 
to construct a new world different from nature’s initial one. Herein lies the 
secret of the Logos as foundation of all power and all authority; hence too the 
growth in Europe of knowledge and technology, industry and imperialism.”26 
With this secret also lies the limitation of power that depends primarily on 
the Logos to understand space, and in so doing suppresses the Eros. Lefebvre 
describes Eros as the sensual knowledge of space, the mystery, spirituality, and 
awesome beauty that activates it and attracts intense attention. In monuments 
the Eros constitutes its monumentality. The Eros never goes away but un-
settles the Logos of space, staining the tableau of perfected knowledge, as was 
the case with the ASI survey reports.
The Style of the Survey: Science versus Art
The work of the ASI, according to Cunningham, was to be “a careful and sys-
tematic investigation of all the existing monuments of ancient India.”27 How-
ever, the form of this “systematic investigation” was open to interpretation. 
Some thought Cunningham’s surveys not systematic enough. Cut through 
with opinion, personal research interests, and conjecture, the information he 
gathered was regarded by his replacement, James Burgess, as compromised. 
Taking up the directorship in 1885, Burgess ushered in a new period of in-
creased systemization at the ASI.28 His aspirations also met with resistance, 
however, and on more than one occasion he had to justify his methods. Major 
J. B. Keith and H. H. Cole were two of Burgess’s prominent opponents.
Keith came into Burgess’s employment after the latter became director of 
the ASI. As director, Burgess’s first order of business was to reorganize the 
survey into independent circles, each managed by a regional director with two 
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assistants.29 Keith was appointed the regional director of the North West-
ern Provinces circle, which covered Agra, Delhi, Fatehpur Sikri, and Oudh. 
Keith’s assistants were A. Führer, a scholar of Indic languages and Arabic, 
and E. W. Smith, a master draftsman. Burgess, wanting to censor the inter-
pretative reporting of Cunningham, placed stricter emphasis on a scientific 
and uniform method of measurements and lobbied for the increased profes-
sionalization among ASI surveyors.30 These requirements were described in a 
letter to the Home Department, in which he explains that the archaeological 
survey is “a science requiring special knowledge and training” and that only 
men with “a high class education” can be expected to produce this sort of 
knowledge.31 He goes on to point out that any man that comes with only a 
curiosity or fondness for the Indian arts, the dilettante, “cannot be expected 
to describe accurately early Hindu or Moslim [sic] buildings and remains; 
and he must fail in fixing with any approximation to truth the dates of the 
monuments he meets with — one of the most essential and useful qualifica-
tions of the surveyor.”32 Among Burgess’s surveyors to be labeled a dilettante 
was Major Keith.
Keith started his career in India in the military, but he found the art and 
architecture of the country more appealing and took a position as an assistant 
to the curator of Indian monuments, H. H. Cole. Under his supervisor, Keith 
worked in central India to reassemble the Buddhist monument of Sanchi and 
to repair and restore the Gwalior Fort. Both men sought primarily to awaken 
in Indians a respect for their past and to awaken in the British a feeling for 
the excellence of the Indian artisanal practices that were slowly dying out 
and being replaced by modern work. Keith claimed British neglect of the In-
dian arts to be responsible for the monuments’ declining material existence. 
“Be it recorded with regret,” he wrote in the Journal of Indian Art, “that the 
Anglo-Indian philistine has been a greater enemy to Indian art than either 
Mahomedan or Mahratta.”33 Keith’s prescribed orientation to the Indian 
monument sought to weave together the monumental survey with the uplift 
of the Indian artisan and was therefore opposed to Burgess’s vision of the sur-
vey’s limitation to scientific inquiry. Not surprisingly, the two men squabbled 
over the goals of the survey.
Burgess made no secret of his antipathy toward Keith and his methods. In 
a letter to the Home Department he decried the wasted resources given to a 
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man he considered to have little competence. Keith’s survey reports of 1887, 
Burgess explained, contained “manifest errors and omissions in them, such as 
must deprive them of all confidence for accuracy in those details which can 
only be tested on the spot, . . . and they have been prepared in a way which 
renders them useless for the processes of reproduction. Even the scales at-
tached to them manifest gross ignorance.”34 The bulk of Keith’s survey re-
ports stated his own views about conservation: he wrote essays on the matters 
of  “(a) the apathy of the Native public, (b) special difficulties in Central India, 
(c) popular error and regard to monuments, &c., being personal property, 
(d) growth of utilitarianism, and (e) lack of popular interest.”35 His concern 
with seeing the appreciation of Indian art converge with the monumental sur-
vey frustrated Burgess, who finally wrote, “Major Keith excites in me a feeling 
of sincere pity as a man who has been so weak as to accept a position for which 
he has none of the necessary qualification, and who, to screen his deficiencies, 
endeavours to evade his responsibilities by the assumption of a special position 
of his own.”36 The powerful rebuke offers us a window into the ambivalence, 
the split between art and science, that defined the ASI’s representation of the 
Mughal monuments in the late nineteenth century.
While Burgess and his followers saw their work limited to the measure-
ment, dating, and delineation in drawings of a monument, the conservation-
ists, like Keith and Cole, wanted more. They wanted something of the monu-
ment’s power, of its ineffable beauty, to be represented in the ASI’s framework, 
as this kind of knowledge would protect the monuments from destruction, 
dismemberment, and decay. In his own defense, Keith described his vision 
for the survey of monuments as oriented to their protection and in sympathy 
with their surroundings: “Each Surveyor ought to feel that he is working for 
the credit of a particular province, of a particular Local Government, and not 
for the benefit of a particular Department of a few European Orientalists. He 
ought to above all things try to awaken Native sympathy for the work — an 
aim that has hitherto escaped notice. In a large country like India where there 
are such divergences of style and so many peculiarities, it would be impossible 
to adopt one uniform system of work. The Archaeological Survey cannot be 
treated as either the Trigonometrical or Geological Surveys.”37 After two years 
under Burgess, Keith was forced to retire due to his failing health. Burgess’s 
plans for the survey could now move forward unencumbered. Führer took 
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over the position of superintendent of the North Western Provinces, and 
under his leadership accurate surveys, supplemented with precise illustrations, 
ground plans, and photographs, constituted the limits of the information col-
lected about the Mughal monuments.38 Drawing on his knowledge of Arabic, 
Persian, and Sanskrit, he translated and published inscriptions, while Smith 
produced the architectural drawings of the related sites. Führer’s texts read 
like the writings of a gazetteer and show no trace of the personal experience or 
judgment of his encounters with any of the Mughal monuments he visited.39 
Smith’s methodical drawings impressed Burgess greatly, and he established 
a new position of architectural assistant and appointed him chief surveyor. 
The most celebrated of Smith’s projects was the complete survey of Fatehpur 
Sikri that commenced in 1889. With the help of seven native draftsmen, Smith 
spent four years compiling and delineating the principal monuments of the 
city. Smith’s self-described aim was “to prepare no more drawings than are ab-
solutely necessary to give a complete, useful, and truthful idea of the Mughal 
architecture of the City.”40 In Führer and Smith Burgess had finally found 
the kind of professionalism he desired, and he was greatly relieved by their 
uncritical espousal of the ASI’s scientific method.
After Keith returned to England, he continued to advocate for the rights of 
Indian artisans, and he later added his voice to those of Ananda K. Coomer-
aswamy and E. B. Havell to promote Indian industrial design and traditional 
arts in the education of Indians. Keith’s ambitions were therefore not as ab-
normal as Burgess would have had the government believe. Indeed, Burgess 
faced a similar debate of procedure when Cole was appointed the Curator of 
Monuments in 1880. H. H. Cole was the son of Henry Cole, the manager 
of the Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851 and the first director of the South 
Kensington Museum. The exhibition presented examples of art and industry 
from around India and, for the first time, brought them into comparison with 
other examples of human skill, so as “to illustrate [India’s] resources, and to 
add to the interests of the great national exhibition of which his Royal High-
ness is the Patron.”41 Here power, empire, and aesthetics intersected to the 
great satisfaction of both the elites and the public. The younger Cole learned 
from his father the importance of sustaining the industrial arts and reverence 
for Indian design, and he understood that both worked for the greater good 
of society. When he assumed his position as the Curator of Monuments, he 
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would have come with a desire to instill the same appreciation for Indian in-
dustrial arts in India that his father had generated in England. His mission, 
however, would be at odds with the practices of the ASI, which sought to look 
past the quality of a monument’s design and focus on the quantifiable. This 
happened most explicitly at the Mughal monuments, whose progressive decay 
Cole tracked in detail.
The job of the Curator of Monuments was simple, “to prescribe remedies 
for the conservation of artistic monuments.”42 Despite his short tenure of 
three years, Cole had a lasting impact on the physical and ideological order-
ing of the Mughal monument. His reports and memoranda on the repairs he 
supervised at Fatehpur Sikri, Akbar’s tomb, and the Red Fort of Agra offer a 
glimpse into the slow transformation of the Mughal monuments from active 
spaces of Islamic practice into ghostly husks of their former existence. His 
sensitivity to the relationship between the living arts and the conservation of 
monuments allowed the spatial practices of economics, worship, and tradition 
to be brought into the framework of his reports.
To provide a context for his own project, Cole included a history of the 
conservation of Indian monuments in his report for the year 1881–82. His 
findings reveal the gradual governmental disruption of the spatial practices 
of the Mughal monuments soon after the territory of the Upper Provinces 
was taken by Governor General Richard Wellesley in 1803. At this time the 
local government authority assumed custodianship of awqaf properties.43 The 
connection of venerated Muslim tombs to the society and economy of Agra 
was thus severed. Cole noted that the state only allocated funds to help repair 
the major monuments when it deemed it necessary. His report also alluded 
to the social changes caused by the government’s appropriation and manage-
ment of both the charitable properties and the monuments their endowments 
maintained. The khadims, mutawallis, and imams of mosques, whose families 
had been connected to the monuments for generations, were, for example, 
made government pensioners. This new status meant that their incomes di-
minished. At Fatehpur Sikri some of these khadims acted as tour guides to 
augment their earnings and presented themselves to tourists as descendents of 
Sheikh Salim Chishti himself. Tourist writings register a similar adaptation of 
the Indian caretakers to tourism at the Taj Mahal, the Moti Masjid in Agra’s 
Red Fort, and Akbar’s tomb in Sikandra.44
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The strategy Cole adopted to reverse this neglectful situation was to ex-
ploit the beauty of the monuments to win them the sympathy of Indians and 
British alike. The quickest means to accomplish this was the photographic 
album, to the preparation of which Cole dedicated a large percentage of his 
resources and time. It was over this project that he would debate Burgess, who 
believed that the surveys of conservation and archaeology should be uniform. 
Cole noted in a letter to the government that Burgess’s surveys and draw-
ings were not attuned to the architectural qualities of the monument and that 
they “have small claim to being considered artistic or perfect representations 
of architecture.”45 Cole’s own wording of his interests — for example, “the 
systematic delineation of beautiful architecture,” “artistic delineation,” and 
“wonderful architecture”— divulges a marked contrast to the objective and 
scientific undertaking of the ASI. His method of course sought to “induce the 
Natives” to properly maintain their architectural treasures instead of neglect-
ing them. On the whole, Cole’s language might seem a minor factor, but it 
severely vexed Burgess, who wanted no such subjective impressions associated 
with the work of a survey that produced photographs and drawings primarily 
for the architect, the artist, and the historian of Indian architecture. When 
Cole’s term ended, the position of curator of monuments was discontinued, 
thereby limiting the operations of the ASI to the objective collection of data.
The opposition between Cole and Keith’s mission to foster sympathy for 
the artist and the living history of the Mughal monuments and Burgess’s vi-
sion of these monuments as purely archaeological sites constituted a schism 
within the ASI. Their differences rendered the study of the Mughal monu-
ment a highly ambivalent endeavor in the nineteenth century. Unable to 
discern the clear mission or even a consistent meaning or logic in the ASI’s 
practices, the government chose to downsize the survey after Burgess retired 
in 1889. The office of surveyor general was abolished and replaced by smaller 
regional departments, with a chief surveyor placed under the supervision of 
the local governments. Without a strong centralized authority supervising 
operations throughout the country, a sustained program of conservation and 
survey was unachievable, and the Mughal monuments once again fell into 
disorder and decay. As long as the state’s interest in these spaces ran the gamut 
from intensive efforts toward their upkeep to their total neglect, the Mughal 
monument was destined to remain a stain on the Raj’s mandate of preserva-
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tion and protection. This was the state of the ASI in 1899, when Lord Curzon 
accepted the mantle of the protector of India’s historical monuments.
Out of the Light Comes the Dark:  
Lord Curzon’s Mughal Monuments
After years of disorganization, a lack of a proper mandate, and internal con-
tradictions, the ASI received its first comprehensive and philosophically based 
program from Curzon, the eleventh viceroy of India (figure 4). By the time 
of his appointment in 1899, the importance of historical monuments to social 
identity and the government’s responsibility toward their preservation and 
protection were popular assumptions in Great Britain. However, these values 
did not easily translate in India, and it took someone of Curzon’s position and 
strong personality to compel a change in vision. In England, John Ruskin’s 
philosophical discourses on the necessity of preserving historical architecture 
for the social good had become widely accepted and would have certainly in-
fluenced Curzon’s own approach to India’s monuments. Ruskin’s ideas were 
born out of the condition of modern development and its destruction of old 
architecture. In his writings, he strives to convince the public to view old 
buildings not as picturesque ruins or obstacles to progress but as irreplaceable 
national treasures. His Seven Lamps of Architecture of 1849 introduced this 
outlook in the section called “The Lamp of Memory.” Ruskin first defines 
architecture, a “distinctively political art,” as not merely utilitarian but as the 
receptacle of social goals.46 He then explains why it is essential to preserve such 
structures: “We may live without her, and worship without her, but we cannot 
remember without her.”47 In Ruskin’s estimation, architecture as a historical 
document was the best purveyor of a nation’s past: “How cold is all history, 
how lifeless all imagery, compared to that which the living nation writes, and 
the uncorrupted marble bears!”48 He thus advocated a policy of architectural 
preservation, so that the values, desires, and accomplishments of Great Brit-
ain’s forbears might be remembered and might continue to inform the culture 
and identity of the nation.
Ruskin’s other important theory, which would have an impact on the Mu-
ghal monument, was his idea of the age value of architecture. This value, he 
claimed, was not what the picturesque artists prized when they admired an 
old castle or abbey. For them, age was an aesthetic quality, one they attached to 
Fig 4: Lord Curzon. Bain Collection, Library of Congress
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an emotional sentiment. Ruskin wanted to move beyond this sort of encoun-
ter to see in historical architecture its “inherent character” as the “exponent 
of age.”49 That character, in Ruskin’s estimation, was the “original character,” 
which only grew in value with each passing year. This perception opened the 
way for the British to view the ruins in the landscape not as impediments to 
modernity but as milestones that helped mark their nation’s progress. With 
such a sensibility in place, it was easy to understand why spaces that encased 
the national spirit needed to be preserved and protected.
While Ruskin provided the argument for architectural preservation, it 
was William Morris who formulated the practical mechanisms and measures 
for what would become a national movement of preservation. His first major 
steps were to form the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings (SPAB) 
in 1878 and to author its famous manifesto. Morris and his supporters then 
took the fight to protect historical architecture to local parishes and counties, 
where modern development and misguided restoration projects threatened 
the original forms of churches, abbeys, and castles. The Foreign Committee 
of the SPAB exported many of the same domestic concerns to Egypt and India. 
Later it would come to advise John Marshall, the director of the ASI (1902–
28) appointed by Curzon, on matters concerning the restoration of Mughal 
monuments. At the time of Morris’s death in 1897, a national awareness of 
the monument had taken shape, and most British citizens were sympathetic 
toward the notion of protecting Britain’s ancient buildings. India would only 
have to wait two more years, until Lord Curzon assumed his position as vice-
roy, for the same convictions to shape the preservation policy of the country’s 
monuments.
Curzon, a voracious reader, would have certainly come across Morris’s and 
Ruskin’s writings and, while differing with their socialist ideology, would 
have agreed with the merit of protecting the nation’s historical buildings. As 
a member of the Souls, an aristocratic social club dedicated to aesthetic pur-
suits, he may have even debated the philosophical and moral importance of 
architectural preservation. Various members of the Souls and Curzon him-
self were also active in saving manor houses and castles from ruin.50 After his 
return from India he became a strong proponent of expanding legislation to 
protect British monuments.
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Curzon’s restoration program for Indian monuments proved atypical 
in that it was not only informed by the ideology of the British preserva-
tion movement but also by the memorable, visceral experiences he had had 
throughout his early travels. His travel writings of 1883 reveal how the monu-
mentality of ancient sites first struck an emotional cord in him. In Italy he let 
“the greatest historic memories of the world” wash over him like a fierce tide 
that made him forget the present.51 In Greece he expressed admiration for the 
country’s architecture and a desire to discover the key to the beauty of its art. 
Lord Elgin’s transference of the Parthenon’s marbles to Britain caused him 
great sorrow because it signaled the rejection of the practice of in situ pres-
ervation, which Curzon believed in.52 In Egypt he learned how to reconcile 
the contradictions between the grand and noble architecture of a society’s 
past and its current state of impoverishment. “Here are the same men of the 
same build and stature, with the same dress or undress and the same imple-
ments, plying the same business as did their ancestors of five thousand years 
ago, so wonderfully depicted on the bas reliefs of royal and private tombs . . . 
civilisation is foiled by a country which refuses to be civilised, which cannot 
be civilised, which will remain uncivilised to the end.”53 The racial ideology 
that Curzon would use to frame and order Indian monuments reveals itself 
incipiently at this stage.
After entering Parliament as a representative of Lancashire and quickly as-
suming a leadership role among the Tories, Curzon made his second excursion 
around the world in 1887. He first visited the American West and then crossed 
the Pacific to tour Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and India. At 
every stop he wrote down his observations of local nature, cities, and people. 
These early writings show his ability to seamlessly meld the political concerns 
of strengthening the British Empire with the traveler’s interest in picturesque 
description. His Problems of the Far East, written after his Asian tours of 1887 
and 1892, reveals this double vision. The “aesthetic impressions” of these coun-
tries presented in the preface, he inexactly claims, function merely as back-
ground for his descriptions of the more important “problems” of “national 
character, resources, and organization of those countries as affected by their 
intercourse with foreign or Western Powers.”54 While this separation of the 
aesthetic from the political may have been his intention, the text discloses a 
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blurring of the two as Curzon weaves the aesthetic encounter with a space into 
the political fabric of a nation.
His visit to China clearly demonstrates how the mystery and impenetrabil-
ity of a space could serve to destabilize and weaken British power. It would be 
in China that Curzon learned his most important lessons of monumentality 
that would influence his work at the Mughal monument. Curzon’s sightsee-
ing in Peking was informed by his desire to bring this unruly country into the 
British orbit and to begin the process by representing China as desiring British 
influence. He starts his narrative with an acknowledging nod to China’s great 
and long history, but he proceeds to devote much of his text to outlining its 
political decline and urgent need for modernization. Taking the reader layer 
by layer into Peking’s spaces and monuments, Curzon makes an argument to 
increase British influence in China. He begins at the outer limits of the city, 
where he drops his reader into the whirling dirt and grit of the congested 
commercial district, which he describes as “a phantasmagoria of excruciating 
incident, too bewildering to grasp, too aggressive to acquiesce in, too absorb-
ing to escape.”55 This lack of order or intelligibility is reduced to the quintes-
sential marker of the non-Western city, where the light of logic and rationality 
cannot penetrate. More precisely, it is a space where the symbolizing order of 
modernity cannot master the other’s cultural order and where the inhabit-
ants and forms object to such mastery. The next stop is the Imperial City, 
accessed between the commercial district and the Forbidden City. Inside are 
monuments, temples, palaces of the nobility, and public offices, all similarly 
shrouded in mystery and, as far as Curzon is concerned, “far more exasper-
ating” to the Western traveler than the disorder of the outer district.56 He 
interprets this inaccessibility, this objection to his gaze, as a sign of Chinese 
arrogance, for nothing about the Western visitor requires such exclusionary 
measures. Even more opaque is the Forbidden City, the most formidable of 
Peking’s spaces, where sits the monarch, admitting no foreigners and project-
ing a spectral power. In the Forbidden City Curzon loses his bearings alto-
gether and subsequently finds nothing but utter indignation for a power that 
lets no light (or British influence) penetrate its walls. Perhaps it was here that 
he also came to realize the monument’s power as a nondiscursive reality, encas-
ing an impossible kernel of the Real. He may furthermore have learned how 
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the monument’s power to at once unsettle and awe could be yoked to political 
power.
The tour of Peking impressed on Curzon the unsettling power an ancient 
city can exert on the traveler and the moral lessons it can provide to those 
willing to read it. China, he later rationalized, was nothing more than a “mon-
strous but mighty anachronism” sitting on the fringe of the world, indifferent 
to the march of progress. He read its lack of interest in European commerce 
and industry as a sign of its stupefaction with its own past. He remarks that 
where Japan buries this past under modernizing projects, China “worships its 
embalmed and still life-like corpse.”57 From Curzon’s perspective, China does 
not conform to the desires of the British gaze and thus refuses interpellation 
into the modern order of nations. His negative experience in Peking, in the 
shadows and sites of the weakening Manchu Empire, along with his other 
experiences of travel to monuments in Persia, the Arab world, Southeast Asia, 
and India, gave him an uncommonly nuanced understanding of how the pasts 
of these societies, like their historical built environments, not only impeded 
progress but — more importantly — thwarted Western influence. In his three 
major books, Russia in Central Asia (1889), Persia and the Persian Question 
(1892), and Problems of the Far East (1894), he repeatedly notes the absence of 
separation between the spaces of the past from the everyday lives of the people 
of Asia. Only when the past was put in its place, far from the active, modern 
present — as Curzon observed it to be the case in Japan — could the British 
move freely, make alliances, sign treaties, and protect the interests of the em-
pire. Thus by the time Curzon was appointed viceroy he clearly understood 
how the monumental spaces of Asia and of the Near East functioned and how 
they could either thwart the ambitions of British power or, if signified and 
ordered properly, be used to promote its interests.
Curzon’s Indian Policy and Practice of Monument Preservation
Before taking office as viceroy, Curzon came to strongly believe in India’s im-
portance to the vitality of the British Empire and its mastery of the world. As 
he argued in the preface to Problems of the Far East, India was “the true ful-
crum of Asiatic dominion.”58 Behind this statement was also his belief in the 
good the British could do in this part of the world: “The best hope of salva-
tion for the old and moribund in Asia, the wisest lessons for the emancipated 
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and new, are still to be derived from the ascendancy of British character, and 
under the shelter, where so required, of British dominion.”59 For Curzon the 
viceroy, these convictions translated into a modernizing mission. No longer “a 
kind of living museum of the European past,” India would be reformed in the 
image of the European present, replete with industry, schools, railroad tracks, 
telegraph wires, museums, and monuments.60 The modernization of India 
was the greatest gift the British could bestow on this country, and Curzon’s 
restoration of Mughal monuments, in this context, can be read as his desire to 
banish the darkness of the past into the confines of their stones, so that British 
power and its progress could move unimpeded everywhere else.
Curzon had already noticed the ASI’s disorganization while in London. In 
his first year as viceroy, he toured the country and evaluated its archaeologi-
cal work. He found extreme mismanagement and neglect of the architectural 
structures by both the provincial governments and the public at large.61 His 
remedy for this condition was to put the ASI back under the direct control of 
the central government. He also committed himself to raising public aware-
ness of the political and social importance of monument preservation for the 
legitimacy of the British Raj. In his seminal speech delivered to the Asiatic 
Society in Calcutta on 7 February 1900, Curzon outlined his preservation 
program and its underlying logic, which incorporated the racial ideology that 
had emerged after the Uprising of 1857. First, he explained to his audience 
that the British were the only people in India capable of such a service. He 
based his claim on Indian shortcomings: Indians, by themselves, had neither 
the resources to protect their historical structures nor an understanding of 
the importance of this practice. He told his audience that during his tours, 
he had observed “a local and ignorant population, who see only in an ancient 
building the means of inexpensively raising a modern one for their own con-
venience.”62 In light of these conditions, Curzon argued that the British, as 
the more enlightened people, had to assume the “peculiar responsibility” of 
preserving India’s monuments.63
Curzon elaborated on this racial division by citing Indian communalism 
and the impassioned antipathy the Hindu and Muslim communities each had 
for the other’s architectural spaces. The British, on the other hand, were “bet-
ter fitted to guard, with a dispassionate and impartial zeal, the relics of differ-
ent ages of sometimes antagonistic beliefs, than might be the descendants of 
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the warring races or votaries of the rival creeds.”64 To support this claim he 
asked his audience to view the visible scars left by “oriental” religious fervor: 
“When the Brahmans went to Ellora, they hacked away the features of all 
seated Buddhas. . . . When Kutub-ud-din commenced, and Altamsh contin-
ued, the majestic mosque that flanks the Kutub Minar, it was with the spoil of 
Hindu temples that they reared the fabric, . . . When we admire his [Aurung-
zeb’s] great mosque with its tapering minarets, which are the chief feature of 
the river front at Benares, how many of us remember that he tore down the 
holy Hindu temple of Vishveshwar to furnish the material and to supply the 
site? . . . These successive changes, while they may have reflected little more 
than a despot’s caprice were yet inimical both to the completion and to the 
continuous existence of architectural fabrics.”65 Having described the dire cir-
cumstances of Indian historical architecture, Curzon turned back to the need 
for a uniquely British disposition, defined by rationality and tasteful apprecia-
tion. It was at this point that Curzon combined Burgess’s and Cole’s projects 
to outline how the ASI might teach the native population how to appreciate 
the past and at the same time order the monumental spaces rationally. Their 
scientific disposition and eye for the beautiful would thus usher the British 
past the pretensions of religious and local knowledge and gain them admit-
tance to a monument’s universal value: “Viewed from this standpoint, the 
rock temple of the Brahmans stands on precisely the same footing as the Bud-
dhist Vihara, and the Muhammadan Musjid as the Christian Cathedral.”66 
Curzon’s speech invited the audience to admire not just the monuments of 
India but also itself within this space — empowered and just. The vision of 
the enlightened British ruler casting out the shadows of “religious fanaticism, 
of restless vanity, [and] of dynastic and personal pride” became the trope of 
Curzon’s imperial program and the constant refrain of his speeches both in re-
gard to monument preservation and the preservation of British rule in India. 
Seen from the context of the power relations of the times, when the national-
ist movement entered a more strident period, his rhetoric also belied the real 
tension and fear the dominant power faced in India.
Once Curzon had convinced the British in India to support a preservation 
program for the Indian monument, he moved on to the reorganization of the 
ASI. On 23 September 1900 he wrote a note to the Revenue and Agriculture 
Department outlining the previous work of the ASI and its failures to protect 
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the country’s monuments. He faulted the provincial system, which put the 
work of conservation in the hands of local governments that had “grosser and 
more material concerns” and left the direction of such work to “the caprice of 
the local Governor.”67 Curzon’s solution was to employ a corps of men firmly 
dedicated to the service of monument preservation and to reestablish the posi-
tion of the director general. In February 1902 John Marshall was appointed 
to this position for a five-year term with the principal duty of conservation.68 
Curzon’s other great accomplishment was the authoring of the Ancient Mon-
uments Preservation Act of 1904. After putting these mechanisms in place, 
Curzon himself oversaw the restoration of the Mughal monuments. His per-
sonal attention to the work at the Taj Mahal turned that monument into the 
flagship of British preservation policy and practice.
Lighting up the Taj Mahal
Of all of India’s historical architecture, it was Mughal architecture in which 
Curzon took the most interest, and of all the Mughal structures, it was the Taj 
Mahal that captured his imagination most strongly. Standing before the Taj 
Mahal during his first visit to India in 1887, he experienced sublime transport: 
“I stood there and gazed long upon the entrancing spectacle, the singular love-
liness of it pouring in waves over my soul and flooding my inner conscious-
ness till the cup of satiety was full, and I had to shut my eyes and pause and 
think.”69 It also was the only building in the world that Curzon encountered 
that he could not critique: “I could not find it in me to devise wherein, even 
according to my own faulty notion of beauty and style, it was imperfect or 
capable of improvement.”70 Clearly moved by the building’s arresting beauty, 
Curzon appreciated the aesthetic power of the Taj Mahal, which gainsaid all 
the carefully constructed theories of Muslim barbarism and lack of culture. 
It was also to align himself with this power that he selected it as the space to 
best represent his worldview.
Curzon introduced his restoration program for the Mughal monuments 
in a speech in December 1899: “I shall examine all these buildings, which 
are already well known to me, with the most minute care; and shall not rest 
satisfied until, in each case, the structure has been rendered secure against 
the ravages of further decay and has received such attention as may be feasible 
and desirable in faithful renovation, or reproduction of that which has been 
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injured or destroyed.”71 With these words Curzon marked a radical change 
in the spatial dynamics of Mughal monuments. Their space would no longer 
be divided between the knowledge of nondiscursive beauty and scientific ar-
chaeology, between the Eros and the Logos. Through his efforts the Mughal 
monuments’ contradictory spatiality would be not only transcended but Brit-
ish power would also be able to appropriate some of the aura and mystic of the 
Mughals.
In practical terms, Curzon compiled lists of repairs and left them with the 
local governments’ superintendents and the ASI, supervising their work from 
Calcutta. He also made six tours to the Mughal monuments during his tenure 
to ensure that the work met his exacting standards. Among the restoration 
projects that he completed were Akbar’s tomb, where he had the marble mina-
rets of the main gateway rebuilt; The Tomb of Humayun, where he restored 
the garden and fixed the water channels. In Delhi’s Red Fort he superintended 
the restoration of gardens and the diwan-i khass, or private audience hall, and 
ordered the mosaic representing Orpheus returned from the Victoria and 
Albert Museum and reinstalled inside the diwan-i amm. At Fatehpur Sikri he 
supervised the restoration of stone screens, rescued the Rang Mahal from pri-
vate ownership, and built a dak bungalow to board overnight visitors. While 
all Mughal monuments were of interest to Curzon, it would always be the Taj 
Mahal he singled out for the most careful and personal attention.
The Taj Mahal’s restoration to its original state of grandeur was para-
mount for Curzon: “If I had never done anything else in India, I have written 
my name here, and the letters are a living joy.”72 Indeed, the attachment of 
his name to the Taj Mahal is revealed in tourist descriptions that mention 
him along with Shah Jahan as the author of the building’s moving presence. 
Even Nehru commented on the Mughal monument’s restoration as defining 
Curzon’s legacy: “After every other Viceroy has been forgotten, Curzon will 
be remembered because he restored all that was beautiful in India.”73 But what 
precisely did Curzon actually do at the site to warrant such commemoration? 
Of course, there are the physical alterations. Among these was the installation 
of the famous hanging lamp that illuminated the central dome of the tomb. 
After six months of correspondences with the consul general of Egypt, the 
Earl of Cromer, and a personal trip across the Arabian Sea, he procured what 
he considered to be the most perfect lamp in Cairo. He also supervised the 
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restoration of the marble inlays and the carved panels inside the tomb, as well 
as that of the mosque and its mirroring structure, the jawab, which sat across 
from each other. This stonework and the clearing of the area just outside the 
Taj Mahal restored to the tomb a suggestion of its original opulence. However, 
Curzon’s design for the garden introduced a thoroughly modern configura-
tion to the monument and marked it with the character of British power.
In Curzon’s estimation, the garden of the Taj Mahal had lost its Mughal 
Fig 5: The Taj Mahal, from the top of the gateway, Agra, 1860. Photograph by Col. E. C. 
Impey © British Library Board, Photo 971/(24)
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character since “no longer was there an orderly arrangement of compartments 
filled with flowers and low shrubs and trees.”74 The overgrown trees and cy-
presses that lined the central canal hindered an immediate view of the tomb 
on entry into the garden (figure 5). Curzon did not realize — or he may not 
have cared — that the obscuring verdure was part of an Islamic garden aes-
thetic. This knowledge did not escape Bishop Heber, who wrote of the garden 
and its relationship to the Taj Mahal in 1824: “Beautiful cypresses, and other 
trees, and profusion of flowering shrubs, contrasts [sic] very finely with the 
white marble of which the tomb itself is composed, and takes off, by partially 
concealing it, from that stiffness which belongs, more or less, to every highly-
finished building.”75 The contrasting colors and textures that Heber found so 
appealing appeared to Curzon a mere obstruction. As a follower of the theories 
of Ruskin, he saw in historical architecture only the universal values of  beauty 
and history. The concealing effect was removed along with the cypresses and 
trees on the outer sides of the garden. Curzon then put down lawns on either 
side of the central canal and fixed the water channels and fountains (figure 6).76 
Although he claimed to have followed recently discovered Mughal plans of 
the garden and channel system, his landscaping made the “setting take on 
a subtly English character.”77 Curzon’s activities at the Taj Mahal extended 
past the monument’s perimeter walls. He cleared the areas outside of modern 
structures, creating a buffer zone between the dense and busy Taj Ganj area 
and the monument. After all these alterations, Curzon was satisfied that he 
had restored the Taj Mahal to its original appearance. “The Taj itself and all 
its surroundings are now all but free from the workmen’s hands. It is no longer 
approached through dusty wastes and a squalid bazaar. A beautiful park takes 
their place; and the arcaded streets and grassy courts, that precede the main 
building, are once more as nearly as possible what they were when completed 
by the masons of Shah Jahan.”78 Although the Taj Mahal was finally restored 
and repaired, it was certainly not the same monument that Shah Jahan had in-
tended it to be. The monument was now a hybrid space; it was both a histori-
cal site that marked the zenith of Mughal rule and a space of  British power. 
The Eros that had been identified with the Islamic quality of the Taj Mahal, 
with the paradisiacal signification of the Rauza-i Munawwar, the Illustrious 
Garden-Tomb, as the pilgrims and devotees spoke of it, was now identified 
with British monumentality and the ineffable sentiment of age it valued. As 
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Ruskin elaborates on the moving power of age: “[A building’s greatest] glory 
is in its Age, and in that deep sense of voicefulness, of stern watching, of mys-
terious sympathy, nay, even of approval or condemnation, which we feel in the 
walls that have long been washed by the passing waves of humanity. It is in 
their lasting witness against men, in their quiet contrast with the transitional 
character of all things, in the strength which, through the lapse of seasons and 
times, and the decline and birth of dynasties, and the changing of the face of 
the earth, and of the limits of the sea, maintains its sculptured shapeliness for 
a time insuperable, connects forgotten and following ages with each other, and 
half constitutes the identity, as it concentrates the sympathy, of nations, it is in 
the golden stain of time, that we are to look for the real light, and color, and 
preciousness of architecture.”79 The Taj Mahal after Curzon’s restoration was 
to be experienced through this prism of “Age.” The “golden stain of time” thus 
suppresses the Indian Real, which persists in the unsettling rituals and eco-
nomic practices that disrupt the order of the monument. But these rituals do 
not concern the British visitor, who could now identify the experience of the 
Taj Mahal in uniquely national and racial terms. This ability to differentiate 
British order from Indian disorder is revealed in the words of J. M. Graham, 
a tourist visiting the Taj Mahal after the completion of Curzon’s restoration: 
“Of late years the Indian Government has spent a good deal upon the building 
and its surroundings, and prevented the near approach of sordid native life, 
with its dirt, its noise, and its petty thefts.”80 The caretakers, which Curzon 
permitted to continue their service to the tomb, only served to heighten the 
contrast now set up between the tenuous transitory nature and the positive 
permanence of the tomb: “They pressed upon us, as we turned to go, withered 
and much-be-handled roses, with dirty sugared cakes, and we thrust the usual 
rupee into their ready clutches.”81 Such fleeting and irksome obtrusions of na-
tive life could no longer mar the experience of monumentality as the ageless 
and sublime beauty of the Taj Mahal washed these elements away. In actuality, 
the “sordid” locals and the newly cleaned space of the monument remained 
mutually signifying and reciprocal signs of the tomb.
When Curzon outlined his proposal for monument preservation to the 
Asiatic Society in 1899, he was doing more than relating feasible solutions to 
the problems of British Indian archeological practice. He also revealed how 
the Indian monument would be produced through a series of conceptual sepa-
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rations and negations that served to render it a modern space of enlightened 
British imperialism. The framework of this procedure is encapsulated in his 
description of the British approach to the Indian monument: “What is beau-
tiful, what is historic, what tears the mask off the face of the past, and helps 
us to read its riddles, and to look it in the eyes — these, and not the dogmas 
of combative theology, are the principal criteria to which we must look.”82 
Taking this statement at its face value would suggest that once Curzon was 
finished with his restoration of a monument like the Taj Mahal, it would shine 
forth as a space of universal transparency and that power, with the help of 
science, would have expressed itself through this illumination. But this trans-
formation constituted only half of the spatial operation. As Anthony Vidler 
has pointed out, there was a covert side to this desire for transparency and its 
aim to “eradicate the domain of myth, suspicion, tyranny and above all the 
irra tional.”83 Refuting Foucault’s theory that power after the Enlightenment 
operated through the eradication of dark space, Vidler argues instead that 
the dark space was an inherent product of that operation: “The moment that 
saw the creation of the first ‘considered politics of spaces’ based on scientific 
concepts of light and infinity also saw, and within the same epistemology, the 
invention of a spatial phenomenology of darkness.”84 This realization shows 
us that Curzon’s overt intentions to illuminate the monument were under-
girded by a hidden deference to and fascination with the darkness he sought 
to eradicate.
Curzon intended to illuminate the Taj Mahal, as he proposed in his speech 
of 1899, according to the universal criteria of beauty and history, but his re-
ordering of the spatial realities of the monument produced a different out-
Fig 6: A marvel of 
beauty — looking N. 
to Taj Mahal, marble 
tomb of a Mogul 
Queen, Agra, India, 
1903. Photograph 
by James Ricalton 
© British Library 
Board, Photo 181/(66)
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come. For example, as a monument was swept clean and restored to its former 
grandeur, the contingent did not vanish, but resurfaced as the dark space of 
the monument. This was the case at the Taj Mahal and at other Mughal tombs 
and mosques — which were still living monuments — where religious practices 
had to be accommodated by the state. The acts of prayer, pilgrimage, venera-
tion, and death, as well as the sublimity of monumental form and everything 
else that was incommensurable and unruly, were subsequently signified as the 
dark space of the monument. These dark elements overstep their boundaries 
and enter the light space to contradict the norms set by power, disrupting its 
rigid conceptual order and questioning the authority of its knowledge. In this 
manner, a monument like the Taj Mahal easily turned from being a dogmatic 
space of empire to a dialectic space of native resistance and imperial reitera-
tion. The implications and crises of this dimorphic existence and Curzon’s 
genius in shaping this sort of existence are revealed most clearly in the new 
practice of tourism, the subject of the following chapter.
 3 between fantasy and phantasmagoria
  The Mughal Monument and the Structure  
  of  Touristic Desire
Curzon’s conservation and restoration efforts prom-
ised that the Mughal monuments would be read as spaces of enlightened Brit-
ish power. He alone combined the Logos and the Eros, obliterated the dis-
tinction between science and art, and produced the Mughal monument as a 
productive space for the British Empire. In this regard, the subjects of empire, 
both Indian and British, were to be interpellated by the monument and to 
identify with the idea of British rule and Indian subjection: “Without India,” 
Curzon insisted, “the British Empire could not exist.”1 To which the monu-
ment is fantasized as responding, “without the British, India would not exist.” 
However confident Curzon was in the power of this ideational dialogue to 
shape the spatial dynamics of his newly reconditioned Mughal monument, 
he also knew that the process would not always go uninterrupted. The monu-
mental Real would always seep back in. Located in contingent and contesta-
tory spatial practices, this reality refused the symbolic order of imperial power. 
It was for this reason that Curzon called on British tourists to perform empire 
by conducting themselves ethically in these moments of doubt and dread and 
thereby veiling the Real behind the reconstituting mirror of the monument 
and the Indian other.
Inviting the Tourist to India
By the turn of the century, many more British tourists were able to undertake 
a trip to India than previously. The technological innovation of the steam 
engine and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 shortened the trip from 
Europe to India from around five months to about sixteen days. Once in 
India, tourists could reach any part of the country by train; rail lines, Curzon 
proudly announced, had reached 28,150 miles in 1905.2 Well-appointed hotels 
like the Maiden’s in Delhi, the guidebooks of Keene and Murray, and compre-
hensive packages offered by Thomas Cook and Sons also made a trip to India 
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manageable. Among the British public who could afford such a journey was 
the growing number of people of some “means and leisure,”3 who might have 
wintered in Egypt or the Riviera and now saw India as an exciting new alter-
native. Beckoned by good weather, dramatic landscapes, and historical monu-
ments, the tourists committed on average three to four months to travel to the 
“show-cities,” stopping along the way to see the ruins.4 Eustace Reynolds-Ball, 
the travel writer, called this new visitor the “fashionable globe-trotter,” dif-
ferentiating the type from its predecessor, “the intelligent traveler.”5
However, the trip to the fulcrum of empire, as Curzon called India, was 
more than a recreational adventure. British tourists were meant to bring the 
goodwill of their nation to the Indians. The Prince of Wales, addressing the 
British public in 1906 after his tour of India, urged his compatriots to go to 
India for this reason: “I cannot but think that every Briton who treads the soil 
of India is assisting towards a better understanding with the Mother Coun-
try, helping to bring down prejudice, to dispel misapprehension, and to foster 
sympathy and brotherhood. Thus he will not only strengthen the old ties but 
create new ones — and so, please God, secure a better understanding and a 
closer union of hearts between the Mother Country and her Indian Empire.”6 
A visit to India, the Prince of  Wales assured his subjects, would strengthen 
the nation’s cause of empire through a spirit of mutual understanding. Curzon 
similarly presented India as a significant facet of his compatriots’ national 
identity: “To me it is the greatest thing that the English people have, or are 
doing now; it is the highest touchstone of national duty.”7 Seen in this light, a 
touristic visit to India could be construed as a service to country. India needed 
the tourist there — and so did Great Britain.
India may have beckoned with the promise of exciting cities and roman-
tic monuments, as well as the possibility of forging lasting relationships with 
the natives, but in reality, touristic encounters were conditioned by anxiety 
and social isolation and mediated by fantasy. Tourists to India were meant to 
stay in a preset and prescribed program of travel. The spaces of tourism — the 
train, the hotel, the city, the restaurant, and the monument — were guarded 
and guided sites of social control. Many British tourists later published these 
sightseeing experiences as encounters with the “real India.” Kipling mocked 
this practice in his sardonic portrayal of the tourist as “the man who ‘does’ 
kingdoms in days and writes books upon them in weeks.”8 But not everyone 
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scoffed at these texts the way Kipling did. Publishers like John Murray, 
Chapman and Hall, George Routledge, and Sampson Low, to name a few, 
reproduced these travel journals to meet an evident demand for entertaining 
descriptions of India. Part of these texts’ allure derived from their presenta-
tion of the ambivalent aspects of empire, revealing that the controlled spaces 
of India, such as monuments, were in actuality shot through with moments of 
shock and apprehension enabling tourists to test their traveler’s mettle. These 
texts now provide invaluable information about the monuments’ function as 
spaces to live out the fantasies and contradictions of empire.
Touring the Indian Monuments
Another important aspect of the touristic visit is how power actualized it-
self at the monument. As Anthony Vidler explains, power is not the result 
of transparency but emerges from a “pairing of transparency and obscurity.”9 
Monuments, like “all the radiant spaces of modernism . . . should be seen as 
calculated not on the final triumph of light over dark but precisely on the 
insistent presence of the one in the other.”10 Viewed in this manner, Curzon’s 
restored Mughal monuments operated on three registers: they affirmed the 
subject as a subject of imperial power, they subjected the tourist to the desires 
of India, and they also brought the subject into contact with the Real. Indian 
monuments were thus not open to unobstructed viewing and walking but 
were, more precisely, sites that oscillated between light and darkness, between 
fantasy and phantasmagoria.
In Out of India, Kipling perceptively illustrates this oscillation between 
light and dark by transporting the reader into the place of a tourist walk-
ing through a historical monument in Rajasthan. In chapter 2 of the book, 
he provides us with a description of Jaipur, the city founded by Jai Singh II 
(1688–1743), the maharaja of Amber and a vassal of the Mughal emperor 
Aurangzeb. Kipling frames the city as a conflicted space in which the old ex-
ists in dialectic tension with the new. Starting with its origins, the city is said 
to have been planned “with huge streets straight as an arrow,” replete with 
palaces, gardens, and temples. Jaipur is characterized by the ruler’s social re-
forms (“he did his best to check infanticide”) and his investments in science 
and learning, particularly astronomy. But then a new layer of meaning is su-
perimposed on this illustrious past: “Later on came a successor, educated and 
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enlightened by all the lamps of British Progress, and converted the city of Jey 
Singh into a surprise — a big, bewildering, practical joke.”11 Kipling reveals 
the person responsible for this modern urban planning to be Colonel Swinton 
Jacob, the superintending engineer of the State of Jaipur. Eager to bring the 
pink city into the modern era, Jacob advised the raja to put down trottoirs 
(sidewalks) of hewn stone to outline the main street and construct waterways 
and gas works, as well as a school of art and a museum. The new structures 
stood in “startling contrast” to the old ordering of the city.
Watching over this “strange medley,” Kipling tells us, were the surround-
ing fortress-studded hills, one of which contained a large welcome sign set 
up originally for the Prince of Wales when he visited the city in 1876. Nearly 
twenty years later, it hailed another visitor, “the average traveler of to-day,” 
who “may appropriate the message to himself, for Jeypore takes great care of 
strangers and shows them all courtesy.”12 In this observation Kipling reveals 
the capability of the tourist at the turn of the century to fantasize himself or 
herself into a position once reserved for royalty: British nationality and the 
space of Jaipur conspired to elevate the tourist from the middle class to the 
ruling class.
In the next chapter Kipling takes us on a walk with a tourist visiting the 
desolate palace of the city of Amber, Jai Singh II’s former capital. The nar-
rative reveals the ambivalent realities of a visit to a monument and the taut 
act of mediating the given truth of the space and the unconscious realiza-
tion of another more troubling one. The tourist leaves behind Jaipur with its 
pavements and educational institutions of enlightenment to come on miles of 
“semi-decayed Hindu temples — brown and weather-beaten — running down 
to the shores of the great Man Sagar Lake,” where he (or she) encounters “more 
ruined temples, palaces and fragments of causeways.”13 The ruins signal the 
tourist’s passage into another time, and as he reaches Amber in the dawn’s 
light, he sees a city “that will never wake.” He ascends the causeway to the 
palace and finds himself in a great courtyard, where he decides against taking 
a native guide, as the Oriental “is undiscriminating and sets too great a store 
on corrugated iron-roofs and glazed drain-pipes.”14 Walking by himself, the 
tourist anxiously maintains the illusion of a past separated from the present. 
Before describing the tourist’s entry into the palace proper, Kipling frames 
what is to follow by introducing Eugène Viollet-le-Duc’s idea that “a building 
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reflects the character of its inhabitants.”15 Accordingly, the dark, narrow, 
recessed passages “where a man might wait for his enemy unseen,” and the 
maze of stairs “leading nowhither” along with the screens of marble tracery 
“that hide or reveal so much” confer on the palace and the people that once 
inhabited it the character of inscrutability.16 This uncanny atmosphere would 
unsettle more susceptible minds, but the rational tourist of Kipling’s account 
cannot be so confounded. Armed with his guidebook and the certainty that 
the palace and its inhabitants are long dead, he does not feel fear but only 
“impertinent curiosity.”17 He explores the palace, taking note of the reassuring 
signs of its ruin: “[A] creeper had set its hands upon the lattice there, and there 
was dust of old nests in one of the niches in the wall.”18 He does allow himself 
a moment to imagine the past as it might have been lived by the women in 
the zenana, or by the kings in the forty-pillared Hall of Audience; but this 
fantasizing, Kipling points out, is far removed from any understanding of the 
true causes of the surrounding decay: “The wise man will visit it when time 
and occasion serve, and will then, in some small measure, understand, what 
must have been the riotous, sumptuous, murderous life to which our Gov-
ernors, Lieutenant-Governors, Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, 
Colonels and Captains and the Subalterns after their kind, have put an end.”19 
The tourist’s travel guide, however, safely steers his gaze away from such offen-
sive deductions. Only the rare “wise man” would pause to contemplate exactly 
what path led to the palace’s present decay, and whether the British rulers did 
not at the very least do their part to hasten it along.
Finally reaching the top of the palace, whose grounds cover two-thirds 
of the city, Kipling’s tourist “looked into its very heart — the heart that had 
ceased to beat.” Everything is bared to his view, even the zenana’s rooms, and 
the noble houses appear as stone heaps. Kipling evokes Lord Byron’s Romantic 
poetry in the tourist’s thoughts as he wonders, faced with the fading struc-
tures of the palace, how one “could have ever believed in the life of her.”20 
The grandiose vista and its stillness have impressed and satisfied him in the 
way grandiose natural scenery is likely to do; the stillness of the desert or the 
sea have a comparably peaceful effect. However, as the tourist turns from this 
view to descend the monument and returns to the present day of his time, he 
is beset by a sense of unease. The modern intrudes aggressively on the tranquil 
vision he has just experienced: “The Englishman went down through the pal-
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ace and the scores of venomous and suggestive little rooms, to the elephant in 
the courtyard, and was taken back in due time to the Nineteenth Century in 
the shape of his Highness, the Maharajah’s Cotton-Press, returning a profit of 
twenty-seven percent, and fitted with two engines of fifty horse-power each, 
an hydraulic press, capable of exerting a pressure of three tons per square inch, 
and everything else to correspond. It stood under a neat corrugated iron roof 
close to the Jeypore Railway Station, and was in the most perfect order, but 
somehow it did not taste well after Amber. There was aggressiveness about the 
engines and the smell of the raw cotton. The modern side of Jeypore must not 
be mixed with the ancient.”21
Why this distaste? Clearly, the sight of the “neat” and efficient machinery 
does not elicit from the tourist the sense of pride in British industrialization 
he might otherwise feel; Kipling’s seemingly matter-of-fact description of the 
formidable power and pressure exercised by the machine evokes something 
menacing, even violent, which, in such proximity to the ruined palace com-
plex, unpleasantly conjures the possibility of a causal connection between the 
two: behind the rhetorical representations of an ordered and improving Brit-
ish India lies the brutal force of iron and steel, in other words, the kind of 
power capable of producing not just “a profit of twenty-seven percent” but 
also death and devastation on a large scale. It represents the barbarity that 
inevitably underlies the imposition of any kind of civilized order.
What Kipling provides in his description of the palace of Amber is the 
messiness of a typical tourist visit to a monument and the unease that rests at 
the core of every touristic experience. Drawn to the monument through the 
fantasy of desire, British tourists are constituted in its space as both subjects 
of and as subjected to empire. They do not find a transparent space of knowl-
edge and linear timekeeping at the Indian monument, but rather an opaque 
space in which time is cyclical and simultaneous, pulsating with the life of the 
Indian past, present, and future. In order to survive their immersion in this 
recalcitrant India, the tourists hold fast to their travel guides and repeatedly 
perform the role of ethical tourists at the monument.
The Guided Tours of the Mughal Monuments
Tourist writings of visits to Mughal monuments in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and the early twentieth reflect the same destabilizing experience of simul-
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taneity and opaqueness of Kipling’s tourist. These writings also disclose a par-
ticular desire for, not opposition to, the contingent, as read in this description 
of a tourist’s visit to the monuments of Delhi: “My record of Friday, December 
22, 1899, runs as follows: ‘A great day, for it has taken us over ground occupied 
by various successive dynasties, conflicting religions, and contending races, — a 
task in sight-seeing which, according to Keene’s Handbook for Visitors, ought 
to occupy one for not less than two days.’ But our most interesting and dis-
tinctive experience was not in the way of visiting ruined palaces, tombs, and 
mosques, and — guidebook in hand — laboriously digging out details of his-
tory and description, but in the form of what might have been a very serious 
encounter with a crowd of rascally natives.”22 The writer goes on to describe 
the aggression his party faced after they refused to pay more than a rupee to 
see two Indian men perform a stunt called well-jumping. Wells were a com-
mon feature of Mughal palaces and forts, and they provided an easy form 
of entertainment for the newly arrived tourists. After diving into the murky 
depths of a stagnant pool from heights of sixty to seventy feet, young men and 
boys would ask for remuneration. Most tourists paid for these feats, but those 
who did not were subject to verbal abuse or threats that left them disoriented. 
The well-jumping incidents reveal how at the Indian monument natives were 
free to alter the controlled order of the space through unauthorized perfor-
mances and thus turn a space of transparency into a space of refusal.
Such local disruptions often came as a shock to tourists due to their spec-
tacular effect, but what made them even more alarming was that they were 
never mentioned in the tourist guidebooks whose maps, itineraries, descrip-
tions, and practical information were supposed to render the visit to India 
predictable. The guidebook was an essential tool of touristic travel, something 
that Kipling’s globetrotter described as “a thing you can carry in your trunk y’ 
know — that gives you plain descriptions of things without mixing you up.”23 
The book of choice was Murray’s Handbook for Travellers in India, Burma, 
and Ceylon. Revised and updated every two or three years, the book made sure 
the tourist knew everything necessary for safe and informed travel. 
The cities and monuments of India, in Murray’s Handbook, were divided 
into thirty-five routes. Each route was described with the same set of informa-
tion, such as a destination, which railway to take there, the size of the popula-
tion, its map coordinates and relative distance from other cities. Hotel infor-
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mation, the whereabouts of social clubs, post offices, banks, and the location 
of the main governmental structures completed the general description. The 
tourist was also provided with suggestions about how to spend each day sight-
seeing. This section often included art historical and archaeological informa-
tion gleaned from James Fergusson’s architectural texts or from ASI reports. 
James Burgess, the former director of the ASI, also lent his archaeological ex-
pertise to the guide by checking the facts and figures of the monuments for 
accuracy. Maps, diagrams, and floor plans of major structures were added to 
help the tourists orient themselves. In the 1909 edition of the handbook the 
Mughal monuments of Agra and Fatehpur Sikri were included in Route 13, 
and those of Delhi in Route 14.
With Murray’s Handbook always open to the relevant page, the tourists 
made their way through the monuments of Mughal India. They quickly dis-
covered, however, that the lived realities of these spaces did not conform to the 
guidebook’s ordered information. An American tourist who visited Fatehpur 
Sikri described this contrary condition: “A troop of guides lay in wait for us, 
and luck let us have another of those stupid parrots who, in embroidered caps 
and winding chuddas, mislead one over all the show-places of India. This one 
stuttered — may all others know and avoid him by that sign! — and, like all of 
his gild, reversed the guide-book order of sight-seeing. We had already suffered 
enough in that way, and we ordered him to right about face and march to 
the Turkish queen’s house, first on the Murray list and first object before the 
Hall of Records. ‘But, ladyship, I wish f-f-first to sh-sh-show you the mosque 
and my ancestor’s grave.’ But we wanted none of his ancestors, except in their 
regular order.”24 The tourist is here doubly interpellated by the space of the 
monument. First, her realization that her racial brethren prepared and ordered 
this site allows her to symbolically identify with the dominant power. But 
then the paranoia of losing this power to the native is reflected in her fantasy 
of the duplicitous native who desires her respect and admiration. The space 
of Fatehpur Sikri is thus ever oscillating between control and lack of control, 
through which the subject anxiously constitutes her identity.
The American tourist’s experience can be compared to a touristic experi-
ence of an earlier period where such an oscillation was not entertained and 
the subject’s principal concern was the demystification of the monument. A 
tourist calling himself an “old Indian” narrates the story of his visit to the 
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dargah of Sheikh Salim Chishti at Fatehpur Sikri (figure 7). Having availed 
himself of a guide who claimed to be a descendent of the sheikh, he entered 
the tomb, which was located in the courtyard of the congregational mosque: 
“Our guide, on entering, reverently left his slippers at the entrance, but did not 
seem (so degenerate is the age) to expect us to follow his example: nor did we. 
We found a crimson cloth covered over the marble tomb under the inlaid 
canopy, and being curious to know if there was aught to be seen beneath, 
begged our guide to upraise it. He, however, protested against this, though 
unable to assign any reason for his objection; and we therefore insisted on hav-
ing the cloth removed, seeing that even any outward form of reverence to the 
place has long since been considered unnecessary. Nothing was visible except 
the usual form of a marble tomb.”25
Curzon would surely have bristled at behavior that showed such lack of rev-
Fig 7: General view of the tombs of Sheikh Salim Chishti and Islam Khan, Fatehpur 
Sikri, India, 1885. Photograph by W. Caney © British Library Board, Photo 1003/(620)
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erence for the mystery of the Mughal monument. Moreover, the viceroy was 
well aware that overt displays of dominance weakened the British subject and 
the imperial cause: “Depend upon it, you will never rule the East except from 
the heart, and the moment imagination has gone out of your Asiatic policy 
your Empire will dwindle and decay.”26 The “Old Indian’s” comportment at 
the tomb reveals his lack of knowledge, his lack of respect for the mysteri-
ous, and an almost poignant inability to reckon with the unknown. Tourists 
heeding Curzon’s advice were better equipped to meet the unfamiliar — and 
commune with the Eros — because they had the control offered by imagina-
tion and fantasy. They were elevated rather than abased by the humility they 
exhibited, as is readily apparent in the account provided by a post-Curzon 
tourist of her entry into the Taj Mahal: “We passed through into an eloquent 
silence: love and death were thus reigning supreme, and beside the eternal 
power of both life itself seemed small and incomplete.”27
Incidents like those cited above reveal the spatial dynamics at play at the 
Mughal monuments. Restored to their former grandeur by Curzon, the ma-
teriality of these sites — the repairs, flowing water channels, and freshly laid 
lawns — was meant to reflect the symbolic ordering of a compassionate and 
enlightened empire. But tourists were not expected to constitute their impe-
rial identity at the sites by simply identifying with this symbolization. They 
were also expected to actively engage with the spatial practices, the nondiscur-
sive elements of the site, and to mediate these contingencies through the tour-
istic fantasy, a fantasy whereby the British tourist sees himself or herself as the 
object of Indian lack: who, after all, would take care of these invaluable sites, 
this precious country, if not them? The legitimacy of empire, which around 
the turn of the century had begun to be challenged by rising nationalist move-
ments, was thus reasserted at the Mughal monuments of Agra and Fatehpur 
Sikri. The crucial point to note here is that through the fantasy of the protec-
tor and preserver of Indian history and life, British power imagined bridg-
ing the gap between the symbolic order and the Real. In an analogous vein, 
touristic fantasy imagined connecting with the impossible other — Lefebvre’s 
“diamond at the bottom of the melting-pot.” Through the practice of fantasy 
the tourist thus affirmed, mediated, and transformed the opaque monuments 
of India not into scientific objects but into monuments of desire.
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The Multiple Narratives of  Delhi’s Red Fort
Not all Mughal monuments were open to such plays of touristic fantasy as the 
Taj Mahal and Fatehpur Sikri. For example, the British governments before 
and after Curzon sought a less improvised, more circumscribed approach to 
the ordering of Delhi’s Red Fort, which was still known to many people as the 
site of the Great Mughal’s last stand and the symbolic center of the Uprising 
of 1857. The Red Fort was after all where Mughal authority was allowed to 
persist, albeit in impoverished form, into the nineteenth century, and for a few 
short months it represented the inversion of British Indian power relations. 
At the Red Fort, the freedom of touristic fantasy that defined the other Mu-
ghal monuments was limited. At this particular monument the tourist was at 
too great a risk of being overtaken by the horror and tragedy of the Uprising. 
Subsequently, a different strategy of spatial ordering was deployed here: that 
of the narrative.
The spatial narrative at sites that are defined by multiplicity, as Certeau 
points out, “makes possible the isolation and interplay of distinct spaces.”28 
It can create out of an old monument a brand-new field of experience and ac-
tion. In the case of the Red Fort, the narrative of the “Sepoy Mutiny” of 1857 
was expected to displace Mughal authority and render it an entertaining yet 
powerless spectral entity. In the authorized narratives of the Red Fort, the 
gardens, courtyards, and palatial buildings were no longer seen as significant 
spaces of Mughal imperial power, and their function during the great durbars, 
festivals, ceremonies, and day-to-day lives of the emperors was veiled behind 
other kinds of stories. The spaces of the Red Fort, the magisterial gateway, 
the audience halls, the Pearl Mosque, and the like were reordered by the codi-
fication of architectural surveys. When the fort was allowed to come alive 
and appeal to the reader’s or visitor’s imagination, it was only through the of-
ficial story of the Sepoy Mutiny. In spatial terms the Red Fort was fitted into 
what was known as the Mutiny tour, which Manu Goswami describes as “the 
‘monumentalization’ of particular sites and events of the rebellion of 1857.”29 
The shrines, scenes of battle, and monuments of Lucknow, Kanpur, and Delhi 
were ordered according to the official symbolization of the traumatic events 
that surrounded the Uprising. The tourists’ visit to these sites, Goswami ar-
gues, constituted their identity as British subjects and was imbricated with the 
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process of imperial consolidation. Through the prism of the Mutiny tour, all 
pre-British history in Shahjahan’s Delhi and palace was supressed. It was no 
longer seen as the seat of the Great Mughal but as the spot where the British 
Empire was inaugurated.
The essential stop on the Mutiny tour was Delhi’s Red Fort, where the 
official narrative of the events of 1857 reaches its climax. For most tourists, 
the story was imparted through tourist literature such as Murray’s Handbook 
of 1909. Following the directions of the Handbook, tourists entered the fort 
through the Lahore Gate, identified as the spot where the commissioner of 
the division was murdered on 11 May 1857. The rooms above the gate were 
described as the scene of the murders of the collector and the commandant, 
as well as of the chaplain and of two British ladies. In the Handbook’s edition 
of 1903, these details were given beforehand, in the general history section in 
the front of the book, remaining separate from the description of the actual 
monument. In 1909 the story of the Uprising was incorporated directly into 
the tourist’s walk through the Red Fort. This change resulted in the creation 
of a more direct sympathy with the space of the fort — and with those Brit-
ish killed there during the Uprising — and with the enlightened authority 
that now controlled it. The other structures of the palace to which the tour-
ist was guided called forth descriptive information gleaned from Fergusson’s 
and other architectural histories, and, where relevant, that information was 
supplemented with accounts of the events of the Uprising. For example, after 
passing though the gate and a long covered corridor, the tourists entered a 
courtyard: “The vaulted arcade ends in the centre of the outer court, which 
measured 540 ft. by 360 ft., of which the side arcades and central tank have 
been removed.” After this physical description the tourist reads that at the 
edge of the tank “were murdered, on 16th June 1857, some fifty Christians who 
had escaped the massacre of the 11th.” The tour of the Red Fort is completed 
with the Delhi Gate, at a structure where, tourists are informed, Bahadur 
Shah II was held by British authorities in September 1857: the story of the 
Uprising thus ends at a space of Mughal imprisonment. Murray’s Handbook 
devotes three times the space to describing the events of 1857 than it accords 
to Delhi’s other histories.30 Furthermore, when sites that have nothing to do 
with the Uprising are presented, they are abstracted into mere museographical 
objects, listed with dates, measurements, and other descriptive information.
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The spatial practice of authorized storytelling enabled British power to 
control the imaginary identification of the Red Fort and transform it into a 
space of triumph. The narrativized space structured the tourist’s experience 
and rendered the Red Fort a threshold marking the death of the Mughal Em-
pire and the birth of the British Empire. Through the tourist’s reading of the 
Red Fort, Mughal authority was cast into the shadows and rendered nothing 
more than a fading echo of the distant past, a bygone power that had aban-
doned its political center. As Goswami writes: “The official discourse on the 
mutiny had operated to repress contestatory narratives and the Royal Mutiny 
tour expressed the colonial will to authoritatively stamp and reiterate British 
constructions of ‘India’s past.’ ”31 While this is certainly how hegemonic power 
uses textual practice to suppress other histories, it does not describe the entire 
spatial process. If power is informed by resistance, then how that resistance 
manifested itself in the Mutiny tour itself needs to be studied. In the context 
of the Red Fort, the narrative as a strategy of spatial control as produced in 
Murray’s Handbook did not function without impediments. The palace itself 
resisted the symbolic ordering, as the trauma of the Uprising could not be 
entirely contained by narrative. This truth of the unthinkable events that oc-
curred at the Red Fort still resonated in the walls and functioned for Indians 
and some British that experienced the British treatment of the Mughals before 
and after the Uprising as a stain of resistance. This excess of symbolization 
that cannot be contained in text rendered the Red Fort a contradictory space 
and left it open to the possibility of counternarratives, other perspectives, and 
different modes of spatial ordering of the Mughal monument. In other words, 
as soon as the dominant power set down its authoritative version of the story 
of 1857, the Red Fort could do nothing but resist it and become a radical space, 
a differential space, that enabled others to produce their own modes of sym-
bolization, to make their own meaning out of the meaningless.
The Other Story of the Mughal Monuments
Among the groups that used the space of the Red Fort to contest the domi-
nant narrative of the monument were the Indian nationalists. The space of the 
Red Fort presented a means for them to tell their own story and to provide an 
alternative social ordering in which the British were rendered estranged and 
their knowledge false. To many educated Indians, the Red Fort, as signified 
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by the Uprising narrative of  Murray’s Handbook, represented the contradic-
tions of  British knowledge and power. From their subject position, the Red 
Fort was not the site of the triumph of good over evil but the site of the social 
death of Indian society. The Red Fort and its urban surroudings continued 
to resonate with scenes of indiscriminant killing, evacuation, and pillaging — 
of Indians. This is what united it with the rest of the city, whose streets, 
buildings, and neighborhoods were inscribed with the same bloody events. 
Although material conditions in the city improved after 1857, the memory 
of the post-Uprising trauma would haunt Delhi’s residents for years to come. 
The Mughal monuments in their restored and preserved state did not an-
nounce the dawn of a new liberal rule, but resounded with sounds of loss and 
death: the loss of British liberal policy, the social death of the city’s Muslim 
community, and, above all, the loss of truth. From the Indian perspective 
the preserved and restored Mughal structures thus functioned as a space that 
belied the barbarity coexisting with British civilization.
The other storytellers of the Red Fort and of other Mughal monuments 
were highly educated Indian urban elites, like the historian Jadunath Sarkar. 
His retelling of the story of the Red Fort takes a decidedly spatial approach 
and contests the guidebooks’ touristic knowledge. It appeared in the Indian 
nationalist journal Modern Review in 1908 and was titled, “The Daily Life of 
the Mughal Emperors.”32 Sarkar begins by questioning the touristic knowl-
edge of the Mughal monuments: “What is it that the common tourist sees 
in them? He may feast his eyes on their delicate mosaics and reliefs; he may 
soothe his spirit in the cool recesses of these pure white domes. But what he 
looks at is after all stone, bare stone. Does he ever think that these halls were 
once full of life, crowded with all the moving pageants of a Court? Does he 
try to realize that life of a bygone world, so distant, so unlike his? If so, what 
is his mental picture of it?”33 After posing these questions, Sarkar explains to 
his readers that this sort of limited perspective resulted from the utilitarian 
point of view practiced by Thomas Macaulay and his followers. These writ-
ers made Indian kings look like “heartless brainless despots, full of pride and 
ignorance, surrounded by pimps and sycophants, squeezing the last farthing 
from a down-trodden peasantry, and spending their hordes on sensual plea-
sure or childish show . . . men whose animal existence was never ennobled by 
intellectual exercise or spiritual musing, aesthetic culture or the discipline of 
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work.”34 To contest this knowledge, he exhorts the reader to look directly at 
the materiality of the Red Fort and asks, “Could this work have been done 
by sleepy voluptuaries?” Appealing to reason, Sarkar then states, “An empire 
like that of the ‘Great Mughals’ could not have been a dead machine; ad-
ministration, arts and wealth could not have developed, as they did develop 
in that period, if we had faineants on the throne, in the Council-chamber, 
and at the head of armies.”35 Having exposed the contradictions of British 
knowledge, Sarkar attempts to correct this misrepresentation. He consults 
the Padshahnama (1628–38), Shah Jahan’s official record, for alternative in-
formation about how the monuments were originally used. The second part 
of the article outlines an average day in the life of Shah Jahan as he would have 
spent it in his palace in Agra. Public and private audiences, prayers, councils, 
and artistic appreciation are the activities that signify and order palace spaces 
such as the diwan-i khass, diwan-i amm, zenana, and Shah Burj (lofty tower). 
Sarkar further describes who stood where during such proceedings, where 
the emperor sat, how he disposed himself before his courtiers, the courtiers’ 
comportment, and the timing of each activity. This information intended to 
reinscribe the space of the Mughal fort according to the rhythms, logic, and 
spatial practices of the seventeenth century.
Sarkar’s article on the Mughal fort is significant in that it reveals the mul-
tiplicity of meaning inherent in the space of the Mughal monument in this 
period of high British imperialism. As touristic discourse produced this space 
as a triumph of enlightened rule, Indians were simultaneously reappropriating 
and reordering it through their counternarratives. By telling their own stories 
of a given space, they challenged both the validity and the function of Brit-
ish knowledge. Sarkar’s article also tries to awaken the Indian tourist to see 
the Mughal palaces of Agra and Delhi not as recumbent spaces of a dead and 
distant Mughal but as spaces that still carry the spirit of a time during which 
India was ruled by an enlightened emperor who gave “peace, prosperity and 
contentment to his people.”36
Although Sarkar was not a nationalist, his thoughts on British represen-
tations of the Mughals did accord with the general mission of the Modern 
Review and its nationalist editor, Ramananda Chatterjee. Founded in 1907, 
the journal was intended for educated middle-class Indians with an interest 
in issues ranging from politics to culture. Over the years the publication in-
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culcated a nationalist sensibility among its readers and promoted new theo-
ries of art and architectural history that refuted British tropes of decline and 
disorder. Historians like Sarkar, as well as resolute Indian nationalists like 
Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, Arun Sen, and Sister Nivedita contributed essays 
presenting the spiritual logic, aesthetic criteria, and artistic practice of India’s 
art and architecture. These authors also challenged the British stereotype of 
the communal antipathy between Hindus and Muslims. For example, Sen 
countered the dominant representation of communal division with a descrip-
tion of an Indian landscape defined by cultural tolerance: “Buddhists, Jains, 
Hindus, Moslems in their eternal attempt at mutual synthesis have attained a 
glorious union. Racial antipathies have been forgotten, religious persecution 
have ceased, bitterness of feeling and rancour of heart soothed. . . . The Mus-
sulman mosque and seraglio are settled facts and they stand in close proximity 
to the Hindu temple. Jainism has worked beautifully for its own self as well 
as for the pleasure or the devotion of Islam. . . . The great trinity of Moghul 
Emperors employed Hindu artists and furthered Hindu tradition as ever did 
Hindu monarch [sic] of old.”37 Although highly idealized, the image of Indian 
sympathy and cooperation could be read as a direct response to Curzon’s ac-
counts of fragmentation and enmity provided to the Asiatic Society of Bengal 
thirteen years earlier.
Contemporary artists, too, were keen to link their work to the mythical 
and legendary stories of the ancient and medieval past and to produce a sense 
of Indian cultural revival. Abanindranath Tagore accomplished this in 1903 
in an art exhibition that coincided with Curzon’s Delhi Durbar. Tagore chose 
to exhibit three evocative watercolors, The Capture of Bahadur Shah, The 
Construction of the Taj, and The Final Moments of Shah Jahan. Like Sarkar’s 
article, Tagore’s exhibition of these romantic watercolors, later published in 
the Modern Review, was a tactical choice meant to help Indians imagine a 
more affirming process of identification than the one offered by the dominant 
power. Exhibited in the context of Curzon’s Durbar, which sought to revive 
and embody the pageantry of Mughal public ceremony, Tagore’s watercolors 
were offered in a spirit of resistance to the British appropriation and significa-
tion of Mughal culture, symbols and, most important, space.
These nationalist narratives and representations of the Mughal monument, 
while providing new symbols and tropes, did not, however, renounce the logic 
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of the modern ordering of the monument. Instead, they inverted the British 
signification of its light and dark spaces and thus retained the premise that 
monumental space is constituted by this binary order. Whereas for the West-
ern tourists the Mughal monuments reflected the good of empire and of their 
race, Indian historians and nationalists increasingly elicited different stories 
from the same monuments, reshaping the way Indian tourists experienced 
the sites.
The Indian touristic experience after the acceptance of the nationalist spa-
tial narrative of the Mughals is revealed in the autobiography of the writer 
Santha Rama Rau. Rama Rau visited Akbar’s city as a girl with her mother, 
Dhanvanthi, in the 1930s, when Indian demands for self-government were at 
a high pitch. At this point, most educated Indians knew the nationalist story 
of Mughal India as imparted by the writers and artists of the Modern Review. 
The production of the space of Fatehpur Sikri through this story of the Brit-
ish usurpation of Mughal authority and its lack of legitimacy is illustrated in 
Rama Rau’s description of her visit:
Fatehpur Sikri, the half-finished walled city, capital for Akbar, the greatest 
of the Moguls, remains as a disintegrating symbol of the old power of the 
princes. We found it, in contrast to the Taj Mahal, alive and intimate. We 
walked through the palace rooms, saw the queen’s bedroom with its cov-
ered bed and unfinished murals, visited the temples of different denomi-
nations within the royal city for the courtiers of different religions. Even 
in those days Indians believed in religious tolerance. It was on that basis, 
Mother told us, that Akbar had unified India.
“We have,” she pointed out, “a far longer history of unity and tolerance 
than any of the Western countries. More than two hundred years B.C. we 
had a great emperor Ashoka, who united India and preserved religious 
freedom for all his subjects. That’s why many of us find it a little hard to 
believe that what we are given to understand about the present religious 
unrest in India is either entirely true or particularly deep-seated. At the 
time Akbar ruled, about seventeen hundred years later, we had tolerance, 
unity and freedom too. Fatehpur Sikri proves some of those things, and 
our own — records which you never learned about, and which I read only 
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after I left school — show that Indians have always valued those qualities. 
Whenever we are given the chance we do act as a nation to institute a uni-
fied government.”38
Her mother’s iteration of the nationalist story of Indian rulers and their 
tolerance has the effect of a decoding stencil structuring Rama Rau’s view 
of Akbar’s palace and beyond: “The sun burned on the deep red sandstone 
buildings with their marble decorations, on the great courts, causeways, and 
half-completed throne-rooms and galleries, the domestic buildings and the 
more recent, poor little houses clinging to the city walls. We gazed out from 
the terraces and balconies down the ravine, the sides of which were encrusted 
with the huts of the peasants, to the immense burnt plains of central India. 
We saw, but no longer commented on, the flat, shocking contrast between 
the old decaying splendor and the new shoddiness and poverty.”39 Rama Rau 
would go on to become a prominent literary figure of postcolonial India. Per-
haps her pointed awareness of the fundamental power of monumental space 
helped her in her greatest project, the adaptation of E. M. Forester’s Passage 
to India into a stage play performed in London and New York between 1960 
and 1962.
After decades of neglect and especially after the Uprising of 1857 the Mu-
ghal monument began to matter again. It became one of the nodal points 
of the new racial discourse that legitimated the British Empire. The first at-
tempts to preserve and study the space vacillated between the Logos and Eros 
of monumentality and turned Mughal monuments into ambivalent spaces of 
British India. Curzon’s insistence on combining the two aspects of monumen-
tality in his programs of restoration and preservation turned the Mughal sites 
into fantastical spaces of power that affirmed British imperialism and sub-
jectivity. However, as the twentieth century wore on, power relations began 
to shift again and the legitimacy of British governance became strongly con-
tested. The freedom — championed by Curzon — to experience the Mughal 
monument through the senses was displaced by more structured narratives 
coming from both Indian nationalist and British texts. 
While these texts were being written and disseminated, a group largely 
ignored by both nationalists and imperialists enacted other tactics aimed 
94 | monumental matters
at recoding the Mughal monument. These alternative spatial practices were 
authored by the principal victims of the backlash of the 1857 Uprising — 
Muslims. In the following chapter I will show how the Mughal monument 
was also produced as a space of alternative social ordering by Muslims, who 
informed its space with their desire to forge a discrete and modern identity 
and with their struggle to survive the shift in power relations during the criti-
cal period after the Uprising and before Indian independence.
 4 rebuilding indian muslim space 
  from the ruins of the mughal 
  “moral city”
While the British and Indian nationalists were writing sto-
ries to reorder the Mughal monuments as ideological spaces for their respec-
tive communities, certain Muslims, too, were forging a unique relationship 
with these historical sites. This chapter will examine how the Muslim elites 
re-empowered the community and re-constituted a modern identity at the 
Mughal monuments. The account begins two decades before the Uprising 
of 1857 and ends with Indian and Pakistani independence from the British 
Raj. The distinctive spatial practices at the monuments were born out of the 
particular struggles these men engaged with, to first defend against the social 
death of their religious community, then to seek social justice and equality, 
and finally to obtain political representation in an India increasingly defined 
by electoral politics. In this period of social and political change, the Mughal 
monuments, once integral parts of the Islamic “moral city,”1 become divested 
of their power to shape Muslim identity. Forced into a self-protective dispo-
sition after the Uprising, many Muslims looked exclusively to the space of 
the mosque to orient themselves and to construct a social identity. When the 
electoral principle and the discourse of secular nationalism started to inform 
and order the public sphere, the Mughal monuments, the historical spaces of 
Indian Islam, were abandoned to imagine a separate national identity. India, 
in this new Muslim geography, was a land of loss, moral decay, and confu-
sion, and the Mughal monument stood as the principal spatial signifier of the 
unhomely reality of an Indian Muslim nation existing within secular India.
Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan’s Hybrid Ordering  
of the Mughal Monuments
In the decades before the Uprising of 1857 a handful of Muslim intellectuals 
attempted to study and represent the eminent monuments of the great Mu-
ghal cities. Most notable among these was Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan (1817–98). 
Sir Sayyid hailed from a noble family of the sharif class that traced its ancestry 
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to Central Asia and Persia. After his family fell on hard times, he took a job 
as a clerk for an East India Company court in Delhi and was quickly pro-
moted to subjudge. Outside of his work, Sir Sayyid’s interests turned toward 
the study of the city’s culture, history, and architecture. He was a new kind 
of Muslim intellectual who possessed a modern sensibility and a deep desire 
to preserve Muslim cultural life. Sir Sayyid’s architectural research appeared 
when Bahadur Shah still held court in the Red Fort and Delhi was a hub of 
Urdu culture. As he sensed that Indian Muslim culture was in the throes 
of dissolution he sought ways to stay this movement. Rajmohan Gandhi de-
scribes this exercise with respect to his writings: “Like other sharif  Muslims 
he too turned to the past to compensate for decline; unlike most of them he 
did so with skill.”2 The text that exemplifies this skill is his famous Athar al-
sanadid (Works of the nobles) of 1847. Published in Urdu, it provides insight 
into his research and theories on the Hindu and Islamic historical sites of 
Delhi. Beyond its informative purpose it also contradicted British representa-
tions of Indians trapped under the weight of religious observations, lacking 
objectivity, and being blind to historical progress. More important, his text 
preserved the Muslim practices and memory that enlivened Delhi’s monu-
ments. In the pages of the Athar al-sanadid, Islamic and especially Mughal 
monuments emerged as spaces of multiplicity; they were simultaneously the 
practiced spaces of the Muslim community and historical markers of their 
Indian past.
The Athar al-sanadid was not completely new in its epistemological syncre-
tism. British officials would often commission Indians to illustrate and write 
descriptions of monuments as souvenirs of their times spent in Indian cities. 
The collector and magistrate of Agra, John Steven Lushington, for example, 
commissioned a student at the Government College, Lalah Sil Chand, to 
compile a history of Agra and a description of its buildings in 1824. Called 
the Tafrih al-’ imarat (Account of the public buildings), it was written in Persian 
and contained thirteen color drawings of the city’s monuments.3 Sil Chand’s 
descriptions provided the monument’s measurements, its functions, and the 
names of patrons — in short, all the supposedly objective information that 
would have satisfied his sponsor. On a subtextual level, Sil Chand allows the 
history and memory of Mughal authority to continue to signify the city. He 
refers, for example, to Agra as Akbarabad, its Mughal name, and to the Taj 
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Mahal as the “illustrious garden of the Taj-e Ganj.” He also resurrected the 
names and locations of the now demolished palaces of the nobility, thus in-
scribing them in the account of the city. These are perhaps minor details, but 
they assure the endurance of local Muslim memory and perspective on the 
sites in the records of the British power.
Another work that performs this blending of knowledge is the Mir’at Giti-
numa of 1850, a geographical work by ‘Abd al-Karim Mushtak of Jhajjar. Also 
written in Persian, it presents a survey of Islam that ends with its entry into 
India.4 Moving through the eras of Muslim rule in India, Mushtak brings 
the reader to Mughal Delhi. He writes of the city in flowery prose: “And the 
width and length and height and fine arrangement [of the gardens, houses, 
courts, mosques, etc.] cannot be grasped by the intellect, for they are wider 
than the face of the earth and higher than the circle of the highest heaven, and 
to the inhabitants [of the city] everyday is like a celebration and every night is 
shivaratri; one cannot have worldly thoughts there.”5 Delhi is represented here 
as a sublime effect that no objective inquiry can fully capture. In stating this, 
the author elevates the lived and imagined experience of the city beyond the 
positivist knowledge that is to follow. He also orients the city for us, calling 
the Jama Masjid the “navel of the city.”6 The sensuality and centrality of the 
great mosque is then further elaborated for the reader in the description of 
the activities that occur in its southeast corner: the gathering of people buy-
ing and selling silk, pigeons, livestock, children’s toys, instruments, weaponry, 
food, and kebab.7 The evening, he relates, brings the storytellers telling their 
tales and claiming their due. The din of trade, the shouting of merchants, the 
haggling, the meetings of neighbors, and the sale of objects that came from 
as far as Kabul and Shiraz signify the space of the Jama Masjid as much as 
its presence as a historical monument. The author takes the opportunity of 
a commissioned geographical history to bring the reader over to his view of 
the Mughal monument, where its space is not solely defined by its placement 
in the linear history of past events but by the acts of praying, selling, buying, 
haggling, and just walking, in other words, by the spatial practices of Delhi’s 
everyday life.
Following in the tradition of these writers, Sir Sayyid’s Athar al-sanadid 
also endeavored to achieve the goal of enlivening the spaces of  Delhi through 
a description of Muslim culture, urban activity, and memory. Unlike the 
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previous histories, written in Persian for British patrons, his text was written 
in Urdu and intended for the Muslim community as much as for the British. 
He visited the monuments he wrote about and consulted the Persian histo-
ries available to him, such as the Mir’at aftab-nama of 1802.8 Sir Sayyid’s six 
hundred–page book had 130 woodcut illustrations made by Mirza Shah Rukh 
Beg and was divided into four parts — miscellaneous monuments of  Delhi, 
the Red Fort and its buildings, the buildings of Shahjahanabad, and the cul-
tural life of Delhi.9 In the second edition of the Athar al-sanadid of 1854, he 
reduced the final part to a few pages and updated and rearranged the order 
of the monuments according to building type. In contrast to the British view 
that saw Delhi as a set of ghost cities surrounding Shahjahanabad, Sir Sayyid 
represented his Delhi as coterminous with the past Delhis. As Narayani 
Gupta observed, “Athar was not an architectural history” but endeavored to 
create “a homogenised past for Delhi, where the ‘Hindu’ buildings . . . contin-
ued into ‘Islamic’ . . .”10 Such a mode of writing stood in opposition to the ASI’s 
later dissection of Delhi’s architecture into Hindu and Muslims parts. In Sir 
Sayyid’s book, history comes alive to inform the present, itself “described in 
terms of people — the diviners, the poets, artists, writers and musicians — as 
well as of the built environment.”11 His description of the Jama Masjid ex-
emplifies such an enlivening of history. Like Mushtak, he brings in the lived 
reality of the mosque and presents it alongside more positivist information 
concerning the style and form of the structure. Also like the earlier author, he 
presents the business and cultural activities as integral to the mosque’s mean-
ing. The north gate of the mosque, he mentions, is next to the great market 
where one finds money-changers and kebab sellers.12 Here, Sir Sayyid points 
out, Madari Sufis perform feats of strength; there, the jugglers perform their 
art. The scene is so exciting, he explains, that it renders the young old and 
the old young.13 Close by, storytellers sitting on carpets narrate the legends 
of Amir Hamza, Hatim Tai, and Bostan Khayal to the hundreds of people 
who come to hear these tales.14 Before the eastern gate of the mosque is the 
Khas Bazaar, a daily fair offering songbirds, pigeons, and a horse market can 
be found. Through the presentation of the Jama Masjid as the center of such 
profuse activity, Sir Sayyid, like the poet Nazir Akbarabadi before him, gives 
the reader a sense of how the local community enjoyed the sights, sounds, and 
smells of the space of the great mosque beyond their daily worship. In describ-
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ing the great mosque both as a great specimen of high Mughal architecture 
and as a space of everyday life in Delhi, he demonstrates the multiplicity and 
openness of these spaces to forge alternative knowledge alongside, or even con-
tradicting, that of the dominant power.
The life and power of the Jama Masjid is put into highest relief when one 
reads it against Sir Sayyid’s description of Humayun’s Tomb and the sur-
rounding garden. He takes a more sorrowful tone as he compares its former 
greatness to its present state: “There was a time when the garden was well 
cared for: water channels ran everywhere, there were tanks into which the 
water fell in a cascade or from which it came up in water fountains; beautiful 
flowers bloomed there and the nightingales made their song heard there. But 
now all is destroyed. The cypress, whose elegant bearing excited the jealousies 
of beauties, and the rose, whose crimson defied that of their lips, do not exist 
anymore, even in memory. The channels have left their beds, the tanks are dry, 
the fountains no longer run, the wells are deprived of water, there is no trace of 
the waterfalls that beautified the place, only a few ruins give an idea of things 
that have been destroyed.”15 After this lyrical description of the garden, which 
resembles in tenor and tone Mir’s shahrashob, Sir Sayyid concludes his account 
with factual data: the name of the tomb’s patron, Begam Nabob Haji; the year 
of its construction (973 Hijra; ca. 1565 CE); the time it took to construct the 
building (sixteen years); and how much the project cost (15 lakhs of rupees). 
This hybrid style of architectural discourse that is “ornate and literary, and 
not burdened with factual details” enlivens the tomb and thwarts the feeling 
of stasis that results from the scientism of modern architectural history.16
The interspersion of the literary in the otherwise positivistic text of Athar 
al-sanadid reveals a desire for a synthesis of British and Indian epistemologi-
cal practices. In this age of social decline, Muslim elites writing of the monu-
ments of the past found an elegant method for preserving their culture in a 
landscape increasingly shaped by British utilitarianism and Indian resistance 
to its scientific codification of monuments and geography. Without resorting 
to open confrontation or insularity, Sir Sayyid’s Athar al-sanadid produced 
the monument as a space of multiplicity in which both the British and the In-
dian Muslim could find a familiar ordering. Tangentially, the text also reveals 
the tolerant scholarly culture of mid-century Delhi, when Indians and British 
came together as peers in the pursuit of archaeological study.
100 | monumental matters
On 5 August 1852 Sir Sayyid was voted in as a member of the Archaeo-
logical Society of Delhi and joined the growing group of native members that 
included Ibrahim Khan Bahadur, the principal suddur amin of Delhi, and 
Nawab Ziya al-din of Loharu.17 Theophilus Metcalfe, a resident of Delhi, 
served as the society’s president.18 Convening monthly between 1847 and 1857 
to read papers, prepare translations, and participate in gentlemanly debate, 
the society offered a space in which British and Indians could freely exchange 
ideas about architecture. The society offered Sir Sayyid and other native elites 
an opportunity to share their interest in the built heritage of Delhi and to 
advance their cultural understanding of these spaces.
Reclaiming Muslim Space after the Uprising of 1857
In the aftermath of the Uprising, the shared sense of purpose and open ex-
change exemplified by the Archaeological Society would be lost. The field 
of archaeology was now the exclusive domain of the British government, 
and Indians its employees.19 At this moment of great trauma, Muslim intel-
lectuals directed all their energies toward helping their community survive 
both spiritually and materially. The particularly desperate social condition 
of the Indian Muslim community after 1857 and his aspiration to modernize 
Muslim society compelled Sir Sayyid to change his approach to Islamic archi-
tecture. This shift is most apparent in his opinion of monuments built and 
maintained by the Muslim charitable institution of the waqf. In his estima-
tion, these buildings hindered the progress of the Indian Muslim community: 
“The grand mosques and monuments and religious madrasas and maktabs, 
which were supported by charitable endowments from the Muslim nobility, 
were to Sir Sayyid symbols of their greed masked with a façade of piety, betray-
ing only the builders’ lack of concern for the collective well-being of the Mus-
lim.”20 Influenced by the teachings of the great reformer of Indian Islam, Shah 
Waliullah (1703–62), Sir Sayyid started to censure the same public monu-
ments of his community that he had extolled in Athar al-sanadid. The turn 
away from their beauty or history and toward the social aspect of Muslim 
buildings radically reordered these sites: mosques, shrines, and schools would 
no longer prove vital spaces in the network of Muslim economic and social 
practices, in which the waqf played a central role gathering and dispersing 
money. Instead, they were recast as the contradictory spaces of Islam, con-
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structions intended to preserve the wealth of the few at the expense of the 
many. Speaking to all and for all Muslims from the site of these structures, 
Sir Sayyid designated these spaces signs of Indian Muslim decline. The new 
disposition exemplifies how the oppression Muslims suffered after the Upris-
ing and their struggle to survive in the new urban order altered the relations 
between the community’s leaders and its built environments.
The deterioration of the Islamic urban order of Delhi, while starting years 
earlier, reached its climax in the post-Uprising period. The British rulers dis-
solved the Islamic “moral city,” and its constellation of interconnected spaces 
that included mosques, the palace, schools, homes, neighborhoods, and the 
market. The modern ordering, based on hygiene, control, and the separation 
of the public and private spheres of activity, disconnected the moral city and 
then reassembled its parts to create a new urban space. After the suppression 
of the Uprising, Delhi’s citizens, who had once identified themselves through 
the system of unified spaces, were left disoriented. The poet Ghalib, returning 
to Delhi at this time, expressed this loss of place: “Between the Jami Masjid 
and the Rajghat Gate, there is nothing but a vast wasteland, dreary and deso-
late” (see figure 8).21 After describing the city’s ruins, he asked how his culture 
could possibly endure in this devastation: “So how can Urdu survive? I swear 
to God, Dihli is a town no more. You might call it a military encampment, 
but the Fort and the city are no more. The Bazar [sic] and the lovely canal are 
no more.”22 The same fragmentation occurred in Lucknow, long considered 
the last great city of Muslim culture. The city’s Jami Masjid and the Asafi 
Imambara were occupied by the British after the Uprising. The former was 
never again allowed to be used as a Friday mosque, thus falling into ruin. 
Without “the heart of the Muslim socioreligious life in the city” the social 
order deteriorated, and the enmity between the Sunni and Shiite communi-
ties of Lucknow that still persists today can be traced to that spatial depriva-
tion.23 As Lucknow was made safe for the dominant power to reassume its 
authority, spatial practices that had made it an Islamic moral city, like Delhi, 
were eradicated.
Another significant change to the urban order of Muslim society in the 
aftermath of the Uprising was the division of social space into the private 
realm of religion and domestic life and the public realm of politics and gov-
ernment. Prior to this division, the mosque, school, market, and palace were 
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signified as public spaces by the activities of community leaders, whose exem-
plary actions (prayer, study, discourse, debate, etc.) constituted and created 
the moral city and community.24 In opposition to this stood the nondiscursive 
realm of carnal and mystical activity engaged in by women and Sufis. After 
the Uprising the state relegated all things religious to the private realm, and 
mosques and madrasas — previously understood as the public spaces of Indian 
Islam — were placed in the same category as the home and the Sufi lodge. This 
resignification, Faisal Fatehali Devji argues, made them spaces of the zaif, or 
the weak, “of slaves, youths and women, where rational or responsible dis-
course neither occurred nor was heard.”25 Without the open and public status 
of spaces like the mosque, Muslim leaders had no place to address or interpel-
late their community. To change this condition of displacement, these leaders 
needed to first take back the public spaces lost in the Uprising, to then return 
them to the public sphere.
It is against this background of social decline and urban reformation that 
the Mughal monuments of Delhi and Northern India emerged as ambivalent 
spaces of the weakened Muslim community and the newly empowered British 
Fig 8: “Delhi. General view of the Jumma Musjid.” Photograph by E. C. Impey  
© British Library Board, Photo 971(14)
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Raj. Of the Mughal monuments, the Jama Masjid and the Fatehpuri Masjid of 
Delhi were selected by Muslim leaders as the spaces for whose restoration they 
would petition the state. Shaped by the power relations of the period, these 
mosques were separated from the other public sites that once constituted the 
Mughal moral city, such as the Red Fort, the Chandni Chowk market, ma-
drasas, and the tombs. The two mosques alone emerged as the space of Indian 
Muslim social survival and identification.
The Return of the Mughal Mosques
When Muslims were allowed back into Delhi in 1859, they found the city in 
a state of physical and social disorder. Their ruling-class status, their Urdu 
culture, and the Mughal authority were no more. Furthermore, the state’s 
policy of retribution left the Muslim community, more than any other group, 
alienated from the great city they called home. Dastanbuy, or Nosegay, a nar-
rative of the Uprising written in Urdu by Ghalib, provides a window onto the 
imbalance of the city’s social order:
In January of 1858, the Hindus were given a proclamation of freedom by 
which they were allowed to live again in the city, and these people have 
begun to return from the places where they had found refuge. But the 
houses of the dispossessed Muslims had long remained empty and were so 
covered with vegetation that the walls seemed to be made of grass — and 
every blade of grass tells that the house of the Muslim is still empty.26
When this account reaches the hands of my friends, I want them to know 
that the city is empty of Muslims — their houses are not lit at night and 
during the day their chimneys give forth no smoke. And Ghalib, who had 
thousands of friends in the city and acquaintances in every house, now is 
in his loneliness, has none to talk with except his pen and no companion 
but his shadow.27
When Muslims could finally return to Delhi, the British authority remained 
aloof and indifferent to their demands for rehabilitation aid. Adding insult 
to injury, the populace was denied access to the city’s principal congregational 
mosques, the Jama Masjid and the Fatehpuri Masjid, effectively prohibiting 
them from coming together as a community to pray on Fridays.
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Two years after the threat of reprisals and insurgency dissipated, the state 
was still undecided as to what to do with these two Mughal mosques. In the 
meantime, the Jama Masjid was being used to billet the Thirteenth Punjab 
Infantry. Suggestions for alternative uses for the mosque were also forwarded. 
For example, A. A. Roberts, the officiating financial commissioner for the 
Punjab, wanted to preserve the city’s great mosques from further decay but 
keep them under British control. In their empty and static state the confis-
cated mosques would serve “as grand but silent monuments of the successes 
which was [sic] vouchsafed to us in September 1857.”28 Roberts added that they 
would act “as tokens of our displeasure towards the blinded fantasies” of the 
Mughal king and the rebels.29 Philip Egerton, the city magistrate of  Delhi 
and another staunch supporter of retaining custody of the Jama Masjid in 
British hands, wanted it to be converted into a Christian cathedral and have 
the marble slabs of its floor inscribed with the names of Christian martyrs.30 
While such ideas circulated, the mosque remained occupied by the army 
and no prayer took place. Then in 1858 the viceroy, Lord Canning, let it be 
known that he was “averse to the continued occupation of the musjid [sic] by 
our troops, and he trusts that Brigadier Longfield will be able to locate them 
elsewhere.”31 Plans and conditions for the restoration of the mosque to the 
Muslim community were drawn up next.
The secretary of the government of India confirmed the government’s 
plan for the handover in 1860: “If at any time the respectable Mahomedans of 
Delhi should ask for the restoration of the Jumma Masjid, and agree to make 
proper arrangement for keeping it in repair, the Governor General considers 
it desirable that it should be restored.”32 The secretary to the government of 
Punjab then clarified that the Jama Masjid would be restored to the Muslim 
community only after the appropriate terms for handing it over had been out-
lined and agreed on. The Muslim community had first to come forth with a 
united voice. This meant that the Shiite and Sunni sects had to suppress their 
sectarian differences, that the conservative Wahhabis had to compromise with 
the progressive Bida’ites, and that all parties had to mind the authority of the 
mosque’s managing committee.33 The influence of the British government, 
while officially prohibited inside the mosque, was discernible in two ways: in 
the selection of managers deemed loyal to the government; and in limiting the 
discourse and practices in the mosque to religious matters.
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Two years later, on 19 April 1862, a group of men finally stepped forward 
to request that the mosque be restored to the Muslim community. After their 
loyalty had been ascertained, the government made preparations to restore 
the mosque to Delhi’s Muslims. Four general conditions had to be accepted 
before the actual handover took place.
 1st Keeping the peace within the Mosque.
 2nd Settling disputes with regard to the building or its purposes.
 3rd Preventing or reporting the occurrence of offences against the  
  State within the Mosque.
 4th Keeping the Mosque in repair and keeping accounts of the  
  endowment property.34
Along with these stipulations, the men had to acknowledge the government’s 
right to confiscate the mosque should there be any sign of seditious behav-
ior taking place inside.35 The final step in the process of restoration was the 
selection of ten managers composed of respectable and loyal men of Delhi’s 
Muslim community. Once this committee of managers had found approval 
the mosque would be handed over to the Muslim community for religious 
services.
After the papers were signed and the managing committee constituted, the 
matter of the actual return was discussed. The secretary of the government 
of Punjab wanted the transfer of the mosque to occur quietly and ordered 
that “no public demonstrations should take place.”36 On the morning of 
28 November 1862 the deputy commissioner of police wrote to the commis-
sioner and superintendent of Delhi that he had the honor to report that the 
Jama Masjid had been opened to the Muslim population for worship. Six 
rules of conduct were first read to the attendees and then hung in English 
and Persian at the mosque gates. Rule one and two stated that non-Muslims 
were prohibited from entering the mosque during prayer and that no one, 
excluding the khadim and the muezzin, was allowed to stay overnight. The 
third rule permitted Hindus to visit the mosque as long as they did not stray 
from “ordinary decent behavior.” The fourth rule stated that European of-
ficers and gentlemen, civil and military, “can enter without restrictions as to 
shoes” and that dogs and smoking were restricted. According to rule five, Eu-
ropean soldiers needed permission from the district officer or commanding 
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officer to enter the mosque. The sixth rule stated that two sentries would be 
appointed to stand at the North and South Gates and that the managers, not 
the government, would pay their wages from the mosque’s waqf. Once these 
rules were heard, the Jama Masjid was open for gathering and prayer and as-
sumed its place as the central space of Muslim public life in Delhi. However, 
as the rules suggest, the mosque remained a government-regulated space — far 
from an ideal situation, but one the community accepted as a necessary first 
step toward regaining its public viability.
The second Mughal mosque of note to be given back to the Muslims was 
the Fatehpuri Masjid. Built by Fatehpuri Begam, a wife of  Shah Jahan in 1650, 
it sits at the western end of the great avenue called Chandni Chowk, facing the 
Lahore Gate of the Red Fort. After the Uprising of 1857 a Hindu merchant 
named Lala Chunna Mal bought the inner courtyard and surrounding shops 
of the mosque for Rs. 40,000 at a public auction. After he died, it was passed 
down to his son Umrao Singh, who continued to collect rents from the shops 
located in the courtyard and outside the mosque. The mosque was still in 
limited use, and people routinely complained that their prayers were disturbed 
by the affairs of business conducted in the shops. The Hindu ownership and 
contradictory use of the mosque’s interior as a market served as a constant 
reminder of the unequal reprisals meted out to the Muslims after the British 
seized Delhi. The conditions at the Fatehpuri Masjid thus belied the official 
policy of religious tolerance and the evenhandedness of the British Raj.
The incongruous spatial practices at the Fatehpuri Masjid lasted for twenty 
years, until the government in Punjab forwarded to W. G. Davies, the com-
missioner and superintendent of the Delhi Division, a confidential letter con-
taining Viceroy Lord Lytton’s opinion that “it would be a very polite measure 
to restore if possible those mosques which are now in the possession of Hindus 
at Delhi, to the Muhammudans on the occasion of the Imperial Assemblage; 
unless there are any great objections.”37 Inquiries were subsequently made into 
whether the proprietor of the mosque was willing to release its ownership. 
After some negotiation, Singh agreed to sell the mosque for a cash sum of 
Rs. 1,10,000. The exchange was made, and on 1 May the government handed 
the shops and courtyard of the mosque over to a board of managers composed 
of seven reputable Muslim men from the community approved by Davies. The 
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same rules of conduct that were hung at the gateways of the Jama Masjid were 
placed at the entrance of the Fatehpuri Masjid.
The return of the Fatehpuri Masjid was unlike the quiet handing over of 
the Jama Masjid. Speeches and newspaper articles proclaimed the greatness of 
the event. The mosque was used to give a spatial dimension to the tolerance 
of British imperial rule, and the building’s restoration to the Muslim com-
munity was seen as punctuating the official acts surrounding the Imperial 
Assemblage of January 1877 in Delhi. The assemblage marked the ascension 
of Queen Victoria to the title of Kaiser-i Hind, or empress of India. The new 
distinction symbolized the power relations between the British and Indians 
and reaffirmed the government’s promise to end its policy of religious inter-
ference. Committed to protecting the feudal order, the British rulers now 
styled themselves as not the ousters but as the inheritors of Mughal authority. 
Like the emperors Akbar and Shah Jahan, the new empress would protect 
the diverse communities of India and demand allegiance from the remain-
ing royalty. Queen Victoria had announced these intentions in 1858, when 
the crown took nominal control of India from the East India Company, but 
the assembly of 1877 would perform this new social ordering through pro-
cessions and public ceremony. The gathering and distribution according to 
the ranks of the diverse subjects, princes, chiefs, retainers, and military forces 
spatially demonstrated the British Raj’s resurrection of the old and familiar 
feudal idiom of the Mughal durbar.38 Yet the liberal policies and Mughal prac-
tices of this new power were contradicted by the continued occupation of the 
mosques of Delhi.
In planning for this assembly, Lord Lytton and his advisors selected Delhi 
as the location due to its historical association with Indian imperial history. 
But because the city still retained vestiges of the biased policy of retribution 
following the Uprising, it remained a conflicted space of empire. The fact 
that the Fatehpuri Masjid and other mosques remained in non-Muslim hands, 
for example, clashed with the representation of impartiality assumed by the 
new imperial government. The viceroy therefore proposed a strategy to infuse 
the government’s impartial sentiment into Delhi by returning the confiscated 
mosques to the Muslim community in time for the assembly. The return of 
Fatehpuri Masjid and the Zinat-ul Masjid, located to the south of Red Fort’s 
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Delhi Gate and built by a daughter of Emperor Aurangzeb, were listed among 
the government’s “various acts of grace” and later published along with the 
proceedings of the assembly in a special gazette.39 Circumscribed by the events 
of the assembly, the space of the Fatehpuri Mosque was signified as a symbol 
of the new relationship of the British rulers toward the Muslim community.
The Annual Register reported the Muslim community’s satisfaction with 
the government’s actions. Altaf Hussain Hali (1837–1914), an Urdu poet and 
a protégé of Sir Sayyid, hailed the policy of restoration and toleration as a new 
chapter in the social struggle of Muslims under the British Raj. In his poem 
Musaddas of 1879, he wrote of the community’s new freedom to worship:
No one wishes your religion and faith ill. No one is hostile to the 
Traditions and the Quran.
No one damages the pillars of the community. No one forbids  
observance of the Holy Law’s commands.
Pray without fear in places of worship. Loudly proclaim the calls  
to prayer in your mosques.40
For the next three decades, the committee of managers exercised control of 
the financial and preservation matters of the Jama Masjid and the Fatehpuri 
Masjid without criticism. Neither was the state’s interference challenged, as it 
exercised its power over these mosques by approving or rejecting new members 
of the managing committees and pressuring them to ensure that no seditious 
behavior transpired in the mosques. The deputy commissioner of Delhi an-
nually received reports from the managing committee’s office and was kept 
appraised of changes in management and maintenance matters.
This stable situation changed as the Mughal mosques entered the twenti-
eth century. Members of the Muslim community raised questions regarding 
the managing committee’s ability to represent them, the restriction of politi-
cal discourse inside the mosques, and the government’s lack of oversight of 
the waqf. The community began to challenge the policies of the state from 
the space of the mosque and called into question its noninterference policy, 
which according to Ayesha Jalal was a fantasy more than a reality: “Far from 
eliminating politics from the realms of religion and culture, the colonial state 
did much to bring these spheres closer than ever and reshape them in the pro-
cess.”41 One area in which the government’s involvement with the mosque was 
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most visible and could therefore be challenged directly was the waqf, which 
was protected by the law. The other area was the public condemnation of the 
destruction or desecration of mosques in the press. The Muslim community 
utilized the courts and the press to challenge British practices and to reshape 
the mosque to fit its own needs and aspirations. No other structure or space 
offered this radical possibility — not the palace, not the fort, not the garden or 
the shrine. Through court cases and newspaper reports the mosque was trans-
formed from a local structure limited to religious practices into a nationalized 
space of the Indian Muslim community, a site where political resistance and 
social desire for recognition could find expression. At Delhi’s Jama Masjid, 
this transformation started to take shape in the first decade of the twentieth 
century.
From Mosques to Monuments of  Muslim India
At the start of the twentieth century new political pressures on the Muslim 
community forced a reordering of the Mughal mosques and monuments. No 
longer would they function solely as religious spaces and touristic sites devoid 
of explicit political meaning. With communal politics framing Muslim iden-
tity, especially in Northern India, the mosque became a critical space in which 
to convene, discuss, and express dissatisfaction with the government. To pre-
vent this kind of politicization of the large and important mosques of Delhi, 
the government made the management committees of both the Jama Masjid 
and the Fatehpuri Masjid sign agreements to prohibit political discussions 
inside the buildings. This policy of indirect supervision of the Jama Masjid 
through the managing committee worked for almost five decades, but in 1909 
the political forces shaping the outside landscape also entered the mosque. In 
the summer of that year two men, Haji Fazil-al-Rahman and Muhammad-
ud-din, of Delhi, filed a petition to take the managing committee of the Jama 
Masjid to civil court.42 The petitioners intended to publicize the managing 
committee’s complicity with government interference in religious matters, its 
unchecked practices of collecting and distributing the waqf revenues, and its 
lack of concern for and misrepresentation of the Muslim community at large. 
Although the Delhi District Court dismissed the case, a closer inspection of 
the charges reveals how the demand for justice for all Muslims rendered the 
Mughal Jama Masjid a space of political and social transformation.
110 | monumental matters
According to Act XX of 1863, or the Religious Endowment Act, any party 
can sue the managers of a mosque for misfeasance, breach of trust, or neglect 
of duty in the civil court.43 The plaintiffs’ primary contention in the case of 
1909 was that the Jama Masjid was a space not devoted to Muslim practice but 
to the spreading of pro-government, loyalist propaganda. Fazil-al-Rahman 
claimed that he submitted his petition for no other reason than to see proper 
management of the mosque where he prayed regularly and to which his family 
contributed large sums of money.44 The plaintiffs further stated that previous 
complaints regarding the mosque’s mismanagement had gone unacknowl-
edged. Six of these complaints were included in the petition and were directed 
against the managing committee: (1) that the committee had an illegitimate 
monopoly over all waqf properties; (2) that the committee members were not 
representative of the community and that they reserved jobs at the mosque for 
family members or friends; (3) that the imam, who was both an employee and 
a committee member, kept the money given by native rulers for the upkeep 
of the mosque; (4) that there were no accounts or audits made of the budget, 
which was supposed to be shared with the Muslim community; (5) that the 
committee prohibited the recitation of the Qu’ran in the mosque, a pious act 
allowed by the Mughal emperors; and (6) that vacancies in the committee 
were not announced publicly but reserved for friends and family.45
The deputy commissioner, C. A. Barron, was forced to disagree with this 
assessment of the committee as he and his predecessors had selected the men 
based on their good character. In further defense of the mosque managing 
committee, he cited a letter of 8 August 1909 from its members in response 
to the plaintiffs’ allegations. The committee began by asserting that the suit 
was nothing more than “the result of personal enmity and jealousy.”46 The 
reputation of the plaintiffs was then individually discredited. First, Fazil-al-
Rahman’s character was questioned for having serious family differences with 
Haji Abdul Ghani, his brother and a managing committee member, and for 
associating with people of notorious repute like Mirza Hairat Dihlavi, who 
had been arrested for forgery. In fact, the latter edited the Curzon Gazette, 
a newspaper that published reports critical of the British government. For 
example, in 1902 it printed an article blaming the British for engendering a 
culture of corruption at religious structures and questioned the government’s 
noninterference methods that left large Muslim endowments open to abuse: 
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“From the time the protecting hand of Government has been removed, lakhs 
and even crores of Rupees . . . have been wasted . . . the Mutawallis or manag-
ers are filling their pockets and no Hindu or Mohammadan has the power 
of demanding accounts of them.”47 According to the committee’s letter, 
Mirza Hairat published the plaintiffs’ petition in his newspaper to publicize 
their grievances with the larger Muslim community and thus to incite pub-
lic agitation. The second plaintiff was also discredited as “not a man of any 
consequence.”
The managing committee’s letter went on to refute the claim that it had 
prohibited the recitation of the Qu’ran; rather, preaching was restricted in 
the mosque. The committee reasoned that if anyone was allowed to preach, 
it would open up the mosque to seditious discourse, and it stated that the 
preachers that were invited knew the pulpit was “for purely religious purposes 
and not to be utilized for controversial or other undesirable purposes.”48 The 
letter against the court petition thus gave the committee an opportunity to 
reaffirm its commitment to prevent sedition in the mosque. Accepting the 
points made in the letter, the Delhi District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
petition on the grounds of this character assessment and for lack of detailed 
argumentation and evidence.
Although Fazil-al-Rahman and Muhammad-ud-din’s case never made it 
to court, the petition still had an impact on the space of the Jama Masjid and 
its meaning to the Muslim community. First, under the provisions of Act XX, 
the mosque was turned into a node in the web of power relations, where the 
petitioners could openly challenge the practices of the committee of managers 
as contradictory to the spirit of a Muslim mosque. Working in collusion with 
the state, the petition asserted, the committee turned what was supposed to 
be the most egalitarian space within Delhi’s Muslim world into a hierarchical 
and thus contradictory space. The publication in Urdu of this petition and the 
subsequent commentary by Mirza Hairat reproduced the mosque as an am-
bivalent space of the Muslim community. In this particular case, the Muslim 
community of Delhi received neither the justice it sought nor control of the 
mosque. But the case and the accompanying press support proved instrumen-
tal in shaping how the Muslim community of Delhi would begin to politically 
identify itself through the space of the Jama Masjid. The community also 
did not have to wait long to get its desired waqf reforms: in 1914 the govern-
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ment convened in Delhi a Religious Endowments Conference to discuss the 
concerns of Muslims for better management of the waqf endowments; out of 
these meetings and through constant pressure from the press came the Chari-
table and Religious Trusts Act XIV of 1920 and the Mussalman Waqf Act XLII 
of 1923 that made managers subject to public oversight. They now had to keep 
careful records of their expenditures and payments and had to annually pub-
lish their accounts.49
The Jama Masjid case of 1909 proved that the state could no longer ignore 
the general displeasure of the Muslim community regarding the mismanage-
ment of waqf properties. Beyond motivating the government to reform its 
laws regarding Muslim endowments, the case revealed a shift in the disposi-
tion of the Muslim community toward its public spaces. Through the prac-
tices of prayer, gatherings, and festivals, the mosque could be defined as a lived 
space. The palaces, forts, empty shrines, and gardens might have gone the way 
of history, but the mosque still constituted the center of Muslim life. It was the 
spatial embodiment of the universal and central principle of Islam — unity. 
The mosque unified the ummah like no other Islamic structure did: through 
the practice of prayer that occurred there, it brought man to God. Though 
times might change and empires might fall and rise, tawhid, the unity of God, 
remained constant and was externalized in the social unity of the ummah.
Accepting these concepts, the poet and Indian Muslim nationalist Iqbal 
projected the idea of tawhid further outside of India and named the Kaaba in 
Mecca the external symbol of unity.50 Mosques in this cosmology locally ma-
terialized the principle of universal unity. Every mosque was oriented toward 
the Kaaba, and the faithful faced in that direction as they prayed together. 
This orientation and practice subjected the mosque to a vastly different or-
dering than the public spaces of the British government and the spaces of the 
Hindu majority and thus symbolized the uniqueness of the Muslim commu-
nity. Once the mosque was understood as the spatial heart of this community 
that linked it to God and the rest of the Muslim world, its protection became 
a prime political concern of all Muslims. This recognition engendered the 
national and political significance of the mosque as a monument of Muslim 
India. From the first decades of the twentieth century until the introduction 
of the concept of Pakistan, the mosque functioned as a practiced and iterative 
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space forging a Muslim national identity as distinct from the other communi-
ties of British India.
The Mosque and the Production of Communal Space
In the years following the petition against the managing committee of the 
Jama Masjid, other mosques and Islamic sites began to receive coverage in 
the Muslim press. Like the Jama Masjid, these sites were publicly discussed 
and debated and reordered through the struggle for social survival and the 
desire to forge a national sensibility among India’s Muslims. In 1913, Madina, 
an Urdu newspaper out of Bijnor, reported the joyful return of the Mughal 
Sunehri Masjid of Delhi, built in 1751, to the community. The story explained 
how after 1857 it had been occupied and no one was allowed to engage in 
namaz, or prayer, there. After several unsuccessful attempts by Muslims in the 
community to gain access to the mosque for prayer, it was finally opened: “It 
has been heard happily that now the Chief Commissioner of Delhi allowed 
Muslims to perform namaz in the mosque.”51 Several months later, Madina 
reported on restoration work at the Red Fort: “There is good news that the 
Government of India has started to adorn some buildings of Red Fort in the 
same way as they looked before the Mutiny.”52 Uplifting stories like these, 
however, remained few and far between. The more typical reports concerned 
the British destruction and desecration of mosques. The most widely known 
example of such a transgression was the Kanpur mosque incident, which gal-
vanized Muslims all over India into demanding social justice.
A modest mosque built by bisatis, or peddlers, the Kanpur mosque was 
brought to national prominence in 1913 through strident reports in the Mus-
lim press. The crisis at the mosque revolved around the local government’s 
destruction of the dalan (causeway) used for ablutions to widen the street. 
While the dalan was not actually part of the mosque’s sanctuary, the commu-
nity and the press represented it as a sacred space whose demolition amounted 
to an act of trespassing. Months before its destruction, the Muslims of Kan-
pur petitioned the government to abandon the demolition plan, and a fatwa 
was issued in support of this demand. The local and provincial governments, 
however, went ahead with the dalan’s demolition because the mosque was not 
a waqf property and the dalan not part of the mosque proper. These technical 
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definitions of what constituted a mosque were rendered moot by the press, 
which presented the government’s tampering with any part of the mosque 
as an act of intrusion. Government officials, like the lieutenant governor of 
Uttar Pradesh, James Meston, were blind to the mosque’s evolving role as a 
radicalized space, and that the press was transforming a local mosque of little 
renown into a national space of Muslim social identification. For months the 
Urdu press ran provocative headlines signifying the demolition of the dalan 
as a symbol of British disregard for Muslim space and society. On 23 April 
the editor of Madina, Agha Rafiq, wrote a perspective piece regarding what 
he called the municipality’s takeover of Islamic places of worship and on how 
such a move should be read: “We are surprised to know that the local mu-
nicipality wants to acquire a portion of the Bisti Bazar Mosque in Kanpur to 
build roads. . . . To respect the places of worship of Indian communities is the 
prime responsibility of the Government of India.”53 He goes on to equate the 
destruction of mosques with the oppression of the religion itself, and he ends 
by warning the government that the demolition of the dalan will only lead 
to the destruction of the social order. On 8 July Madina reported the dalan’s 
demolition under the provocative title, “Demolition of  Islamic Places of  Wor-
ship.”54 This incident was then linked to the demolition of another mosque, 
that of Sheikh Abdul Haq in Delhi, which the paper claimed “clearly express 
that the Government of India has no respect for Islamic places of worship” 
and that it “gives no value to the religious sentiments of Muslims.”55 Later in 
September, in response to an opinion printed in a British daily, the Pioneer, 
Madina linked the Kanpur mosque to the Mughal Fatehpuri Masjid of Delhi. 
The Pioneer had advised the Muslim community not to see the incident at 
Kanpur as reflecting the government’s ill will toward the community, saying 
that they should instead focus on the return of mosques, like that of the Fateh-
puri Masjid, as proof of its goodwill. Madina responded by pointing out that 
the Fatehpuri Masjid had been sold to a Hindu before it was given back in the 
context of the Imperial Assembly and went on to clarify the Muslim position: 
“But we would like to tell the Pioneer that Muslims remember such incidents 
including the Fatehpuri Mosque in which mosques have been restored to 
Muslims by the Government. Muslims are thankful for such graceful acts. At 
the same time it does not mean that mosques would not be demolished in the 
future and that Muslims could be targeted without any mistake.”56 Madina 
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presented itself as the voice of a united body of Muslims — and the govern-
ment as its opponent. The space of the Kanpur mosque, like the Fatehpuri 
Mosque, had become a pivot on which the power relations of Muslims and 
their government now turned.
As the weeks went by, other newspapers read by Muslims like Comrade, 
al-Hilal, and Zamindar continued to press the government for restitution 
after interfering with the community’s religion.57 Further agitations, arrests, 
and even deaths surrounding the demolished dalan functioned to crystallize 
Muslim opinion against the British on a national scale. To put an end to this 
trend, the viceroy, Lord Hardinge, at the request of the Muslim League, fi-
nally visited Kanpur. The Muslim community’s victory came soon after, on 
14 October, when the viceroy agreed to pardon prisoners arrested in agitations 
and to rebuild the dalan.
In the aftermath of the Kanpur mosque incident, several transformations 
can be observed in the ordering of Muslim social space and the community’s 
sense of place in larger British India: first, it turned the mosque from a local 
place of worship into a national space for the formation of a Muslim commu-
nity; second, it revealed to Muslims all across India that their displacement 
from the public realm was probable if they did not remain vigilant; and third, 
the mosque was returned to the public realm as a space of debate. The rhetori-
cal ordering of the small and local mosque of Kanpur as a protected space of 
Indian Muslim identity was also used to defend the small mosques of Delhi 
from destruction between 1913 and 1929, when land was cleared to make room 
for the capital city of New Delhi.
Resisting New Delhi through the Mosques of  Delhi
The construction of New Delhi forced the displacement of Indians who 
owned land and buildings on the land demarcated for the new city. To stave off 
agitations, the government approached this relocation process judiciously. It 
counted monuments and divided them into two categories: those that should 
be saved and restored and those that could be purchased for later demolition. 
The deputy commissioner, H. C. Beadon, further divided the buildings con-
sidered worthy of preservation into three groups: ancient monuments of his-
toric interest; religious buildings still in use and of more than local repute; 
and sacred tombs and recognized graveyards. All other structures, Beadon 
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reasoned, could be bought out from their owners and demolished. Mughal 
monuments of all kinds would be spared.58 What seemed a simple and rea-
sonable solution to the problem of making room met with opposition from 
the Muslim press. Unlike the British, who divided Muslim structures along 
historical importance, level of use, and renown, the press signified all Muslim 
structures as protected spaces of the Muslim community, thus thwarting the 
ordering imposed by Beadon. The demolition of any of these structures could 
now be framed as proof of the government’s illiberal rule. The Hamdard daily, 
edited by Muhammad Ali from Delhi, wrote of the British destruction of 
Delhi’s Muslim spaces in a two-part piece titled “Old Graves and Mosques 
of Delhi,” registering the difference in the British perception of these spaces: 
“The old monuments, whether they be graves, mosques or shrines, are loved 
and respected by all communities, but mosques and graves are especially re-
spected from the religious point of view by Muslims. . . . On the one hand, 
these graves and mosques have deep relevance to the history of Muslims. On 
the other hand, the graves of both the poor and the King are given the same 
religious respect.”59 The article goes on to insist that the Muslim community 
does not want its religious structures disturbed and that although the chief 
commissioner of  Delhi, William M. Hailey, having assured Muslims of  Delhi 
that he would not hurt their sentiments, had nevertheless gone ahead and 
demolished a “famous mosque” by the Koki Bridge. The mosque’s fame de-
rived from being the location at which the Sufi Sheikh Abdul Haq Muhaddis 
Dehlavi had delivered his sermons during the reigns of the Mughal emperors. 
Since all Muslims were aware of the mosque’s special status, it should not have 
been slated for destruction. The commissioner acknowledged his mistake and 
rebuilt the mosque.
In the second news piece, the Hamdard took Hailey to task for designat-
ing some mosques and graves as of limited local interest and subsequently fit 
for demolition. In response to this bias, the newspaper stated: “The view of 
Mr. Hailey that all the ‘essential religious buildings and graves of top per-
sonages’ would not be disturbed is confusing. Indeed no discrimination can 
be made among the religious buildings. A broken old mosque of which all 
the walls are fallen and whose history is unknown is religiously no different 
from the big Jama Masjid of Delhi.”60 The Hamdard continued to follow the 
planning and demolitions of Delhi for two years. In 1915 it reported three 
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unfortunate incidents in regard to mosques and graves in Delhi. Using the 
law of land acquisition, the Hamdard explained, the government had bought 
the Burji Masjid, where prayer was done five times a day and where the Hazrat 
Shah Bahauddin shrine was located. This, Hamdard stated, ran counter to 
the government’s intention of sparing the good sentiments of the people of 
Delhi in building its new city.
Another Delhi newspaper, the Muslim, reported in July 1922 that the Bagh 
Kalali mosque located inside the precincts of New Delhi was destined for 
demolition according to a map the writer had seen. The paper asserted the 
Muslim point of view regarding the destruction of mosques: “The laws about 
mosques in Islamic jurisprudence are so strict that once a mosque is built it 
becomes sacred and respectable until the Day of Resurrection. Even an inch of 
its land cannot be used for any other purpose.” This observation was followed 
by an implicit warning to the government: “Firstly, the mosques were occu-
pied. We tolerated it because we were helpless. Now the mosques are being 
martyred for roads and buildings. If this condition prevails, it will be difficult 
for Muslims to tolerate.”61 From the Muslim’s stance concerning the history 
of mosques in Delhi it becomes clear that these structures, no matter their his-
torical value, were uniformly understood as symbolic spaces of Muslim social 
identity. The article also bears testimony to a growing sense of empowerment 
derived from the community’s critique of governmental actions against its 
mosques. By 1922 the mosque had become a space of Muslim social identity 
serving the community as a public line of defense against what were seen as 
British attempts to bring about the community’s social death.
In the decades before independence the mosque, more than any other 
Islamic structure, became the principal space of Muslim social identifica-
tion. Therefore, of all the Mughal monuments only the Jama Masjid and the 
Fatehpuri Masjid were selected as representative spaces of the Muslim com-
munity. Considering this reality, the state presented their restoration as sym-
bols of its goodwill toward India’s Muslims. But the British underestimated 
the true significance of the mosque as a lived space at the heart of the commu-
nity. While Muslims certainly appreciated the return of the Mughal mosques, 
the supposedly grand British gesture did not settle the issue of their social 
subjugation; rather, it merely marked the beginning of the community’s ef-
forts to reclaim control over their public spaces of social identification and 
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resistance. British rule prevailed at the Red Fort and the Taj Mahal because it 
went largely uncontested by the Muslim community. But at the Jama Masjid, 
the Fatehpuri Masjid, and other religious sites, Muslims rejected the power 
structures put in place by the British. From the space of the mosque, other 
horizons of action would open up in the 1930s and 1940s and guide the Mus-
lim community through the struggles for independence and state formation.
From Community to Nation and the  
Politicization of Islamic Monuments
By the 1930s New Delhi was a completed city, the ASI stood on solid footing, 
and the Muslim press had secured the mosque as the representative architec-
tural space of Indian Muslim identity. Also at this time, the electoral principle 
began to frame the political landscape and the All-India Muslim League was 
defining Muslim nationhood as distinct from the symbolic ordering of the 
Indian nation by the secular Congress Party. This difference was pinned to 
the Muslim community’s minority status. Initially this position helped the 
community negotiate its place “within the paradigm of ‘inclusionary secular 
nationalist’ politics articulated by the Indian congress.”62 But by the 1930s the 
Congress Party had changed its tactics from a policy of inclusion to what Ali 
Riaz described as a secular form of majoritarianism, “because they perceived 
it as an antidote to the rising influence of Muslim identity politics.”63 From 
this standpoint, both the Muslim League and the Hindu nationalist party 
were negatively figured as “religious communalists” and labeled as divisive and 
therefore harmful to the goals of national independence and democracy.
The Muslim League rose in influence after the passing of the Government 
of India Act of 1909, which introduced the electoral principle and the prom-
ise to give Indian Muslims a reserved number of seats in local and imperial 
governments. The British government included this last and controversial 
provision to quell Muslim fears of domination by a permanent Hindu major-
ity. This tactic of claiming unfair representation may have had its effective-
ness in balancing power, but the Muslim League knew it could also weaken 
its cause for greater overall Indian power in government. Thus in 1916 the 
Muslim League came together with the Indian National Congress in a spirit 
of compromise. For its part, Congress agreed to the principle of weighted 
votes, separate electorates, and a one-third reservation of seats for Muslims 
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in the imperial government. These proposals were written into law in the 
Government of India Act of 1919. But the climate of compromise began to 
dissipate as Congress secularists increasingly claimed these electoral measures 
to be antithetical to the democratic process. The Nehru Report of 1928 all 
but rescinded the previous compromises and a policy of secular majoritari-
anism began to inflect Congress decisions and tactics. The Muslim League 
responded by separating from the Congress and injecting the discourse of 
Muslim nationalism into the sphere of political policy and debate. This al-
teration of native power relations initiated a new spatial disposition to the 
geography and the Mughal monuments of India. Muslim leaders positioned 
their community as a separate nation existing within the secularist and Hindu 
ones. Those elements of the Indian landscape that contradicted this vision, 
such as the Mughal monument, celebrated for its syncretic form, were either 
reordered to align with Indian Muslim nationalism or purged from the newly 
constituting communal space.64
The rhetorical logic of the Indian Muslim political elite framed the Mu-
ghals, long admired and imitated by the British rulers and by secularist In-
dians for their integrationist ethos, as contradictory to the idea of Muslim 
nationhood. For example, the Muslim League shunned Akbar, the greatest 
historical unifier of Hindu and Muslim India.65 Nehru observed this rejec-
tion on Akbar’s four hundredth birthday in 1942, when “all classes of people, 
including many Muslims joined, but the Muslim League kept aloof because 
Akbar was a symbol of India’s unity.”66 The Mughal monument, a sign of In-
dian Islam’s cultural heterodoxy, was also expunged from the imagined land-
scape of the emerging Indian Muslim nation. This distancing from the Mu-
ghal era and its heritage was not an entirely recent development but the final 
stage of a movement initiated by Islamic reformists in the eighteenth century.
In their efforts to make sense of the deteriorating state of Indian Islam after 
the demise of Aurangzeb in 1707, some Muslim reformists pointed to the cor-
ruption of their religion by Hindu customs. To counteract this decline, they 
urged Muslims to simplify their faith, to look to the Prophet and the customs 
of the Arabs for guidance in everyday matters. Shah Waliullah led this charge 
in Delhi after the city was devastated by a series of attacks starting with Nadir 
Shah’s in 1739. He advised his followers to look past the local and to the Ara-
bian Peninsula to find their cultural bearings and to reclaim their sense of 
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community and spiritual character: “We are Arab people whose fathers have 
fallen in exile (ghurba) in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy 
and Arabic language are our pride.”67 Following this logic, he condemned the 
local traditions that had developed around Sufi mystics, like the pilgrimage 
to the tombs of Sufi saints, venerated by both Hindus and Muslims.68 When 
Muslims again experienced devastating loss, disorientation, and fragmenta-
tion after 1857, Shah Waliullah’s teachings found new purchase. Educated 
Muslims like Sir Sayyid saw in them a way to save the soul of the community 
by insulating it against the assaults of British modernization while preparing 
a communal mirror based on an idealized vision of Indian Islam.
Although reformists slowly stripped Indian Islam of its Hindu accretions 
throughout the nineteenth century, the process took on a quality of politi-
cal urgency after 1857, when the British government separated and codified 
the Indian public according to communal categories. New dispositions and 
relationships to the state were thus mediated through religious practice and 
conflict. At the intersection of the movement of Muslim reformism and Brit-
ish identity politics, the Indian Muslim community began to take shape as a 
distinct social formation.69 Official representations of public agitations mani-
fest this new communal figuration; whether they originally derived from per-
sonal, local, or class conflicts, they were almost always represented as alterca-
tions between Hindus and Muslims in official documents.70 Muslims that 
had identified with their degree of wealth, ancestry, and regional or sectarian 
affiliation found it expedient to assume the religious identification to “com-
pete more effectively for government patronage.”71 To put flesh on the bones 
of this invented category, a new Indian Muslim morality, history, and culture 
were constructed. The first to give shape to this embodiment of the “Indian 
Muslim” was Sir Sayyid. Starting with his Causes of the Indian Revolt of 1858, 
Sir Sayyid defended the Muslim population against the misconceived notion 
that they were the enemies of the British Raj. This kind of critique became 
especially necessary after W. W. Hunter’s scathing study of 1871, The Indian 
Musalmans: Are They Bound in Conscience to Rebel against the Queen?72 One 
year later the first census was taken, making it a quantitative reality that Mus-
lims constituted twenty-two percent of India’s population, thus cementing 
their minority status.
Confronted with misconceptions and demographics Sir Sayyid became 
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concerned with producing a favorable representation of Muslims and, more 
practically, with their social survival. This need took on a new urgency after 
the various India Council Acts began to open the local and municipal coun-
cils to natives. Here the Muslims would be at a disadvantage because, unlike 
the Hindus, they did not adapt their education to meet the demands of a mod-
ernizing world. Sir Sayyid built his famous Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental 
College, later known as Aligarh Muslim University, in 1875 with the aim of 
addressing this deficiency. The modernization of Indian Muslim education 
brought with it a new national sensibility whereby the community began to 
see and represent itself as a distinct group with its own history, culture, and 
social order.
Another stimulus for the constitution of Indian Muslim national identity, 
and one that would affect the space of Mughal monuments more directly, 
was the epic poem, Musaddas, written by Hali at the urging of Sir Sayyid 
in 1879. Musaddas narrates the rise and decline of Muslim culture from the 
eminent early caliphs to the decadence of the late nineteenth century and of-
fers the community a way out of its weakened state. Hali begins by describing 
the great heights reached by Muslims in the arts and sciences. In the section 
called “The Monuments of Islam” he writes, “There is no continent upon this 
globe in which their buildings do not stand firm; Arabia, India, Egypt, Spain, 
Syria, Dailam, the whole world is filled with their foundations.”73 In the poem, 
these monuments function as symbols of the greatness of early Islamic culture, 
but in their present state they stand as contradictory spaces: “Those palaces 
of stone and their brilliant purity, to whose ruins moss clings today!”74 Like 
Shah Waliullah and Sir Sayyid, Hali ascribes this decline to the lost purity of 
faith, which the community must again attain to save itself.
In Musaddas the monument signals the trajectory of Muslim decline that 
leads readers at last to India. Here, Hali proceeds to describe the poverty, in-
dolence, and general lack of readiness of the Indian Muslim community to 
take its place in the larger sphere of British rule. The reason for the commu-
nity’s sorry state is its loss of moral direction, which can be rediscovered by 
looking to the Prophet’s timeless message. Hali maintains that by reacquaint-
ing itself with Arab culture and history, the community may be directed to 
a “moral realm immune to temporal cycles of progress and decline.”75 In this 
framework, monuments akin to the forms of early Islam are lauded, while 
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those that show local variations in style and function are considered degraded. 
By this logic the syncretic Mughal monuments inevitably symbolized the be-
ginning of Muslim decline, when the classical simplicity of early Islam was 
lost for good.76
The movement away from present day India and back to the Hijaz of 
the Prophet reoriented the community temporally and spatially and helped 
it differentiate itself from the other communities. Progress for the good of 
the community was thus not seen as the forward movement of modernism 
per se but as the return to the simple, unchanging character of classical Arab 
Islam. While secularists and the British government alike vied for legitimacy 
by looking to the Mughals as their model, Hali instructed the Muslim com-
munity to sever such affiliations with the past and to see itself as a separate 
Islamic nation — though part of the larger Islamic world — living and func-
tioning in an alien modern India. In so doing, Hali transposed Islam and 
modernity, making the former the new master-signifier of the Indian Muslim. 
As national independence loomed on the horizon and the political terrain was 
shifting underfoot, Islam, and the symbolic order it signified, would stabilize 
the community and direct its identification with the Indian landscape and its 
monuments.
Muslim Nationalism and the Spaces of the “Moral Community”
By the late 1930s and the 1940s, the secularist Congress and the British gov-
ernment put increasing pressure on Muslims to reveal where they stood in 
the struggle for freedom and the larger political landscape. Sensing that the 
independence movement was gravitating toward Hindu symbolism and cul-
tural idioms, Muslim leaders altered their demands for electoral privilege to 
call for a separate nation status based on Islamic symbolism.77 Underscoring 
this demand were the cultural arguments of Sir Sayyid, Hali, and the poet 
and reformist Iqbal. In 1940, at the historical meeting of the Muslim League 
in Lahore, the party’s leader, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, summed up this rea-
soning in a speech that inaugurated the new object of Indian Muslim desire, 
Pakistan: “Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions, phi-
losophies, social customs and literature. . . . It is quite clear that Hindus and 
Muslims derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have 
different epics, different heroes and different episodes. . . . To yoke together 
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two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the 
other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of 
any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state.”78 This 
view introduced the conception of the Indian Muslim community as a nation 
living separately within a nation and lacking a place of its own. A separate ter-
ritory was now desired in order to manifest the Muslim nation.
Pakistan, it must be remembered, began as an ideological imagining and did 
not become a territorial reality until 1946. Until then, Muslim elites thought 
of it as a useful concept for constructing an imagined “moral community” but 
considered its actual creation an unattainable goal, given the geographic dis-
persion of Indian Muslims throughout the subcontinent. As David Gilmartin 
points out, the primary concern of the Pakistan movement was “to create a 
Muslim political community, to define a symbolic center to give moral and 
political meaning to the concept of a united ‘Muslim community’ in India.”79 
This overarching Indian Muslim identity then supplanted regional social 
formations and spaces such as town mosques, schools, and shrines. Before 
the Pakistan movement, the political moral order of most Indian Muslims 
was conceived on a local level, “with its own distinctive structures of author-
ity, subordination, and conflict.”80 This moral order was further constituted 
through the spatial dynamics of local arenas of public performance, which by 
the 1930s and 1940s were for many Muslims limited to mosques and yearly 
festivals at Sufi shrines.
Another way of defining Muslim unity, before the introduction of the con-
cept of Pakistan, was through tajdid, or reform, which “long played a central 
role in the discursive articulation of Muslim moral community.”81 Reform at 
the heart of the national movement provided Indian Muslim political elites 
with a radical ideology that the British state or the Congress Party could 
neither assimilate nor debate.82 Finally, the public agitations surrounding the 
destruction of mosques, the corrupt waqf administration, and the demise of 
the Ottoman Khilafat, also helped produce a common identity out of com-
mon interests. However, none of the local and reformist forces ordering the so-
cial space and identity of the Muslim community could provide a “fixed image 
of unity,” which was needed to move forward the Muslim League’s claim of 
nationhood. To bring this about, first, local public arenas were framed as rep-
resentative spaces of division; then, Pakistan, as an idea and subsequently as a 
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state, was conceived “in sharp moral opposition to this world of conflict and 
division.”83 Therefore Pakistan, the universal and desired space of the Indian 
Muslim community, was imagined as a place to supersede the local and his-
torical spaces of Indian Islam.
While Pakistan was just an idea, there seemed a possibility for Muslims to 
divide their allegiances between the imagined space of the national commu-
nity and the local spaces of their everyday lives. But in 1946, as independence 
drew closer to the horizon, a choice was forced on the Muslim League’s leader-
ship: to allow Pakistan to remain an idea or to redefine it as an object in terms 
of territorial statehood. The latter choice was not solely reflective of Jinnah’s 
desire to further the moral unification of the Indian Muslim community but 
might also have been forced by Nehru’s conception of an independent India. 
As Gilmartin explains, Nehru’s India derived from a secular national ideology 
that was “a sort of rationalist statism tied to science, modernity, and the indi-
vidual ethics championed by Gandhi.”84 A direct product of this secularism 
was the replacement of the religious identity structured by British imperial-
ism with an identity based only on territory. For a Muslim community faced 
with a loss of power and electoral seats in this new social order of individual 
citizenship, Pakistan as a territorial entity seemed the only option for retain-
ing its integrity. Jinnah and the Muslim League chose a territorial Pakistan 
over the idea of Pakistan, and the Congress Party accepted their choice as a 
sacrifice necessary for the founding of an independent Republic of India as a 
secular state.
The territorial reality of Pakistan shook the Indian Muslim social order to 
its core. As long as the notion of a separate Indian Muslim nation was no more 
than a symbol of moral unity, it did not challenge the sense of place through 
which most Indian Muslims experienced their everyday lives.85 Those spaces 
that organized daily encounters, provided moral guidance, and helped ne-
gotiate relationships inside and outside the community could coexist with 
an imagined Pakistan. However, when the idea emerged as a physical reality 
in the negotiations among the British, the Congress Party, and the Muslim 
League, what ensued was “the disjuncture between place and territory,” which 
for those Muslims remaining in India meant a loss of place and local iden-
tity.86 Muslim leaders who had supported Pakistan as a moralizing ideal able 
to unite a disparate community and to help them negotiate local relationships 
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were dismayed by its sudden transformation into a physically bounded reality. 
Men like Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad and Maulana Muhammad Zakariyya 
saw Pakistan and Partition as destructive to the culturally mediated sense of 
place that had helped Muslims identify themselves in the Indian landscape. 
These men had tried to suture the community to “the places that had already 
been sanctified in the Ganges-Jamuna doab by the blessedness (barakat) of 
the community’s pious forbears.”87 However, as Gilmartin explains, their ef-
forts were overwhelmed by the more powerful draw of Pakistan: “This des-
perate attempt to maintain the linking of place, ancestry, sanctity, and moral 
order was cast against the backdrop of a fixed partition of territory that had 
symbolically torn these linkages asunder.”88 The Mughal monument in this 
vortex of social and political change was cast adrift along with all other signs 
of Muslim connectedness to the Indian landscape.
The Congress leader and staunch supporter of Hindu-Muslim coopera-
tion, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, warned Indian Muslims in April 1946 
that when Pakistan became a reality, they would “awaken overnight and dis-
cover that they have become aliens and foreigners . . . left to the mercies of what 
then would become an unadulterated Hindu Raj.”89 The absurdity of denying 
a thousand years of Muslim history in India, of abandoning the rich Indo-
Islamic civilization, and the profound relationships that had grown between 
Hindus and Muslims was the keynote of his argument against Pakistan. In 
the end, the physical reality of Pakistan offered little more to the Indian Mus-
lim community than the loss of a place that had been carefully constructed 
over hundreds of years of living, struggling, and dying. With the separation 
of Pakistan from India, the sense of an overarching moral community no 
longer defined Indian Muslim life for those who remained. Along with that 
loss came the fragmentation of the leadership of the Muslim community, as 
many elites left their homes in the big cities for a future in Pakistan. Finally, 
as Gilmartin correctly argues, without a regional identity or a sense of place 
in India, the only recourse the Muslim community had to express its social 
conditions of conflict and pain was through violence.90 The other way, and 
one taken by the majority in later years, was through silence.91
From the post-Uprising period to independence, the Mughal monument 
that had once been a beacon of Indo-Islamic glory and achievement slowly 
faded from the lives of the Indian Muslim community. This process started 
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soon after the demise of the moral city, when the monuments were severed 
from the social network they once maintained, and only the mosque rose in 
prominence as the principal symbolic space of the community. However, it 
was not until the prospect of independence drew near, when Muslim leaders 
adopted the symbolism of the reformist movements, that the Mughal monu-
ments were shunned for their Indo-Islamic significance. Through the leaders’ 
desire to constitute an identity by the master-signifier of Islam, Pakistan be-
came a point de capiton, fixing in place the free-floating signs of territory, na-
tion, culture, and architecture. In this new symbolic order the Mughal monu-
ment was meaningful if it served Islam and the national aspirations of the 
Muslim community. When Pakistan finally became a territorial reality on 
15 August 1947, neither the ideologies of Islamic nationalism nor secular na-
tionalism could contain the sublime trauma of Partition. In the atmosphere 
of chaos, death, and suffering that ensued, Mughal monuments would once 
again be enlisted as spaces to help bring order and meaning to the new nation-
state of India.
 5 tryst with destiny
  Nehru’s and Gandhi’s Mughal Monuments
On 15 August 1947, at 12 a.m., India became an independent 
nation-state, and Nehru read his famous speech, “A Tryst with Destiny,” at 
the Constituent Assembly. Reminding his listeners of the struggle that led up 
to Indian independence, Nehru accentuated the importance of that singular 
moment, which would subsequently be evoked again and again as the trope 
of India’s crossing from a “period of ill fortune” into an unbounded future. 
Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children exemplifies the hold the temporal 
metaphor continues to have on the national imagination with regard to this 
fateful occasion in 1947.1 What often goes unnoticed in Nehru’s speech is the 
spatial metaphor with which he ends: “We have to build the noble mansion 
of free India where all her children may dwell.” The spatial symbolism was 
carried into the following day, when another significant event took place at 
the Mughal Red Fort: the unfurling of the Indian tricolor (figures 9 and 10). 
The choice of this location for the public performance has as much, or more, 
to reveal about the power relations of the newly independent secular state as 
the timing of its freedom alone.
The choice of the Red Fort to fly the Indian flag for the first time and to 
address the public gathered below connects these events to others that reach 
back ninety years. The monument was the setting for the climax of what many 
Indians regard as the first revolution for Indian independence, the Uprising of 
1857. The fort’s occupation by the sepoys and subsequent retribution contin-
ued to haunt the imagination of Indians. The Red Fort was where Bahadur 
Shah had been reinstalled as the legitimate ruler of India by rebelling Hindu 
and Muslim sepoys, where the colonial power structure was overturned for a 
time, and where the Mughal Empire finally died. It was in the diwan-i amm of 
the Red Fort that Bahadur was later tried for rebellion, treason, and murder; 
and it was where he answered “not guilty” to the charges brought against him.2 
The aged king, the last Mughal ruler of India and a talented Urdu poet, was 
found guilty and forced to leave his palace at the Red Fort and live out the five 
Fig 9: (Right) Nehru  
at the Red Fort look- 
ing down at crowd 
assembled, 15 August 
1947. © AP/Wide 
World Photos
Fig 10: (Below) New 
Indian flag, Red Fort,  
Delhi, India, 15 Au-
gust 1947. © AP/Wide 
World Photos
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remaining years of his life imprisoned in a bamboo hut in Burma. After the 
trial, the fort passed into government ownership and was converted into an 
army cantonment and a protected historic monument. The Red Fort’s visible 
gates, along with the high domes and minarets of the Jama Masjid, loomed 
over the city and served as a daily reminder to the local population of the loss 
and humiliation meted out by the British rulers after the Uprising.
Delhi’s Descent in Novel Form
The pathos of living in the shadows of these great monuments between 1857 
and 1947 is eloquently related in Ahmed Ali’s novel of 1940, Twilight in Delhi. 
Sitting on the steps of the Jama Masjid, Mir Nihal, the patriarch of an emi-
nent Muslim family, ruminates on the past, present, and future of Delhi. Pass-
ing below him is the long procession of British soldiers, dignitaries, and leaders 
assembling for the coronation ceremony of King George V in 1911. Taking in 
the scene from an awry position, Mir Nihal sees a conflicted tableau stained 
by the specter of death. It causes him to reject the veracity and ethicality of 
the authors of the scene in the historical city: “Right in front of him was the 
Red Fort built long ago by Shah Jahan, the greatest of artists in mortar and 
stone, but which was now being trampled by the ruthless feet of an alien race. 
On his right, beyond the city wall, was the Khooni Darwaza, the Blood Gate; 
and beyond that still was the Old Fort built by the Feroz Shah Tughlaq many 
more centuries ago. Still beyond stretched the remnants of the past Delhis. . . . 
Today it was this very Delhi which was being despoiled by a Western race who 
had no sympathy with India or her sons, thought Mir Nihal.”3 The coronation 
ceremony staged as a durbar was meant to remind Indians of their past and 
show them that their British rulers respected the country’s bygone author-
ity enough to emulate its processions and ceremonies. However, the spatial 
dynamics of early twentieth-century Delhi and its Mughal monuments only 
produces in Mir Nihal an effect of estrangement from the city. The history, 
old social codes, and high culture of Delhi no longer provide him with a stable 
and familiar place to dwell. The Delhi of 1911 offers him only a sense of exile, 
where praying, walking, and observing the surroundings prove agonizing 
and alienating acts in his everyday life. Even the sight of the congregational 
mosque, the nexus of Muslim life in Delhi, fills him with disgust: “The pro-
cession passed by the Jama Masjid whose façade had been vulgarly decorated 
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with a garland of golden writing containing slavish greetings from the Indian 
Mussalmans to the English King, displaying the treachery of the priestly class 
to their people and Islam.”4 Delhi’s historical monuments, restored and con-
trolled by the British and by Indian loyalists, do not afford Mir Nihal’s hopes, 
dreams, and desires much space. The city that was his and his ancestors’ home 
no longer exists leaving him lost in time: “The past, which was his, had gone, 
and the future was not for him.”5
Set in the years 1910–19, Ali’s novel takes place in the intimate and homely 
space of the mohalla, or neighborhood, comprised of a labyrinth of galis (nar-
row lanes) and havalis (multi-story houses sharing a central courtyard). Mir 
Nihal’s story unfolds in both the private space of the home and neighborhood 
and the public spaces of the main shopping bazaars of Chandni Chowk and 
the Jama Masjid. Linking them together is the canopy of the sky above, filled 
with kites and pet pigeons, and time is kept by the muezzin’s call to prayer. 
The book tells the story of the slow loss of this dwelling space’s safety as the 
modernizing projects of the British encroach on it. The familiar is made un-
familiar to reflect the growing anxiety of the Muslim community struggling 
to find stability amid the political changes, the building of the new capital, 
the non-cooperation movement, new fashions, and social formations. The 
subplot of the novel is the spiritual draining of Muslim Delhi, of its culture, 
language, practices, and spaces. Like the Jama Masjid, emblazoned in gaudy 
gold letters, other spaces once ordered by the needs of the Muslim commu-
nity are reordered by the government. The widening of the grand bazaar of 
Chandni Chowk in 1913 provides another example. The street was stripped of 
its original social purpose, rendering it unfamiliar and hostile: “Worse than 
all the changes which were felt so deeply by the people was the disfiguring 
of the Chandni Chowk whose central causeway was demolished and the ex-
pansive peepal trees which had given shelter to the residents and the poor 
from the scorching rays of the sun, were cut down. The road did look wide 
and broad, a real boulevard, but its uniqueness and oriental atmosphere were 
destroyed. This affected the people more deeply than anything else. For that 
was the bazar through which they had walked day in and day out through-
out their lives.”6 The final blow in this psychological displacement of Delhi’s 
residents is the building of New Delhi, which brought in new people “who 
would have no love for her nor any associations with her history and ancient 
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splendor.”7 Ali’s account of the transformation of the erstwhile Mughal city 
is accented with irony and contradictions and provides an earnest picture of 
the ambivalent reality of its residents after the development of  New Delhi and 
the reordering of Old Delhi. Not all saw the restructuring of Old Delhi and 
its monuments as a termination of future possibilities of survival and libera-
tion. Nehru and the Congress members, for example, used the contradictory 
nature of these spaces tactically, turning them into differential space to cre-
atively resist the dominant ordering of the city and to produce an alternative 
identification with its monuments.
The Indian National Army Trial at the Red Fort
This tactical use of space was demonstrated in 1946 at the Red Fort with the 
trial of the Indian National Army (INA). The defendants were high-ranking 
officers of Subhas Chandra Bose’s army that had become prisoners of war after 
their capture by the Japanese in Burma. These soldiers of Hindu, Muslim, 
Sikh, and Christian faiths committed themselves to the Axis powers in their 
fight against the British. “Chalo Dilli!,” or “let’s go to Delhi!” the slogan of the 
Meerut sepoys during the 1857 rebellion, became the INA’s battle cry.8 After 
the INA’s defeat in 1945, three of its officers did go to Delhi to be put on trial 
for war crimes. The trial would take place at the Red Fort. The selection of 
the site, according to Bose’s biographer, resulted from its associations with 
the trial of Bahadur Shah and the defeat of a similarly composed group of 
renegade soldiers in 1857.9 The British hoped to iterate the lessons of the past 
with the highly publicized contemporary trial. However, India, Delhi, and 
even the Red Fort had changed in the ninety years that had passed since the 
Uprising. A pan-Indian movement to oust the British had now reached fever 
pitch, a native press kept the population informed of all government mal-
feasance, and a well-organized and ideologically sophisticated native political 
party was leading the fight. Furthermore, the INA did not resemble the sepoys, 
who had been dismissed by both British and Indians as uncouth and of low 
social stock. The INA soldiers were well respected as a symbol of national unity 
and Indian patriotism. The Indian public understood the prosecution of such 
men for treason as yet another attempt by the British Raj to destroy the coun-
try’s unity and damage its self-respect.
In this new historical context and through the symbolization of national-
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ism, the trial was unlikely to be understood as a recurrence of that of  Bahadur 
Shah. Instead of underscoring the guilt of the mutinying soldiers, the location 
of the Red Fort served to punctuate the illegitimacy of British rule. In Frank 
Moraes’s biography of Nehru, we see the Congress leader fully appreciating 
the radical potential of the monumental space, which allowed him to turn 
the trial into a performance of national unity, thereby strengthening his cause: 
“In the following months the trial of three Indian National Army officers was 
held in Delhi’s Red Fort. Because the Congress had interested itself in their 
defense, Nehru appeared formally in court wearing his barrister’s gown which 
he had discarded thirty years earlier. . . . The three officers on trial were a 
Hindu, Muslim and Sikh, and this again gave their appearance a symbolic sig-
nificance. The accused were convicted, but were released almost immediately 
by order of the then Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Claude Auchinleck. 
New Delhi was on the retreat.”10
Stirring up memories of the Uprising, the trial at the Red Fort offered the 
Congress Party an opportunity to subvert imperial power and turn its social 
ordering of India — defined by the idea of intercommunal hatred — on its head: 
“It was not they [the INA] who were on trial but the judges and the authorities 
who had appointed them.”11 Would this sort of reordering have been possible 
had the trial taken place in Edwin Lutyens’s New Delhi? The trial that ren-
dered the Red Fort a differential monument of British rule also opened up a 
space to express the possibility of independence. The Red Fort thus emerged 
after the trial in 1946 as a space to mark the inauguration of the Indian nation, 
a new beginning of social life based on the secularist principles of equality. 
When the Indian flag was raised for the first time at the Red Fort it signified 
not only the fulfillment of the wish to one day rid the country of the British 
but also the exchange of one symbolic order for another. Only at this Mughal 
fort could India declare itself a new nation and could the public have its tryst 
with destiny.12
Nehru and the majority of Indians read the flag raising at the Red Fort 
as a sign of transition from the bondage of imperialism to the freedom of 
swaraj (self-governance). Nehru told his audience how to look on the cere-
mony, lest there be confusion: “We have gathered here on a historic occasion 
at this ancient fort to win back what was ours. This flag does not symbol-
ize the triumph of individuals or the Congress but the triumph of the whole 
Tryst with Destiny | 133
country. The free flag of India is the symbol of freedom and democracy not 
only for India but for the whole world.”13 This message would be reiterated 
in speeches, public meetings, and radio addresses during the following year to 
promote an identification of the public with the secularism of the Congress 
government. The symbolic correspondence between Indians constructed in 
the beautiful tableau of Nehru raising the flag at the Red Fort would, however, 
quickly be unsettled by the stain of communal hostility as northern India and 
Delhi was hit hard by the wave of Partition related violence. Nehru’s answer 
was to redeploy the symbolism of the Mughals through a stern warning: “If 
the people continue to take the law in their own hands, the result will be ab-
solute anarchy like the one that followed the fall of the Mughal empire.”14 His 
historical statement suggests that only the communal harmony once offered 
by the Mughals, and now offered by the Congress Party, would bring India 
prosperity and peace, that anything else would lead to its death. These words, 
however, did not win Nehru immediate support for his vision, and it would 
take help from Gandhi and other national leaders to veil the stain of Parti-
tion’s trauma, the indelible dark spot on the national landscape.
The Partition’s Mughal Monument
While a new community was drawing its first breath at the Red Fort, other 
Mughal monuments resounded with the death rattle of an old one. The events 
surrounding the partition of India and Pakistan after independence turned 
the Tomb of Humayun and the Purana Qila, or the Old Fort, into refugee 
camps that held tens of thousands of Delhi’s recently expelled Muslims. The 
price of Indian independence came at the heavy cost of amputating the west-
ern and eastern territories with their Muslim majorities from the Indian sub-
continent. Congress leaders had expected that in exchange for these territories 
India would not only be freed of British domination but also of the divisive 
ideology of communalism. Communalism, however, would arise as a force 
of resistance to the secular power of Nehru’s government. To challenge the 
powerful symbolism of the Red Fort, the surrounding Mughal monuments 
and mosques would become the spaces of resistance.
Fear, coercion, and political conviction led 12 million Hindus, Sikhs, and 
Muslims to migrate across the borders. Nehru and Muhammed Ali Jin-
nah were faced with the unexpected and unprecedented problem of how to 
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resettle hundreds of thousands of refugees. Graver than the logistic problems 
this entailed was the political problem of how to forge a national ideology 
based on secular ideals, to which both leaders were committed, when commu-
nal violence was coming to define the birth of their nations. Just one month 
after Nehru talked about building a “noble mansion” in which all could dwell, 
and fulfilled his promise by repossessing the Red Fort, 121,000 Muslims were 
taking refuge in Mughal monuments.15 Zakir Hussain, the founder of the 
Jamia Millia Islamia (National Muslim University) in New Delhi and a later 
president of India, described to Nehru the scene at the monuments as “areas 
in which humanity was dumped.”16 Forced out of their houses by recently 
displaced Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus, Delhi’s Muslims camped out in the 
open courtyards of the monuments with limited personal possessions, water, 
or sanitation. The irony of Muslims living in these conditions is expressed 
by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre: “Between 150,000 and 200,000 
people were going to live in those relics of Islam’s ancient grandeur in condi-
tions of undescribable filth, without shelter from the sun or the monsoon’s 
cataracts.”17
Maulana Azad, who had warned Indian Muslims that the creation of 
Pakistan would alienate them from India, spoke to his qaum, or community, 
from the pulpit of the Jama Masjid in November 1947. First he laid the blame 
for the current social trauma squarely on the misguided separatist aspirations 
of his audience. Then he asked them to think about their historical embed-
dedness in Delhi and in the space of the mosque: “I told you that the two-
nations theory was the death-knell of a life of faith and belief. . . . Those on 
whom you relied for support have forsaken you, left you helpless. . . . Behold 
the minaret of the mosque bend down to ask you where you have mislaid the 
pages of your history! It was but yesterday that your caravan alighted on the 
banks of the Jamuna. . . . How is it that you feel afraid of living here today 
in this Delhi, which has been nurtured by your blood?”18 With these words 
Azad rendered the Jama Masjid the one space in Delhi where Indian Muslims 
could begin again to have a sense of place and from where they could regain 
their bearings in an independent India. The great mosque’s marble domes, tall 
minarets, and red sandstone represented hundreds of years of Muslim pres-
ence in India. India was the only place where the community of the faithful, 
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much like the structure itself, belonged. Gandhi would pick up this line of 
argument against those Hindus and Sikhs hoping to drive all Muslims out of 
Delhi, calling them foreigners in a Hindu nation.
Yet while Nehru and Azad tried to render the Red Fort and the Jama 
Masjid symbolic spaces of an Indian nation ready to move forward, Muslim 
refugees continued to flood into the Purana Qila and the area outside the 
Jama Masjid. These spaces challenged the leaders’ idealism and rendered all 
Mughal monuments contradictory spaces. Moreover, they revealed that com-
munal rather than secular ideology was shaping the public consciousness of 
Indians all over Delhi. On 21 November 1947, Gandhi reported in his daily 
prayer meeting at Birla House that during recent riots 137 of Delhi’s mosques 
had been destroyed or converted to temples by Hindus and Sikhs.19 In a letter 
to the first home minister, Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru condemned the practice 
of conversion: “It is obvious that this business of not only destroying a mosque 
but converting it into a temple is of the utmost significance and very grave con-
sequences will follow from it, apart from our prestige suffering greatly.”20 The 
destroyed and converted mosques with flags of the Arya Samaj and Hindu 
Mahasbha flying over them, and the Mughal monuments filled to capacity 
with Muslim refugees, clearly demonstrated to Congress leaders that their 
image of the Indian nation was not being accepted by all Indians. Of greater 
urgency to Indians was trying to understand and reckon with their leaders’ 
irrational decision to sever Pakistan from India. The sense of meaninglessness 
emanating from an arbitrary decision that called into question not only the 
concept of nation but also the power of those who rule in its name grew like a 
black hole swallowing up all the cultural meaning and social order that the na-
scent secular government had expected to establish. The collapsed figure and 
future of the nation needed addressing; meaning and social ordering needed 
to be pinned down through secular symbolization. The first step toward this 
goal was to give the darkness that swept India a name — communalism. This 
naming enabled the nation’s leaders to veil the initial trauma of Partition and 
to identify the resistance to the secular as religious, and then to delegitimize it. 
The new context of post-Partition power relations thus forced secularists like 
Gandhi and Nehru to redefine the meaning of a secular nation after years of 
signifying it with the contradictory motifs and symbols of Hinduism.
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How Congress First Figured the Mughal Monuments
During the forging of the independence movement Mughal monuments were 
signified as Muslim space, foreign and un-Indian to certain members of the 
nationalist movement. When the Congress Party took hold of the reins of the 
movement it did not refute this vision, but due to its efficacy tacitly supported 
a vision of an India divided between Muslim and Hindu culture and history. 
The vision itself was produced a year after the Uprising. Partha Chatterjee’s 
study of the early nationalist formations of the swaraj locates the emergence of 
this spiritually based imagined community in the Bharatbarser Itihas (History 
of India, 1858) by the Bengali Tarinicharan Chattopadhayay.21 Divided neatly 
into three stages of history — Hindu, Muslim, and British, each ushered in by 
conquest — his history is a tale of the birth, blossoming, and eventual decline 
of the Indian national spirit, which, according to the author, was born in the 
Vedic era, when the great Hindu canonical texts and epics were composed. It 
then experienced its full bloom during the Gupta Empire and fell into decline 
soon after. Chattopadhayay and his followers attributed exceptional courage, 
honesty, and exploratory prowess to the Indians of the years 1500 b.c.e. to 
550 c.e. This view stood in contrast to the nineteenth-century British por-
trayal of Indian Hindus as meek and fearful of travel. Early nationalists also 
conceived of a “Golden Age,” in which all Indians existed in a state of social, 
cultural, and territorial unity. This belief allowed them to argue that India, 
having once before been a true nation, could again become one — an impor-
tant first step in challenging the assertion that British rule created the Indian 
nation.
Yet by implication this argument also rendered the idea of an Indian nation 
synonymous with a purely Hindu past: Indian Muslims not only belonged 
outside this nation but were the reason for its decline. Mahmud of Ghazni’s 
conquests in Somanath in 1084 were cast as the defining moment of India’s 
entry into “the night of medieval darkness,” and British stereotypes were ad-
opted to characterize Muslims as bigoted, warlike, and resolutely un-Indian.22 
Hindu nationalist historians iterated the rhetorical logic of Chattopadhayay’s 
historiography, whereby the national past was distinctly a Hindu past and non-
Hindus were non-Indian. Parties like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, 
National Volunteers Union) that formed in 1925 and the Hindu Mahasabha, 
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founded in 1915, built their Hindutva, or “Hinduness” movements around 
these assumptions and conceived of the Hindu nation as the “the superimpo-
sition of a religion, a culture, a language, and a sacred territory.”23
Before Indian nationalist history transmuted into Hindutva history, the 
Congress Party had already accepted its beliefs and logic. To proclaim their 
sovereignty in India and to justify the delivery of state powers into their hands 
alone, the Congress leaders accepted the fantasy of a pan-Indian Hindu cul-
ture and that it alone could restore to India a state of unity. Nehru, for ex-
ample, adopted the Sanskrit term Bharat Mata or Mother India, to designate 
the homeland.24 His narrative of Indian history, written in The Discovery of 
India in 1946, follows the same general trajectory and periodization — Hindu, 
Muslim, British — of the early nationalist histories. In line with his secularist 
ideology, Nehru normalizes the integration of foreign migrants and conquer-
ors into the fabric of Hindu society and culture. In his history, in fact, the 
continued assimilation of those who entered India into Hindu social, cultural, 
and political customs and traditions “became the symbol of nationalism.”25 
Nehru thoroughly sanctioned the rise of Hindu nationalism in the swaraj 
movement as an inevitable process: “Thus it was natural for the old Brahminic 
faith to become the symbol again and again of nationalist revivals.”26
Tellingly, Nehru’s chapter on the Muslim phase of Indian history is titled 
“New Problems,” thus setting the stage for an interruption of Hindu cultural 
growth. But even the Islamic conquerors, who came with the ambition of 
spreading their faith and subjugating all other religions, Nehru explains, were 
assimilated.27 Unlike the British, they settled in India and controlled it from 
within. The Afghan rulers, such as the Delhi Sultanate and the Tughlaqs, 
were essentially Indian. They spoke the Sanskritic Pashtun language and had 
once been within the Indian Buddhist orbit. In Nehru’s view these facts al-
lowed them to be seen not as foreign invaders belonging to an alien race but as 
ancient Indians returning home. Nor are the Mughals, and especially Akbar, 
represented as Muslim rulers, but as leaders assimilated to the normative stan-
dard of the Hindu nation.28
Nehru departs from earlier nationalist representations of Muslim rule as 
a historic rupture that marked the subjugation of Hindus. He instead con-
tends that underlying the Indian nation is an unbroken history of Hindu cul-
ture. Indeed, he argues that since most Muslims were or are Hindu converts, 
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Hinduism continues to inform their culture: they don the same clothing style, 
eat the same food, practice similar arts, and enjoy the same hobbies, such as 
hunting and polo.29 Overall, Nehru’s history presents Hindus and Muslims 
as united in their geographical and cultural development in India and pitted 
against the British rulers, the only rulers of India that did not assimilate to 
the country’s culture.30 Surveying the long history of cultural syncretism, he 
rejects the idea that the culture of Indian Muslims is separate and different 
from that of Hindus and that they therefore constitute their own nation.
Gandhi, for his part, also adapted symbols and idioms from Hindu culture 
to frame his ideal image of the Indian nation. Like Nehru, Gandhi saw India 
as “a harmonious collection of religious communities all placed on an equal 
footing.”31 Hinduism could permeate all aspects of Indian society and culture 
because it was a religion tolerant of other religions. There was no need to de-
mand separate nation-states, because Gandhi “promoted a syncretic and spiri-
tual brand of the Hindu religion in which all creeds were bound to merge, or 
converge.”32 But the actions of Hindus and Sikhs migrating to India after Par-
tition told a different story: the forced expulsion of Muslims from their homes 
and mosques proved that they were in fact seen as foreigners and outside the 
protection of the new nation-state. The Hindu-centric idiom of nation-
hood espoused by the Congress Party, although based squarely on tolerance, 
did not stay the hand of violence and subsequently made empty gestures of 
Nehru’s promise to build a mansion for all Indians to dwell in. To clear away 
the ugliness of this reality of Indian independence, Nehru needed the help of 
Gandhi, who came to Delhi and labored until his death to change the process 
of identification of independent India. It was for this cause that the Mughal 
architecture of Delhi would again be put into service.
Gandhi’s Ordering of the Mughal Monuments
According to Kumkum Sangari, Gandhi’s secularism, which would come to 
reorder India after Partition and independence, was based on his “recognition 
that even a pluralist or reformed Hinduism could not be a binding force in a 
multireligious society, and that violence destroyed or transformed the ‘inside’ 
of all religions.”33 In the fight for independence, the spirituality of Indians was 
taken into the public sphere as a means to prove that the materialistic British 
state was unsuited to rule India. This position changed after the reality of 
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Pakistan and Partition. The state cast religion out of the public sphere and 
deemed it a personal matter.34 Furthermore, based on its ideology of secular 
universalism, the Indian nation-state would not recognize the individual as 
part of a group but only as a singular entity. This direct relationship meant 
that religion would no longer serve as a mediator between the public and 
private social realms. Furthermore, like Nehru, Gandhi began to argue that 
“conversion from one religion to another did not alter the deeper bonds of 
patriotism or nationality or common culture or social affiliations or regional 
allegiances, it only altered religious denomination.”35 This idea of a “combined” 
or “composite” culture was essential for mending the broken ties and social 
fragmentation that occurred in Delhi after Partition: “Muslims were now 
explicitly included as co-sharers in a wider Indian cultural exceptionalism.”36
After the question of the place of Indian Muslims in the imagined national 
landscape was resolved, the question of how they would be reintroduced into a 
newly independent nation-state had still to be answered. Nehru was too busy 
contending with the logistics of moving and resettling thousands of refuges to 
attend to this issue, so it was up to Gandhi to spearhead the cultural transfor-
mation of India from a communally divided nation-state into one ordered by 
secular universalism. Once in Delhi, Gandhi set to work convincing Hindus 
and Muslims to see each other not as enemies but as the children of a com-
mon Mother India.37 Delhi, for Gandhi, became the symbolic center of the 
new Indian social order. He visited the Purana Qila, talked to Muslim leaders, 
and publicly took up the cause to care for the Muslim refugees. In a prayer 
meeting he could not help but bring the audience’s attention to the historic 
fort that had once served both Hindus and Muslims but was now a camp for 
the disenfranchised of Delhi:
It is said that in the Mahabharata period the Pandavas used to stay in this 
Purana Quila. Whether you call it Indraprastha or Delhi, the Hindus and 
the Muslims have grown here together. It was the capital of the Mughals. 
Now it is the capital of India. . . . The Mughals came from outside. They 
identified themselves with the manners and customs of Delhi. From among 
them some happened to be Ansari Sahebs, Hakim Sahebs and some be-
came Hindus too. The Hindus also joined their services. In such a Delhi 
of yours the Hindus and the Muslims used to live together peacefully. They 
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did fight occasionally. But they would fight for a short while and then be 
united again. On one occasion, some fanatic made a murderous attack on 
Shraddhanandji [an Araya Samaj activist]. But earlier the Muslims with 
great affection, had taken Shraddhanandji to Jama Masjid where he ad-
dressed them. This is your Delhi.38
Guiding the public through these historic moments and monuments, Gan-
dhi attempted to construct a national mirror of unity and used the spaces of 
Mughal Delhi to symbolize the unity of Hindus and Muslims. At a prayer 
meeting on 13 September 1947, he reiterated this symbolism to order the Jama 
Masjid and the Red Fort: “Delhi is no small place. It is the capital of the coun-
try. Here we have the grand Jama Masjid and also the fort. You have not built 
these nor have I built them. They have been built by the Mughals who ruled 
over us. They had become part of India. By telling the Muslims today to leave 
the country do you mean to say that you are going to take possession of the 
Jama Masjid? And if that is your intention, do you know the implication? Just 
think about it. Are we going to stay in the Jama Masjid? I cannot agree to any 
such proposal. The Muslims must have the right to visit that place. It belongs 
to them. We are also proud of it. It is full of great artistic beauty. Shall we raze 
it to the ground? That can never be.”39
On 18 September Gandhi brought up the Jama Masjid again and addressed 
the attempts to convert it into a temple, as had been done with other, smaller 
mosques of the city. In his speech he outlined the contradictory nature of such 
a spatial practice and implicitly affirmed the secular ordering of the space, 
whose preservation would be symbolic of India’s unity and religious freedom: 
“We have got the Jama Masjid which is the largest mosque in the world. What 
will happen to that mosque if we kill most of the Muslims or they go away to 
Pakistan? Will you transfer that mosque to Pakistan? Or will you destroy that 
mosque or turn it into a Shiva temple? Suppose some Hindu in his pride wants 
to turn it into a Shiva temple, or a Sikh wants to turn it into a gurdwara — 
I would say that it would be an attempt to bury Hinduism and Sikhism. No 
religion can be built up in this manner.”40 The idealized space of the Mu-
ghal monument continued to figure in his speeches and became a trope of 
his universal secularist ideology. The Jama Masjid, for example, reappeared 
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in Gandhi’s speech against educational reforms that sought to erase Muslim 
contributions from national history. In the speech he demanded reason rather 
than blind parochialism to prevail: “By way of example, if we make the vain 
attempt of obliterating the Muslim period, we shall have to forget that there 
was a mighty Jama Masjid in Delhi second to none in the world, or that there 
was a Muslim University in Aligarh, or that there was the Taj in Agra, one of 
the seven wonders of the world, or that there were the great forts of Delhi and 
Agra built during the Mughal period. We shall then have to rewrite our his-
tory with that end in view.”41 In his writings and speeches Gandhi iterated the 
question of what kind of image of India would appear if Muslims were turned 
out and their great monuments razed. The ruinous landscape he conjured 
meant to compel Hindus and Sikhs to reacquaint themselves with the realities 
of Indian culture and history. More crucially, he wanted them to realize that 
not long before the events of Partition their everyday life had been a vibrant 
tableau enlivened by Muslim culture, neighbors, and monuments.
To reinforce the principle of “combined culture,” Gandhi performed his 
vision publicly. He started to read from the Hindu epics, the Qu’ran, and the 
Bible at his daily prayer meetings. But of greater impact was his participation 
in the urs, or death anniversary fair, at the dargah of the Sufi saint, Khwaja 
Qutubuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki, in Mehrauli three days before his assassination 
(figure 11). The popular shrine sits within a larger complex of architectural 
structures. Built by Sher Shah in 1542, it came under the guardianship of the 
Mughals, who built a marble mosque and tombs for the later emperors near 
the shrine. The last great palace of the Mughals, the Zafar Mahal, was built 
adjacent to the dargah in 1842, symbolizing the Mughals’ continued reverence 
for the great Sufi saint. In the aftermath of Partition the complex was closed 
and locked and the area around it vacated due to Hindu and Sikh violence. 
This left the Muslims of the surrounding area homeless and made the site a 
grim monument to the communalism now ordering the Indian landscape. In 
a prayer meeting, Gandhi explained that the vacated shrine, with barbed wire 
and locks, gainsaid the values of the new nation and the past: “Last September 
this shrine was subjected to the wrath of Hindu mobs. The Muslims living 
in the vicinity of the shrine for the last 800 years had to leave their homes. I 
mention this sad episode to tell you that, though Muslims love the shrine, 
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today no Muslim can be found anywhere near it. It is the duty of the Hindus, 
Sikhs, the officials and the Government to open the shrine again and wash 
off this stain on us.”42
In India the urs festival of a Sufi saint of the Chishti order embodies the 
“convergent, composite traditions of popular worship” and thus provided a 
perfect stage for enacting the historical union of Hindu-Muslim culture.43 At 
the festival at Mehrauli on 27 January 1948, Gandhi made a short speech to 
add further significance to the reopening of the shrine, in which he asked the 
visitors to perform an exercise: “I request you — Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims 
who have come here with cleansed hearts — to take a vow at this holy place 
that you will never allow strife to raise its head, but will live in amity, united 
as friends and brothers. . . . We might be different outwardly but after all we 
are the offshoots of the same tree.”44 As the Mughal emperor Akbar had done 
Fig 11: Mahatma Gandhi at the 
Mehrauli shrine, 27 January 
1948. © AP/Wide World Photos
Tryst with Destiny | 143
in the sixteenth century, Gandhi used the syncretic site of a Sufi tomb to re-
draw the Indian community of Hindus and Muslims as a combined culture. 
Gandhi’s participation in the urs festival turned the shrine into a symbolic 
space of his vision and into a radically open space to creatively remake the 
social order of India.
But even before his visit to Mehrauli Gandhi performed another public act 
to give greater meaning to the urs festival. Seeing that the violence in Delhi 
had not abated after several months and that Mughal and Muslim spaces re-
mained physically threatened or occupied, Gandhi reemployed a strategy he 
used in Calcutta in September 1947 to bring peace to that city. On 13 January 
he pitched his final battle against the divisive forces of Indian society and 
commenced what would be his final fast. Moved by his suffering, government 
employees, police, Hindu nationalists, Sikh and Muslim leaders, and the Paki-
stani high commissioner were among many others who signed a pledge to end 
the violence. The deputy commissioner of Delhi took Hindu and Sikh leaders 
to Mehrauli to repair the shrine of Khwaja Qutubuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki so 
it would be ready for the urs.45 Other Muslim structures of Delhi were also 
repaired in intercommunal efforts. The built environments of Delhi were fi-
nally being produced through the practice of intercommunal cooperation as 
symbolic sites of Gandhi’s idealism, and the government promised to preserve 
them as such. It was to celebrate this change in the course of the Indian nation 
that Gandhi in his weakened state visited Mehrauli.
In hindsight it seems that Gandhi’s fast proved too effective, as it left Hindu 
nationalist parties feeling alienated and disempowered in the secular reorder-
ing of the public sphere. Angered to have lost their power so suddenly, a radi-
calized segment of Hindu nationalists retaliated for what they perceived as too 
many concessions to Muslims, and Gandhi was assassinated thirteen days after 
he ended his fast and three days after his visit to Mehrauli. This violent act, in 
turn, also had unintended consequences for those who perpetrated it, for in-
stead of gaining them a space in the political landscape, it brought about their 
banishment from it. After Gandhi’s assassination, political parties founded on 
the theory of the separate Hindu nation were cast out of the public sphere and 
the secularists maintained the single authority to represent India.
Muslims welcomed the barring of Hindu nationalist parties from the pub-
lic sphere. Gyanendra Pandey writes of the changes Muslims felt in Delhi after 
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Gandhi’s death: “The assassination of Gandhi wiped out the blaze of  Hindu-
Muslim violence in such a way that ‘the world veritably changed.’ ”46 Pandey 
quotes one Muslim as stating more emphatically: “Gandhiji made it possible 
for Muslims to continue to live in India.”47 Throughout the long process of 
shifting power relations from British domination and nationalist resistance to 
Congress domination and communal resistance, the Mughal monuments of 
Delhi functioned as spaces of creativity. They gave tangible shape and order 
to the secularist ideology Gandhi shared with Nehru, and after the final 
banishment of communalist ideology, they continued to remind the newly 
independent nation of the historical roots of one of the great religions exist-
ing within it. However, communalism continued as a blemish on the Mughal 
monuments of India, no matter how many times the secularists try to wash 
it away. The specter of communalism and its violence, emerging from the un-
conscious register, continued to signify the national landscape.
After Gandhi’s assassination and the expulsion of communalism from 
the public sphere, the business of nation-state building could finally proceed 
with Nehru at the helm. The violence of Partition, the desecration of Mus-
lim mosques and tombs, and governmental neglect of the remaining Mus-
lim community would remain a repressed memory at the Mughal sites but 
periodically resurface to unsettle the symbolic ordering and ideology of the 
new state. When the Mughal monuments were turned over to the ASI, its 
mandate was to present and preserve them as nothing more than artifacts of 
the Islamic and British past, devoid of any more particular or recent mean-
ing. But the sites had born witness to a violent creative moment in the story 
of Indian independence: the contradictions of the new nation had been laid 
bare before them, and Gandhi had utilized them to constitute an alternative 
vision of the nation. The erasure of the trauma of the post-Partition period 
from public memory would require continuous and repeated efforts, and even 
so, that trauma would leave traces that could never be entirely suppressed. In 
the following chapter I will examine both how Nehru’s development policies 
and the practice of heritage production worked to keep the stain left behind 
by the sublime and incomprehensible events of Partition invisible, and how 
private individuals are using the contradictions inherent in such efforts to 
critique and recreate definitions of  Indian nationhood.
 6 the ethics of monumentality  
  in postindependence india
With the violence of Partition subdued and communal-
ism banished from the public sphere, the Indian government with Nehru at 
the helm was finally free to launch a “multifront attack on poverty, ignorance, 
and economic stagnation.”1 While these problems emerged from the economic 
realities inherited from a colonial government, Nehru believed they could 
all be traced back even further to the recalcitrant processes of Indian social 
identification. Identification based on religion, region, and caste would have 
to be replaced by identification with secular nationalism and the principles 
of liberal humanism; otherwise, Nehru contended, Indian society would re-
main in a state of inertia.2 Therefore the state’s most immediate task was to 
promote processes and spaces of secular identification. This, however, meant 
that the government would deny access to those who identified with other 
communities besides the national one to the public sphere. In justification of 
this contradictory logic of a democratic state, Nehru asserted that separatist 
movements based on group identification simply could not serve an India that 
needed to solve the immediate economic problems of inflation, food short-
ages, and low agricultural output.3
According to Sandria Freitag, the decision to remove all processes of com-
munal identification from the public sphere left unresolved the question of 
how the nonsecular members of civil society would engage the state about 
their needs.4 After Partition and Gandhi’s assassination, communal groups 
quickly became India’s other, and the opportunity to develop a new inclusive 
ordering for Indian civil society seemed foreclosed on. Furthermore, deprived 
of official recognition and legitimate access to the state, these others could 
only gain visibility in the public sphere through violent acts, such as the ones 
we saw in the 1980s and 1990s and in 2002.
If we accept the premise of this argument — that the postindependence 
state engendered communal violence because it did not resolve the issues of 
religious representation in the public sphere — then it would follow that if 
Nehru and Gandhi had allowed communal groups into the public sphere, 
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a truly democratic and peaceful civil society could have been constructed. I 
argue that this notion is too imprecise, as it derives from an analytic perspec-
tive limited to the realm of discursive (ideological) space. The problem with 
this perspective is that the contestatory and contradictory nature of the pro-
cess of national identification itself is unproblematized and the nondiscur-
sive (violent, exploitative, artistic, ludic) spatial practices of both the state and 
those that contest it remain unexamined.
Judith Butler has remarked that the very foundation of a national identity 
is perforce an imagined and inherently impossible ideal: “Every description 
of the ‘we’ will always do more than describe; it will constitute and construct 
an imaginary unity and contrived totality, a phantasmatic ideal, which makes 
the ‘representability’ of the we into a permanent impossibility.”5 What this 
means is that in the process of constructing the national “we” an exclusion 
of the other must first take place, and this excluded other will always remain 
a surplus that will “haunt the very claim of representability that it [the state] 
seeks to make.”6 The Indian political landscape of the 1990s clearly reflects 
this point and has proven that even if Hindu nationalists are allowed legiti-
mate access into the public sphere, and if government positions are reserved 
for Muslim representatives, the real problems of social equity and justice re-
main unsolved and a new other is simply created to divert attention away from 
the contradictory social realities of Indian nationhood. It is precisely the non-
discursive social realities of subjectivity and economic development, and not 
the secular-communal divide, that structure the public sphere and render it 
ambivalent.
To more adequately understand how development and national identifica-
tion have worked to shape the Indian public sphere, of which the Mughal 
monument forms an essential part, it is important to leave the level of ideology 
and probe more deeply into the spatial practices of economics and interpella-
tion. From such an analysis emerges the realization that there is a more funda-
mental drive at work in the ordering of the public sphere. This drive operates 
at the very foundation of the Indian nation-state and shapes its desires and 
ideological illusions. It is the drive to suppress the Real of Partition, the un-
speakable, violent, and arbitrary act that inaugurated Indian independence. 
Without a national purgation of the traumatic events of postindependence, 
through commissions, commemorations, histories and testimony, Partition 
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has remained to haunt the national unconscious and, as does most trauma, 
resurfaces periodically as social violence. Yet on a day-to-day basis the Real 
does not directly affect us because of ideology, which diverts our gaze from its 
destructive truth as it “masks some insupportable, real, impossible kernel.”7 
As Slavoj Žižek further explains, ideology operates on the level of fantasy to 
support our reality and structure our social relations; it functions “not to offer 
us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an 
escape from some traumatic, real kernel.”8
Invested in this ideological operation, the postindependence state is not 
one concerned with policing the borders of the public sphere against the entry 
of other ideologies. In fact, it would welcome them as an opportunity to re-
inforce its own ideological claims. Instead, I want to argue that the policing 
effort of the state has been directed to the suppression and control of the Real, 
that unruly sign of impossibility that can unsettle its social reality. In the first 
decades of the postindependence era, it was the difficulty of the Indian Real, 
constituted by Partition, communal violence and the disenfranchisement of 
religious communities, that threatened the secular tableau and needed to be 
masked. One of the forms this mask would take was national culture as dis-
seminated through the practices of heritage and tourism. The Mughal monu-
ment became a key site at which this masking function was deployed and to 
which the principle actors and ideologues of the Indian political landscape 
would return again and again to cover the presence of the Real.
The Mughal monument emerged as radically different after Gandhi’s as-
sassination, an event the secularists strategically used to blot out the bloody 
events of Partition from the national landscape.9 No longer an openly differ-
ential space used to harmonize communal division, the monument was now 
cast as a terminal point of Nehruvian power and its social order. Generally 
speaking, two vectors shaped the spatial practices of this power: the ideol-
ogy of liberal humanism, encapsulated by the phrase “unity in diversity”; and 
Nehru’s obsession with the transformation of India into a modern and indus-
trialized nation. The first vector informed the imaginary identification the 
government set up between Indian citizenship and its mirror, the national 
monument, while the second underwrote the monument’s new symbolic or-
dering through the practices of heritage and tourism development. The prac-
tices of identification and tourism functioned not only to veil the Real but to 
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mystify the realities of governmental intolerance toward alternative spatial 
practices and of the aggressive practices of development at play.
In this chapter I first examine how the practices of heritage and tourism de-
velopment have ordered the Mughal monument to veil both spatial practices 
and the trauma of the Indian Real. Subsequently I consider how the Mughal 
monument, after decades of intensive development programs, has once again 
become a differential space enabling people to challenge national symboliza-
tion by calling attention to the material realities of overdevelopment, corrup-
tion, and disregard for the social fabric of these sites. Additionally, the past ten 
years have revealed how the spatial practices of Muslim religious authorities 
have transmuted the Mughal monument into a differential space, a creative 
site to transcend the contradictions of secularism, face the ghost of Partition, 
and bring the imagined nation into closer alignment with the social realities 
of the Indian people.
The Mughal Monuments and the Development of  Heritage
In the political context defined by Nehru’s ardent secularism, the Mughal 
monuments were radically and singularly reframed as sites of national heri-
tage. This did not mean the erasure either of the Mughal monuments’ ex-
cesses or of the traumatic memory they contained. Instead, it meant that the 
space of the monument, after being symbolized as “heritage,” obscured this 
other meaning. Raphael Samuel outlines the inexhaustible purview of the 
heritage operation: “ ‘Heritage’ is a nomadic term, which travels easily, puts 
down roots — or bivouacs — in seemingly quite unpromising terrain. . . . It sets 
up residence in streets broad and narrow, royal palaces and railway sidings, 
canalside walks and town hall squares. It stages its spectacles in a promis cuous 
variety of venues. . . . It attaches itself to an astonishing variety of material 
artifacts. . . . Lexically, ‘heritage’ is a term capacious enough to accommodate 
wildly discrepant meanings.”10 In India the deployment of the term heritage 
enabled the state to cast its net over the diverse built and natural environments 
of India and to assimilate them into the homogenous category of national 
culture. Though not introduced into the lexicon of monument preservation 
in India until the 1970s, the concept of heritage structured the Mughal monu-
ment since independence. Heritage was especially useful to Nehru and later 
governments, who used it to justify tourism development schemes that radi-
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cally and indiscriminately altered the ordering of the cultural and social envi-
ronments around monuments.
The conversion of the Mughal monument into a heritage site occurred 
shortly after independence, when it was ordered by the exigencies of nation 
building. In setting up its new rule, the Indian government and its army of 
civil servants had to replace older practices based on “the colonial injunctions 
to collect taxes and preserve law and order to distributing resources and tak-
ing leadership in rural reform and industrial management.”11 One of these 
industries was tourism, which the state developed through careful planning. 
The newly created Tourism Department initiated various projects to exploit 
the economic potential of the famous Mughal monuments, and the Planning 
Commission integrated these projects into national economic and social poli-
cies. In the years following Indian independence these spaces would emerge 
as national heritage sites, desirable tourist destinations, generators of foreign 
currency, and sources of growth for local economies.
The first three decades of governmental development of the Mughal sites as 
spaces of national heritage remained confined to the building of touristic in-
frastructure (roads, hotels, parks, etc.), allocating money to publish brochures 
and publicity “to counteract the influence of a century-old propaganda against 
[India].”12 Another significant mechanism of transforming monuments into 
spaces of heritage and tourism was the Planning Commission’s Five-Year Plan. 
First introduced on 8 December 1951 and chaired by Nehru, the Five-Year 
Plan outlined a method of rapid and intensive nation-wide economic develop-
ment based on the Soviet model. It was not until the second Five-Year Plan 
(1956–61) that the Planning Commission took a direct interest in the tourism 
industry and allocated special funds of Rs. 336.38 lakhs ($7.1 million) to the 
Tourism Department for development projects on both the national and state 
levels.13 The socialist leanings of Nehru and his immediate successors pre-
vented rampant development or private capital investment. The government 
was more concerned to balance the needs of foreign tourists with the needs of 
the local economy and of domestic tourists.
By the end of the 1970s, the nation’s most-visited monuments were equipped 
with amenities such as electric lighting, plumbing upgrades, new roads, and 
hotels. The personnel at these monuments also expanded, and archaeologists 
shared their management and publicity duties with the tourism industry’s 
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economic advisors, market researchers and developers. The government of 
Indira Gandhi, adopting Nehru’s ideological disposition, focused tourism 
development on the further diversification of the tourist base and invested in 
the expanding industry of domestic tourism. Among the benefits of tourism 
listed in the sixth Five-Year Plan (1980–85) were the “promotion of national 
integration and international understanding, creation of employment oppor-
tunities, removal of regional imbalances, opening up of new growth centres 
in the interior of the country.”14 As part of its mandate, the Tourism Depart-
ment invited the prominent National Institute of Design (NID) to study re-
gional imbalances and draw up development plans for Fatehpur Sikri. Of all 
the Mughal monuments in the Agra-Delhi circuit, Fatehpur Sikri was the 
least able to accommodate visitors wishing to stay overnight, and the least 
integrated with the local economy. After a careful survey of the monument 
and the adjacent neighborhoods, the NID made several recommendations in a 
published report, Fatehpur Sikri Integrated Development Plan.15
The NID’s aim was not only to advise the government on how to exploit 
the tourism market at Fatehpur Sikri but also to express that the monument’s 
conservation and social uplift were integral to this development. It argued 
that projects of economic expansion unrelated to the monument, if  left un-
checked, would lead to increased traffic, stone quarrying, construction activi-
ties, and population growth.16 All the NID’s recommendations were aimed at 
offsetting encroachment and damage to the monument while creating “con-
ditions for the participation of local population in tourist activities.”17 Not a 
single one of these recommendations was implemented and there continues 
to be disquieting displays of poverty close to the monument, shocking tourists 
that venture off the guided path and revealing the contradictions of heritage 
development in India. Additionally, in 2003 the Times of India reported that 
quarrying activities have resumed and that the monumental gateway of the 
monument, called the Buland Darwaza, and the western wall of Fatehpur 
Sikri have shown cracks and destruction due to dynamite blasts.18
The NID’s report marked the end of an era of Nehruvian economics that 
sought to bridge tourism development at the Mughal monuments with social 
uplift and equity. In the next phase of development, which began with the 
government of Rajiv Gandhi, we see the transposition of social integration 
and equitable growth with more concentrated schemes of commercial growth 
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and private-sector partnerships. Following these tourism developments the 
contradictory ordering of the Mughal monument as national heritage became 
more apparent and resistance to the state began to grow in strength.
The Taj Corridor Project and the Contradictions of  Neoliberalism
Rajiv Gandhi’s government recognized tourism as one of the fastest-growing 
industries in India. Its strength lay in its low level of capital investment com-
pared to other industries and in its ability to attract foreign currency and gen-
erate tax revenue. In light of these positive qualities, between 1985 and 1990 
the Planning Commission allocated Rs. 326.2 crores ($16.6 million) to tour-
ism development, the highest expenditure yet, to achieve a 7 percent growth 
rate. To meet this goal, the seventh Five-Year Plan proposed four areas of ac-
tion: “(i) faster development of tourism; (ii) according the status of an industry 
to tourism; (iii) re-defining of the role of public and private sectors to ensure 
that the private sector investment is encouraged in developing tourism and 
the public sector investment is focused mainly on development of support in-
frastructure; and (iv) exploiting tourism potential to support local handicrafts 
and other creative arts and to promote national integration.”19 The earlier 
strategy of spreading investment evenly across India was replaced by a strategy 
of investing in overseas marketing and the aggressive redevelopment of popu-
lar destinations into safe and protected tourist enclaves.
The new profit-driven orientation of the tourism industry in India com-
pelled the state to streamline and consolidate its public-sector agencies and to 
invite private sector initiatives. The conservation of national heritage monu-
ments was also reoriented to the new tourism industry that sought “to exploit 
advantages of India’s unique place as a cultural tourism destination and to uti-
lise tourism as a major force in support of conservation of national heritage.”20 
The last point discloses the state’s conviction that tourism and conservation 
were not opposing forces but could be mutually sustaining. Yet throughout the 
1990s a momentum of development built up and outpaced conservation de-
mands and social-integration policies at the heritage monuments. In 2002 this 
imbalance reached a critical point when an ill-conceived revitalization project 
for the Jumna riverbank threatened the structural stability of the Taj Mahal.
The Taj Corridor Project is probably the greatest catastrophe ever averted at 
a Mughal monument. The project now stands suspended in time as an empty 
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space symbolizing a nation-state cut loose from its socialist moorings. The 
project emerged during the ninth Five-Year Plan when the state asserted its 
desire to become one of the world’s top tourism destinations. Under pressure 
from the Ministry of Tourism, the Uttar Pradesh State Tourism Department 
invited faculty and graduate students of the Landscape and Architectural De-
partment (LAD) of the University of Illinois to produce a new plan for incor-
porating Agra’s Red Fort, the Taj Mahal, and the Jumna River front into an 
environmentally sound and unified tourism zone. The report they compiled 
became known as the Taj Mahal Cultural Heritage District Development 
Plan. The LAD mainly wished to incorporate the inhabitants of the surround-
ing rural neighborhood into the tourist zone and to promote extended stays 
in the city. The heritage component of the plan was designed to bring to light 
the riparian culture of the nobility that had vanished after the Mughal capital 
shifted to Delhi in the mid-seventeenth century. New building and landscape 
design proposals focused mainly on the river’s edge: “Its main feature would 
be a movement promenade that would link the remaining historic sites and 
bring the riverfront landscape into the civic realm.”21 In this way, the devel-
oped riverfront, “the spine of the Taj Cultural Heritage District,” would have 
legal and administrative protection and ensure public access.22
In the estimation of the LAD, everyone besides the locals underused the 
riverfront, especially tourists. To this day, farmers bring their animals to the 
river, and a train of camels walking in line along the sandbank and water buf-
faloes grazing below the Taj Mahal are not uncommon sights. Locals also 
use the riverfront to bathe, to pray at the ghats, to play cricket, to fly kites, 
and as a commons. The LAD study implicitly discounted such traditional uses 
of the space and recommended incorporating the waterfront into the tourist 
experience. The planners were, however, careful to explain that locals were 
not to be displaced, but assimilated: “They would have an opportunity to 
participate in the tourist economy (if they so desire) as boatmen, caretakers 
of orchards and public gardens, and makers of arts and crafts displayed in the 
arrival centers.”23 The LAD’s plan, while never fully implemented, provided a 
rough sketch of how to alter the spatial practices of the Mughal monuments 
and their surroundings to expand the touristic spaces and routes in Agra so 
visitors would prolong their stay. The state of Uttar Pradesh especially wel-
comed the design for a promenade, and from it was born the Taj Corridor 
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Project. Controversial, destructive, and eventually aborted, the project would 
reveal the underlying contradictions and oppositions of economic develop-
ment and of the promise of heritage protection at the Taj Mahal.
The LAD advised against new building projects pending further studies of 
the impact waterfront revitalization would have on the monuments. These 
studies were never completed, but the construction of an esplanade that 
stretched along the riverfront, connecting the Taj Mahal to the Red Fort, was 
nonetheless begun in 2002. No one knew at this time who had sanctioned the 
project, but A. G. Krishna Menon, an architect and the director of the TVB 
(Tulsi Vidhya Bharatiya) School of Habitat Studies, faults the Uttar Pradesh 
state government with the rapid transformation of an academic study into 
a development reality. To push the project through, the state government 
worked with the National Project Construction Corporation, “a commer-
cially aggressive public sector consultancy and construction company.”24 The 
first stage of the esplanade’s construction was a landfill comprising a twelve-
foot base of soil, stretching one mile long, and covering an area of seventy-two 
acres. A sixteen-hundred-meter long wall was also built to keep the river from 
carrying away the landfill (figure 12).25
Fig 12: The Taj Corridor seen from the Agra Red Fort © Ebba Koch 2004
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Without the knowledge of the minister of tourism and culture, Shri Jag-
mohan, the project proceeded at an atypical speed and would have been com-
pleted if an Indian Express reporter, Prarthna Gahilote, had not publicized 
the undertaking. Gahilote’s investigation revealed that the Taj Corridor Proj-
ect disturbed the protection of two World Heritage Sites, the Red Fort and 
the Taj Mahal, which was legally mandated by the Ancient Monuments and 
Archaeological Sites and Remains Act of 1958 and overstepped the Indian 
Supreme Court’s ruling of 1996 that defined a no-development zone of two 
hundred meters around the monuments. Gahilote also discovered that the 
local civic authorities at the Agra City Municipal Corporation and the Agra 
Development Authority had little knowledge of the project except that the 
Uttar Pradesh Central Pollution Control Board had approved it in August 
2002.26 Most alarming and telling of how fragmented and insular the admin-
istration of heritage sites had become was the ASI’s response to the project at 
the Agra Circle office: they informed Gahilote that since the construction 
was taking place outside the borders of the monument, the work did not fall 
under ASI jurisdiction.
After her article ran in June 2002, other newspapers picked up the story, 
leading to a public outcry. From New Delhi, Jagmohan immediately stopped 
the project, and the Supreme Court asked the Central Bureau of  Investigation 
(CBI) to discover how the corridor had been authorized, where the funding 
of Rs.175 crores ($36 million) had come from, and how it had been spent. 
The case eventually led to the resignation of the chief minister Mayawati on 
charges of corruption.27 In the wake of the scandal, an eyesore of concrete and 
red sandstone intended as a shopping promenade connecting the major Mu-
ghal sites of Agra sits instead as a symbol of the discord between the national 
trend of rapid development and the protection of the nation’s heritage.
The Taj Corridor Project also signifies the inauguration of a wider public 
consciousness regarding Indian heritage. In the aftermath of the crisis, inter-
ested members of the public demanded transparency of political institutions 
and revealed their intolerance for negligent conservation practices. Nongov-
ernmental members of the public additionally demanded a greater share of 
power in the practices of conservation and sought to introduce a new inte-
grated approach to tourism and heritage policy. One of the most prominent 
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figures of this concerned public is Amita Baig, a heritage management consul-
tant for the World Monument Fund, who has written and lectured extensively 
on the social impact of heritage development. Baig calls on conservators, the 
tourism business, and government administrators to synchronize their eco-
nomic exploitation of the monument with the social needs of the local land-
scape. Development schemes like the Taj Corridor Project in Baig’s estimation 
symbolize the danger of putting profits above people.28 Without greater over-
sight of such schemes, she argues, Agra and the Taj Mahal will not remain vital 
heritage spaces: “Agra will be a city of monuments and hotels, devoid of life 
and culture, or worse, the people to whom this heritage is home. The cultural 
significance of the Taj Mahal would thus alter radically, perhaps even dimin-
ish its importance as the cultural icon of India, for icons can only be sustained 
where there is a healthy environment, where the living cultural heritage is vi-
brant and there is synergy.”29 Offering fresh perspectives on how to integrate 
conservation and development, private citizens like Baig are influencing the 
policies and practices of the ASI and the tourism industry. They are also rede-
fining the terms of capitalist development: “Public-private partnership is not 
the mere grant or receipt of funds, it is the sharing of knowledge, of custodian-
ship. Most crucially it expands the base for decision-making and enlarges the 
stakeholder’s role. The management of the cultural heritage is more than ever 
before, a transdisciplinary undertaking. It must become one of the key build-
ing blocks for the future.”30 Baig’s thoughts on cultural heritage development 
reveal how public advocacy has become another dimension of the heritage 
monument, brought to greater prominence after the disapprobation of the 
privatization schemes of this decade. Other advocates have followed in Baig’s 
footsteps and publicized the mismanagement of Mughal monuments at the 
hands of the ASI and other governmental bodies, and some have even taken 
these organizations to court.31
The crisis of the Taj Corridor Project not only promoted internal national 
resistance to state heritage policy and practice but also uncovered how pres-
sures to conform to international standards of values and practices can shape 
heritage sites. The relations of UNESCO and the Indian state offer another 
layer of controversy and contradiction to the heritage dimension of the Mu-
ghal monuments.
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The Taj Corridor Project as International Crisis
The ASI, like all bureaucratic institutions, has an entrenched culture of prec-
edents and rules sustained by an inflexible system of file keeping. This culture, 
inherited from the British imperial machine, enabled the ASI to thwart new 
conservation principles and methods for twenty-five years. The only authority 
the ASI served in these years was the Archaeological Remains Act of 1904 and 
later the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act of 
1958, which replaced the former. Both acts provided the legal parameters of 
ASI activity and focused it principally on the matters of monument ownership 
and protection. This limited scope of activity, combined with the bureaucratic 
culture of the organization, restricted its adaptation of new methods of con-
servation and prevented the ASI from coordinating effectively with other so-
cial and economic sectors such as education, urban development, and tourism. 
This would begin to change in 1972, when the United Nation’s Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) initiated its World Heritage 
Project. The project’s aims were the establishment of an international set of 
principles and standards of heritage conservation and the exchange of methods 
and resources to prevent the further deterioration of the world’s monuments. 
Born out of these goals was the concept of the World Heritage Site and a 
system of inscribing these sites on the prestigious World Heritage List. Desir-
ing this designation for Indian sites to increase their profile internationally, 
Indian officials and delegates of UNESCO put pressure on the ASI to reorder 
the great Indian monuments to meet the cultural and conservational criteria 
required of a World Heritage Site. Starting in the 1970s the space of Indian 
national monuments would begin to conform to the principles and practices 
established by a multinational group of delegates and conservation experts. 
The process of synchronizing national spaces with the demands of an inter-
national body would shape the Mughal monuments according to global meth-
ods and codes of conservation and give rise to new contradictions at the sites.
The first Mughal monuments to be listed on UNESCO’s World Heritage 
List were the Taj Mahal and the Red Fort in Agra. This status meant in-
creased publicity for these sites as well as a subsequent increase in tourism, 
which then added pressure to exploit the profit potential of the monuments 
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and their surroundings. Other problems expose an underlying contradiction 
of World Heritage. As monuments selected as the finest examples of the di-
versity of human achievement come to be ordered by a standardized set of 
global values and touristic practices, the surrounding culture is reduced to 
spectacle, and handicraft production and festivals become mere historical 
reenactments. Local economies are forced to assimilate to a service industry 
and to provide labor and resources to keep the hotels, bars, restaurants, and 
visitor centers running. Ironically, a World Heritage Site that is supposed to 
express the uniqueness of a nation’s cultural accomplishments ends up attract-
ing capital investments ensuring that these sites become what David Harvey 
calls a “serial replication of homogeneity.”32 The challenges posed to World 
Heritage monuments by capitalist development became a greater concern 
after nation-states like India began to privatize their economies. In response 
to these concerns, the World Heritage Committee sponsored a study of the 
development dilemma and advanced new theories and practices to make the 
opposing forces of commercial interests and heritage protection mutually 
supportive.
The World Heritage Convention was one of a group of conventions signed 
into treaties at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment. Emerging from this broad framework, the World Heritage Program 
had as its goal the establishment of a link between the human environment 
and economic development.33 Translated into the preservation of cultural 
heritage, this meant that a monument would be protected only when a vil-
lage, town, or city surrounding it was developed. UNESCO’s ideal of a symbi-
otic relationship emerging between a heritage site and its social environment 
was not articulated as a focused planning strategy until the late 1980s and 
the 1990s. The World Heritage Program called this concept “sustainable de-
velopment” and introduced it as part of the practice of the preservation of 
natural heritage sites such as parks and animal preserves. In the late 1990s 
the program expanded the concept to cover cultural heritage as well. In 1998 
the director of the World Heritage Center, Bernd von Droste zu Hülshoff, 
outlined the meaning of sustainable development: “Sustainable develop-
ment has been defined as a rate of economic development that can maintain 
both economic growth and the fullness of the planet’s biological and cultural 
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diversity.”34 With this new directive, the application process for monuments 
has become more comprehensive and requires the state party to submit infor-
mation about the population surrounding the structure as well as practical 
plans for integrating them into the care for the site.
The World Heritage Center’s ability to influence national and local de-
velopment programs at Indian monuments was clearly demonstrated in its 
response to the Taj Corridor Project.35 After becoming aware of the plans for 
an esplanade connecting the Agra Red Fort to the Taj Mahal, the World Heri-
tage committee sent a group of conservationists to inquire about the state of 
the sites. The corridor, it was reported back to UNESCO headquarters in Paris, 
was devised by the Taj Protection Mission Management Board (TPMMB) 
under the chairpersonship of the chief secretary of the state government of 
Uttar Pradesh. The TPMMB was set up in 1998 after the Supreme Court had 
issued a recommendation in connection to an environmental protection case. 
The board, however, overstepped its authority in sanctioning the purely com-
mercial Taj Corridor Project and in requesting funds for its construction from 
the Central Government Ministry of Environment and Forests. Upon con-
cluding its investigation, the World Heritage Committee determined that the 
Taj Corridor Project did in fact endanger the Taj Mahal and related Mughal 
sites. The building activities altered the flow of the Jumna River and raised its 
water table, hastening the sinking of the Taj Mahal.
The committee issued a draft decision expressing “grave concern” about 
the preservation of the site and put forth several requests based on the prem-
ise that the Taj Corridor Project development stood in contradiction to the 
values and practices of the World Heritage Convention. These requests were: 
to allow closer monitoring of the sites by the World Heritage Center and the 
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and to accept their 
advice on better conservation methods; to carefully analyze and assess the im-
pact of development projects on World Heritage Sites and assess the damage 
already done; to ensure better coordination between local and state manage-
ment parties and to establish effective management of the sites; and finally, to 
submit a report on the status of its conservation to the twenty-eighth World 
Heritage Committee session in 2004.36 The implications of the Taj Mahal 
coming under international scrutiny registered with officials in Parliament. 
The Ethics of  Monumentality | 159
Several Lok Sabha ministers questioned the minister of environment and for-
ests, Shri A. Raja, in December 2004 and again in December 2005 regarding 
the progress made in removing the debris threatening the Taj Mahal.37 These 
proceedings are indicative of the influence of the World Heritage Commit-
tee’s recommendations and the central government’s desire not to lose the 
World Heritage standing of any of its monuments. They also add another 
layer of symbolization to the Mughal monuments; not only are they national 
heritage sites representative of Indian “unity in diversity” but also universal 
symbols of human achievement.
Yet both the national and global symbolic orders of heritage mystify the 
social reality of its production and its integral relationship to tourism develop-
ment. If we consider the spatial practices that order heritage monuments, the 
underlying ambivalence of the concept of heritage becomes apparent. Among 
the practices that compel this ambivalence are the promotion of  homogenized 
space instead of the preservation of diverse spatial practices; the displacement 
of the local economy in favor of a tourist economy; and finally the state’s ex-
change of its ideological moorings in the equity of Nehruvian socialism for a 
more aggressive, neoliberal capitalist model of investment. These practices do 
not simply rest quietly in space but, as Lefebvre has argued, reveal the contra-
dictory nature of our social reality: “The contradictions of space thus make 
the contradictions of social relations operative. In other words, spatial con-
tradictions ‘express’ conflicts between socio-political interests and forces; it 
is only in space that such conflicts come effectively into play, and in so doing 
they become contradictions of space.”38 In the case of the Mughal monuments, 
the state’s economic practices and its conflict with the democratic social or-
dering have rendered them ambivalent sites of the Indian nation. It is in these 
spaces that contradictions of social reality are experienced and from where 
they are contested and not — and this is the crucial point — in the discursive 
field of ideological struggle. The contradictions of space, in other words, open 
up new possibilities, new orderings at the monument. One of these possibili-
ties is for the monument to become a differential space, or a radically open 
space to encounter once again the traumatic and mediate it through other 
more creative spatial practices. The next section will consider this creative or 
differential quality of the Mughal monument.
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The Muslim Waqf and an Ethical Reproduction of the Taj Mahal
The Taj Corridor Project crisis brought into focus the opposition between 
the capitalist development of heritage preservation and the realities of social 
inequity and homogeneity it produces. It also effected change in the ASI’s con-
servation practices, forcing it to commit to a more comprehensive approach 
and to incorporate internationally accepted modes and values of heritage pres-
ervation. The ASI’s new openness and the state’s commitment to sustainable 
development were thought to put the Taj Mahal and other Mughal monu-
ments on stable footing. Then on 13 July 2005 crisis visited again: the chair-
man of the Sunni Waqf Board of Uttar Pradesh, Hafiz Usman, registered the 
Taj Mahal as a waqf property (figures 13 and 14). As soon as the waqf registra-
tion was announced, reporters from Indian news outlets and from CNN and 
the BBC raced to Lucknow and to the office of the chairman. The ensuing 
headlines and sound bites warned of a looming disaster: an Islamic trust had 
claimed ownership of the Taj Mahal! The reason underlying the registration 
was assumed to be profit, as most reports mentioned that the Waqf Board 
stood to claim 7 percent of Rs. 20 crores ($4.6 million) of yearly ticket sales. 
This fact was typically followed with the ASI’s promise to challenge the reg-
istration in light of the danger that the Waqf Board’s ownership allegedly 
posed to the physical conservation of the Taj Mahal and its World Heritage 
status. The chairman subsequently saw himself vilified in blogs, newspaper 
editorials, and chat rooms for communalizing a national monument. Ifran 
Habib, a prominent historian of the Mughal era, and Parliament members 
of the Rajya Sabha called for new legislation to exclude national monuments 
from the Waqf Board’s purview.
The hostile responses to the waqf registration exposes the symbolic order-
ing of the Taj Mahal and the misrecognition that underlies the identification 
of a national “I” in the mirror of the monument. To maintain the fantasy of 
wholeness and national unity, the monument must be rendered a space limited 
to representing Indian national heritage, and any act that alters this illusion is 
viewed as illegitimate and pernicious. When one steps outside this perspective 
and views the space obliquely, the waqf registration of the Taj Mahal takes on 
a different aspect. It becomes immediately apparent that the singular identifi-
cation of the monument with the secular and democratic ideals of the nation 
Fig 13: Hafiz Usman, chairman of the Sunni Waqf  Board of  Uttar Pradesh, India 2007. 
Photo by the author
Fig 14: Entrance to the Sunni Waqf Board of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, India. 2007. 
Photo by the author
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renders the spatial ordering of the Taj Mahal a symptom of the ambivalent 
and conflicted process of national identification. The uniform “public” outcry 
to exclude from the spatial ordering of the Taj Mahal the Indian Muslim prac-
tice of waqf reveals the ambivalent reality of the Indian monument: it is not a 
space of secular acceptance but is in fact a space of secular refusal.
After independence the Indian government took over the historical monu-
ment’s proprietary rights and ordered it as a national space of  Nehru’s socialist 
secularism. Mughal monuments with their hybrid Hindu and Islamic archi-
tectural style offered an ideal space to close the division between the Hindu 
and Muslim communities in the wake of Partition. Like other public sites, 
the monuments were also used to produce a nation of individuated private 
citizens, a necessity for rapid development. Basing the new national culture on 
the universal principles of secular humanism, science and technology, Nehru 
expelled all other interests, especially those of religious groups, from the pub-
lic sphere. It was Nehru’s desire, as Partha Chatterjee explains, for the Indian 
state to “stand above conflicts and provide an autonomous political will to 
control and direct the economy in the interest of the people as a whole.”39 
The Indian monuments as national spaces would both reflect this secular, 
democratic social order and orientation of the state and also obfuscate the 
real trauma that such an ordering forced on people already suffering from 
the violence of Partition. Any attempt to assert the religious meaning of a na-
tional monument was represented as antithetical to India’s national goals and 
regressive in its aspiration. As a result of this symbolization, the Taj Mahal’s 
relevance to Islamic culture and religious practices was fixed to its historical 
origins, and its original funerary function was subordinated to its national 
significance. The waqf registration that asserted the Taj Mahal’s religious sig-
nificance created a crisis in the state’s ordering of the monument and revealed 
the contradictions present in its process of national identification.
The waqf registration itself is a simple process that occurs on a regular basis. 
The Taj Mahal’s registration begins when a man from Faizabad, Mohammad 
Irfan Bedar, filed a Public Interest Litigation suit with the High Court of 
Allahabad in 2004. His intention was to force the Sunni Waqf  Board of 
Uttar Pradesh to at last decide on a request he made in 1998 to be named care-
taker or mutawalli of the Taj Mahal. Before the claim could be adjudicated, 
the court had to ascertain the status of the Taj Mahal, and it turned to Section 
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36 of the Waqf Act of 1995, which entrusts a waqf board with the authority 
to collect information and inquire about the waqf status of a property. The 
court then asked the same Sunni Waqf Board of Uttar Pradesh to provide 
this information, knowing that once a property is determined to be a waqf, 
the decision is final.40
Usman told me in an interview in 2007 that the Waqf Board, following 
the High Court’s orders, consulted documents from libraries and archives in 
Kolkata, Aligarh, Rampur, and London to discover if in fact Shah Jahan had 
designated the Taj Mahal a charitable endowment, or waqf. The historical 
text at the center of the argument is the Badshahnama, written by Abdul 
Hamid Lahori between 1629 and 1632. Usman claims that the text confirms 
that the Taj Mahal was indeed intended as a waqf property. The other part 
of the investigation was to determine if Muslim practices were still being per-
formed at the Taj Mahal. Since the complex contains a mosque and several 
tombs in addition to the main tomb, the site was designated a qabristan, or 
Muslim cemetery. Further noting that Friday namaz, prayer, had been oc-
curring regularly at the mosque since 2000, that the imam was still paid a 
government salary of Rs. 100 a month, as per Shah Jahan’s orders, and that 
the urs celebration on the anniversary of Shah Jahan’s death has been held for 
the past 352 years, Usman decided to register the Taj Mahal as a waqf property.
After the registration Usman publicly announced the new ordering to take 
place at the site: “From today, the ASI ceases to have absolute right of posses-
sion over the monument. Henceforth, we will have the right to manage all 
religious rituals carried out inside the Taj Mahal premises.”41 This challenge 
to the symbolization of secular ideology resulted in the immediate public vili-
fication of the Sunni Waqf Board members as opportunists bent on commu-
nalizing the nation’s preeminent heritage monument. The ASI immediately 
filed a petition with the Supreme Court to rescind this registration, citing 
as reasons that the Sunni Waqf Board had illegally claimed ownership of a 
central government property and that it did not have the ability to conserve 
the Taj Mahal. The court, however, stayed the board’s registration of the Taj 
Mahal in December 2005.42
When major English-language newspapers reported the waqf registration 
in July 2005, Indians began debating the issue in Internet chat rooms and 
message boards. Both the press and the Internet-using public rendered their 
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verdict in favor of the ASI and its secular mandate without fully exploring 
the practice of Muslim charitable endowments. In doing this, they effectively 
closed the debate on this request for representation. Had the waqf registration 
of the Taj Mahal been framed differently — for example, as a tactical means 
of enfranchisement — the public might have reacted less antagonistically and 
viewed the act not as a destructive move but perhaps as a creative solution to 
the problem of spatial representation at the nation’s monuments. Presented 
this way, Usman’s registration of the Taj Mahal becomes a bid to make visible 
Muslim spatial practice and history at the tomb.
To further appreciate Usman’s tactical production of the Taj Mahal 
through the waqf registration, the action must first be viewed in the context of 
the power relations of the past two decades. This context is defined by Hindu 
nationalist resistance to secular power and through the focus on the destruc-
tion of the built heritage of Muslim culture and society. Starting with the 
Ram Janmabhoomi movement of the 1980s, Hindu nationalists, a confedera-
tion of Hindu organizations led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), radical-
ized themselves around the spaces of Mughal and other Muslim architecture. 
The culminating moment of this radicalization was the destruction of the 
Mughal Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in December 1992. The BJP and its partners 
insisted that a temple commemorating the exact birthplace of the Hindu god 
Ram had been razed to accommodate the construction of the mosque, which 
was built in 1528 by Mir Baqi at the behest of Babur, the first Mughal em-
peror (1526–30). The subsequent destruction of the sixteenth-century mosque 
marked a significant blow to the secular ideology of Indian politics. The Babri 
Masjid, the epicenter of this political and social shakeup, was a waqf property, 
registered with the Sunni Waqf Board of Uttar Pradesh, and thus protected 
by law. A Hindu temple to the god Ram planned for the site has not yet been 
built on the grounds of the mosque (in spite of several attempts by Hindu na-
tionalists to do so).43 Even though the Ram temple remains only an imagined 
space of radical Hindu nationalism, it has served its primary purpose: the 
transformation of the Indian social order from one based on Nehru’s secular 
individualism to one based on communal separatism and Hindu ascendancy.
The BJP clarified the aim and logic of the mosque’s destruction in its justi-
fication of the demolition: “These structures and mosques are not — and were 
never intended to be — symbols of the purely religious sensibilities of Muslims 
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which every Hindu ought to respect; but were intended to be, and are me-
mentoes of the atrocities on this great nation perpetrated by the Ghaznavis, 
Baburs and Aurangzebs and of their victories, as also of the defeat of our coun-
trymen and their spiritual and political humiliation.”44 The BJP contended 
that the secular government had obscured the history of these Islamic sites by 
falsifying their true nature and thus rendering them conflicted spaces: “This 
historical background of the Mohammedan invasion and the provocative oc-
ular reminders of that violent and barbaric invasion were completely ignored 
even after the partition of India. This neglect resulted in the failure to evolve 
a sound basis for Indian nationalism and durable relationships between Hin-
dus and Muslims. The effort was to suppress the historical facts from history 
books, and explain away irrefutable facts by falsehoods such as claiming that 
Babur was secular and tolerant.”45 At the same time that Hindus are reminded 
of their historical suppression at the hands of Muslim rulers, myriad examples 
show them how the Indian state perpetuates their weakness: the alimony case 
of a divorcée, Shah Bano, in which the state allowed Muslim family law to 
supplant a Supreme Court decision; Muslim militancy in Kashmir; and the 
state’s policy of Indian Muslim appeasement for fear of agitation.46 To turn 
the tide in favor of Hindu society, nationalists claim they must first erase or 
reconvert the monuments or “mementoes” of their subjugation.
The demolition of the Babri Masjid initiated a series of violent acts against 
Muslims that includes the Bombay riots of 1992 and 1993 and the massacre, 
in 2002, of more than two thousand Muslims in the state of Gujarat by the 
BJP’s youth wing, the Bajrang Dal, and other Hindu nationalists.47 The dire 
state of the Indian Muslim community — defined by random acts of violence 
and social inequity — certainly weighs on Usman’s mind. In our interview he 
pointed to this condition as that which compelled his waqf registration of 
the Taj Mahal. While the Taj Mahal is in no immediate danger of physical 
demolition, Hindu nationalists have already begun to seize it rhetorically, 
threatening to erase the site’s Muslim identification and putting a Hindu one 
in its place. Usman points out that the waqf registration means to frustrate 
this process and to save the Taj Mahal from Hindu appropriation: “The fun-
damentalists might gain power over the next fifty years. If they claim that this 
is the Shiv Mandir or Kali Mandir or some other Mandir, who will tell them 
that this is not a Shiv Mandir or Kali Mandir, but that this is the Taj Mahal, 
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it has two graves inside, there is a mosque next to it? This is one of the reasons 
why we registered the Taj Mahal under the waqf.”48
The chairman’s fears may also have been fed by the events of October 2001, 
when young Hindu men stormed the Taj Mahal. Following a two-day con-
vention of the BJP in Agra, more than a thousand members of another youth 
wing, the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha, stormed into the site. Moving easily 
past the guards, they made their way into the tomb complex. While there, 
they carved their names into the marble, chanted “Jai Sri Ram,” or “victorious 
Ram,” urinated in the pools, picked flowers, intimidated female visitors, and 
planted saffron flags.49 When police regained control of the monument, they 
forced the youths out but made no arrests for damaging a World Heritage 
Site, nor were reports filed or anyone charged with a crime. Indian Muslims 
might read this failure to assert accountability as the state’s tacit consent to 
the destruction of all signs of Muslim rule and life in India. The incident 
received only nominal coverage from the press, but it shocked the local com-
munity just the same.
As a response to such forceful Hindu nationalist agitation and the lack of 
adequate state protection of Muslim historical spaces, Usman’s anxious bid 
for the public acknowledgment of the Taj Mahal’s Muslim genealogy becomes 
not only reasonable but in his view singularly urgent. The waqf registration, 
the chairman explains, not only renders the Taj Mahal a protected Muslim 
space but also allows it to be represented as such: “[It] is a symbol [alaamat] 
of Muslim rule [in India]. It is a sign [nishani] that they were once kings. 
The Taj Mahal proves that Muslims had their glory and that Muslims could 
build beautifully, and that they had a good administration.”50 Balraj Puri, a 
human rights activist situated in Jammu and Kashmir, follows the same logic 
in viewing Mughal and other Islamic monuments as critical spaces to reassert 
Indian Muslim emplacement in the national landscape: “The Red Fort, Taj 
Mahal, Ajmer Sharif, Deoband and Aligarh represent political glory, aesthetic 
achievement, spiritual centre [sic], seat of religious learning [sic] and symbol[s] 
of modern Muslim resurgence respectively not only of the Urdu region but 
also of the Muslims all over the sub-continent.”51 But this identification is 
only part of the process of the waqf registration of the Taj Mahal. It also cre-
atively reveals the gap that exists between the symbolizations of Indian Mus-
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lims as either alien deposits on Indian soil or equal citizens of the nation state 
and the complex reality of their existence in India.
A Monument to a New India?
The Taj Mahal waqf registration invokes the Lacanian ethical imperative to 
realize that we are all the same in our struggle to mediate the gap between the 
contingent impossible kernel of the Real and our impossible desire to fill its 
lack (through the fantasy of ideology). When this perspective is taken, the In-
dian Muslim appears neither as an other to be banished for his or her internal 
impossibility (which is the stance taken by the BJP and its allies), nor can he or 
she be falsely cherished as the same (the symbolic deception of which Hindu 
fundamentalists accuse the secular government). Instead, in relation to the 
gap our neighbors appear like us, as individuals constituting a plurality that is 
produced by what Žižek describes as the “multitude of responses to the same 
impossible-real kernel.”52 Usman’s registration thus did not mean to swap one 
ideological ordering for another at the Taj Mahal. His act, I argue, was more 
poetical than political in its search for an ethical alternative to the closure of 
Mughal monuments to India’s other(s).
Usman’s waqf registration as a creative act echoes the ideas of Muslim lead-
ers like Maulana Wahiduddin Khan, who believe that Muslims must work 
with Hindus and leave behind the siege mentality developed after Partition if 
they wish to live in India: “The self-styled intellectuals would say that in this 
the Muslims were not to blame. That the real culprits were the Hindus. They 
would put forward the argument that after partition the Muslims had been 
continually thwarted by prejudice and injustice on the part of the majority 
and had, as a result, fallen pray to feelings of insecurity. As such, their psychol-
ogy had become defensive. No one who developed such a psychology could be 
capable of playing a creative role.”53 The productiveness of the chairman’s act 
is further elucidated by his response to my question if the waqf registration 
was a political move to gain the votes of the Muslim community for his Sama-
jwadi party. He says he aimed not to please a particular group but had filed 
the registration at the behest of the court, simply following the law: “Those 
who believe in secularism and in the constitution of India are happy with that 
decision.” Because the Waqf Board works lawfully with the secular govern-
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ment, it cannot be easily dismissed as acting against the state: “The Waqf 
Board is a legal institution created by a Parliamentary Act. . . . This institution 
should be strengthened by Muslims as their own, so that we will be able to 
protect our buildings under the law.” This last aspect of the waqf registration 
allows the chairman to open a space within the national landscape of India 
and to lawfully and cooperatively stand for the truth of the monument’s — and 
India’s — multiplicity.
The waqf institution, in Usman’s view, provides Indian Muslims with a 
means to peacefully and creatively negotiate a place within the national land-
scape. Yoginder Sikand explains the importance of accepting a solution like 
the waqf registration as a tactic to transcend the contradictions of Indian so-
cial reality, especially after the failure of secularism in the past two decades: 
“At a time when religious militancy has emerged as a major challenge in large 
parts of the world, including in many Muslim communities, the need for 
more reasoned understandings of religion that seek to creatively relate to the 
reality of growing religious pluralism, with the fact of the nation-state and 
global system of nations, and with all the many question that these pose for 
contemporary existence, has never been more urgent before.”54 Yet Usman’s 
waqf registration as a poetic move to produce a pluralistic space at the national 
monument is veiled by the ideology of dominant power. More precisely, the 
communalist labeling of the waqf registration makes it easy to overlook the 
inherent contradictions of nationhood in India. It also causes the continued 
repression of the trauma of Partition and sanctions the permanent state of es-
trangement of Indian Muslims for the sake of the illusion of a unified nation.55 
If the supreme court sides with the ASI and rescinds the waqf registration the 
country will miss a chance to broaden the meaning of Indian nationhood, to 
elevate India’s “unity in diversity” to more than a slogan, and to finally pro-
duce Shah Jahan’s sublime tomb as a monument of Indian plurality.
From independence to today, there has been a consistent effort to turn the 
Mughal monuments of India into national spaces of social unity and shared 
heritage. The ideology of secularism that symbolized these sites was, however, 
structured around the missed encounter with the trauma of Partition, which 
remained an unsettling presence at the Mughal monuments in the years fol-
lowing it. Economic development, World Heritage designations, conservation 
mandates, and Hindu fundamentalist history have supported the closure of 
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ideological meaning and in so doing have maintained the veil of the traumatic 
truth of the nation’s birth. The waqf registration of the Taj Mahal challenges 
the closure of ideological meaning and has exposed its inherent contradic-
tions. But the state and its secular public have been unwilling to accept this 
reality for fear of fragmenting their national identity. In the meantime, com-
munal violence continues to threaten the landscape and the Mughal monu-
ments. It is against this backdrop that the Mughal monument in its radical 
openness is emerging again as a critical space for resisting power and address-
ing social trauma.
In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the breakthrough occurs when patients not 
only learn the source of the trauma that caused their suffering but also when 
they realize that the void caused by this original trauma that leads to the mul-
tiplicity of meaning is not something they have to avoid. Instead of veiling 
or repressing it through ideological symbolization, they can — and indeed 
must — face its radical contingency and learn to live with the void. As Žižek 
explains: “There is no solution, no escape from it; the thing to do is not to 
‘overcome,’ to ‘abolish’ it, but to come to terms with it, to learn to recognize it 
in its terrifying dimension and then, on the basis of this fundamental recogni-
tion, to try to articulate a modus vivendi with it.”56 Usman’s registration of the 
Taj Mahal as a waqf property is in line with this ethical imperative: he asks the 
nation to recognize the constitutive trauma of its birth and, more important, 
to realize that living with the void, with the plurality of meaning and spatial 
practices, does not lead to the dissolution of the self but to the enjoyment of 
the positivity and productivity of being.
Because of their sublime presence and radical openness, monuments mat-
ter. From the conquests of Nadir Shah, through British rule, freedom move-
ments, and nation building, Mughal monuments were used time and again to 
help stay social dissolution, resist power and achieve ethical breakthroughs. As 
they begin to see this dynamic and creative aspect of the monument, Indian 
citizens will finally visit these sites not to reject but connect with the hard 
kernel of their past and that of their neighbors. Otherwise, like the old man of 
Lal Patthar, they will keep returning to the Mughal monuments never know-
ing why and vainly engage in washing away the bloody stain of their nation’s 
traumas.
  epilogue
Every day, Muslim Ahmad leaves his courtyard house in 
the Khari Baoli mohalla, the neighborhood flanking Chandni Chowk, and 
makes his way to the Fatehpuri Masjid for noon prayers. As the slight eighty-
five-year-old moves through the narrow lanes of this predominantly Hindu 
section of Old Delhi, men, both young and old, stop to greet him with great 
reverence. They touch their heads and hearts, prostrate themselves to touch 
his feet, or simply hold their hands in a gesture of namaskar. “I am a very 
respected man here,” Mr. Ahmad explains to me. After his prayers, he often 
spends the afternoon sitting in the courtyard of the mosque speaking to 
friends and neighbors who seek his council, his blessings, or simply conver-
sation. For those who come to pray here, the Mughal-era mosque would be 
much like any other place of worship in contemporary Delhi were it not for 
the connection to the past that Mr. Ahmad provides. His family has prayed at 
the Fatehpuri Masjid for two centuries, and he might be the only person in the 
community that can speak with authority of its history during the past one 
hundred years. His erudition in this regard is not merely that of a longtime 
worshipper but is based on a connection with the people and place that was 
forged by his grandfather and father.
Mr. Ahmad’s grandfather was Deputy Nazir Ahmad (1836–1912), the social 
reformer, best-selling Urdu novelist, and a close friend and supporter of Sir 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan.1 Nazir Ahmad traveled with Sir Sayyid to speak to the 
Indian Muslim community on the subjects of social uplift and educational 
reform, and he is revered as an early advocate of women’s education and rights. 
After his death, his son, Bashiruddin Ahmad Dehlavi (1861–1927), Mr. Ahmad’s 
father, quit his post as deputy collector for the nizam of Hyderabad and 
moved to Delhi to manage the family properties. The change in occupation 
left him with a lot of free time. It was then, Mr. Ahmad explains, that Sir 
Sayyid presented Athar al-sanadid to his father. He showed me the book and 
the inscription inside that reads, “If there are any shortcomings with this 
book, please complete it.” Dehlavi honored the request and wrote Vaqiat-i 
darul-hakumat-i Dihli,2 a meticulously researched, three-volume exposition 
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on the monuments of Delhi. When I asked Mr. Ahmad about his father’s 
intended audience, he replied: “All those persons who believe in their glori-
ous past, [wanting to know] what was the condition, what is the condition, 
and what will be the condition of the community, those gentlemen read this 
record of Bashiruddin Ahmad Dehlavi.”3 Considering this family history and 
Mr. Ahmad’s depth of knowledge, I asked him to offer his thoughts and per-
ceptions on Mughal monuments, the condition of Indian Muslims, and their 
sense of place in the Indian landscape today.
We met a few days later in the Fatehpuri Masjid to talk of Delhi’s monu-
ments and the Muslim community in the city and in India. I saw him sitting 
against a broken stone screen of the small cemetery in the courtyard of the 
Mughal mosque (see figure 15). The setting could not have been more appro-
priate, for the mosque’s history is inextricably linked to Mr. Ahmad’s life and 
ancestry, and its ideological message and physical condition have informed 
his worldview, which lately is characterized by much despondency regarding 
the future of Muslims in his country. When asked how Indian Muslims relate 
to the historical sites of their past, he takes in his surroundings and explains: 
“The [Muslim] nation is sleeping, with no eyesight. The whole nation is no-
where.” Does he think that the people he prays with every day are aware of 
the historical importance of the mosque? His answer is a resounding, “Not at 
all.” Asked to expand, he elaborates: “My dear, keep it in mind, historical im-
portance is valuable for those people who are having knowledge, who are edu-
cated. The whole Muslim society is demoralized, illiterate, uncivilized. Every 
shortcoming in life, you will find in Muslims in India nowadays.” This answer 
confirms Chairman Usman’s assessment of the condition of the Mughal heri-
tage spaces — which he aimed to remedy by registering the Taj Mahal as a waqf 
property — as utterly disconnected from the lives of Indian Muslims today. 
Clearly, the Muslims that Mr. Ahmad has known see neither the Fatehpuri 
Masjid nor other Mughal monuments as historical spaces of their community. 
Perhaps realizing the dismal direction our conversation was taking in this 
regard, Mr. Ahmad brought up a talk he was invited to give to an audience of 
Hindus on the subject of Islam and Hinduism. He said he spoke to them for 
two hours and concluded the talk by relating what he thought was the greatest 
achievement of Hindus vis-à-vis the Muslim community in the post-Partition 
era: “Listen with care: it is their hate for Muslims. Hate us — [but] we love our 
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religion, so our religion is not dead, and the credit goes to the hatred which 
is in the heart of the Hindus for Muslims. Not against Islam, for Muslims.” 
These words summarily describe a major part of the social condition compel-
ling the Muslim ordering of not only the Mughal monument but the entire 
Indian landscape. As in the period between the Uprising and Partition, this 
landscape is still ordered by the only thing that cannot be dominated, rede-
fined, and dismissed by the state and its social forces — the timeless and un-
mappable ordering of Islam. By reiterating this truth Mr. Ahmad ended our 
conversation on Mughal monuments in the crumbling courtyard. “Islam is 
not in stones,” he says. “Islam is not in walls and doors. Islam belongs to the 
beautiful depth of your heart.”
The spatial practices of Muslim social life in India, expressed by a spiritual 
relationship to the world, shape and order the space of the Fatehpuri Masjid: 
largely detached from the other social networks of the city, it is now no more 
than a neighborhood mosque adjoined by a small madrasa. Unlike other Mu-
ghal monuments of Delhi and Agra, the Fatehpuri Masjid has not been fully 
Fig 15: Muslim Ahmad in the courtyard of the Fatehpuri Masjid, Delhi, 2007. Photo by 
the author
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integrated into the tourist circuit or government conservation programs. Only 
a very few intrepid foreigners, Lonely Planet guide in hand, ever make it down 
the dusty and congested bazaar of Chandni Chowk. After passing through 
the mosque’s main gate, they quickly notice this Mughal monument’s differ-
ence from the rest. The Fatehpuri mosque is not under the direct care of the 
ASI, and since it is a waqf property, it depends primarily on the Delhi Waqf 
Board for its preservation. The board’s resources, however, are stretched thin 
across almost 2,000 properties, 193 of which are mosques, leaving the Fateh-
puri Masjid in a state of neglect. Thoughtful visitors might wonder why the 
government allowed this particular site to fall into such ruin. It is after all 
a Mughal structure, built in 1650 by Begum Fatehpuri, one of Shah Jahan’s 
wives. Part of the larger “moral city” of Shahjahanabad, the Fatehpuri Masjid, 
along with the Red Fort east of it, served to bracket the Chandni Chowk. It 
was once surrounded by a fifty-four-acre garden that tied it in with the shade 
trees, water channel, and fountains lining the great market corridor. Today, 
the mosque’s walls are lined with shops, obscuring it from view. The mosque’s 
physical state inside can be defined as slow ruination: the carved stone fence 
of the small cemetery is broken and lies in pieces on the ground; the madrasa, 
housed in the courtyard, needs renovation; and the main sanctuary could ben-
efit from conservational study.
Many people who come to pray at the Fatehpuri Masjid also come to seek 
the legal council of the Shahi imam, Mufti Mukarram. Representing his com-
munity for the past thirty years, the imam is a respected scholar of Arabic, 
Urdu, and sharia law, as well as an outspoken critic of the treatment of Mus-
lims both in India and around the world. Interestingly, however, he does not 
possess any knowledge of the architectural history of the mosque.4 This kind 
knowledge is of little use to his primary duty, that is, helping his commu-
nity navigate the complexities of everyday life. While the imam represents 
the present condition of Indian Muslims at the Fatehpuri Masjid, the young 
students of the madrasa represent its future. Between their classes they can 
be seen about the courtyard, playing and conversing with their schoolmates. 
When I asked them how it feels to go to school in such a historical context, the 
young men seem puzzled by the question, but then stated that they were proud 
of it, realizing that this was probably the desired response. But their answer, 
especially after their initial hesitation, rang not so much with conviction as 
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with confusion and reflected the general disorientation they experienced in 
the changing urban landscape of Delhi.
Indeed, rapid development is burying what is left of the Mughal ordering 
of Delhi under metro lines, overpasses, tourism corridors, and shopping malls, 
leaving the residents of Old Delhi increasingly estranged from the greater city. 
In the bleak landscape that emerges, the teachings of the madrasa provide 
the spiritual grounding its students cannot find in the silent stones of the 
ancient mosque. But this is nothing new. After the fateful weakening of Mu-
ghal authority in the eighteenth century, the Uprising of 1857, and the trauma 
of Partition, madrasa education proved vital to the survival of a community 
that needed to find a means to orient itself, renew its identity, and educate its 
youth in a shifting political climate. However, its curriculum is in desperate 
need of revision if its students are to compete in today’s economy. Once the 
young men leave the limited — and at times limiting — space of the Fatehpuri 
Masjid, they will enter a national landscape ordered by the inexorable forces of 
economic growth, in which traditional learning and culture cannot guarantee 
them a place to grow and prosper. Their estrangement from this landscape 
is clearly outlined in the Times of India television campaign of 2007, “India 
Poised.” Recited with great emotional affect by India’s legendary Hindi actor, 
Amitabh Bachchan, the spot offers an energetic and arguably divisive repre-
sentation of today’s India:
There are two Indias in this country.
One India is straining at the leash, eager to spring forth and live up to  
all the adjectives that the world has been recently showering upon us.  
The Other India is the leash.
One India says, “Give me a chance and I’ll prove myself.”
The Other India says, “Prove yourself first, and maybe then, you’ll have  
a chance.”
One India lives in the optimism of our hearts; the Other India lurks in 
the skepticism of our minds.
One India wants, the Other India hopes. . . . One India leads, the Other 
India follows.
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These conversions are on the rise.
With each passing day, more and more people from the Other India are 
coming over to this side.
And quietly, while the world is not looking, a pulsating, dynamic, new 
India is emerging.5
It is not hard to imagine where the young men of the Fatehpuri Masjid, with 
no more than a madrasa education, stand in the divided India this commer-
cial evokes. As the new economy spreads forth, powered by English-speaking 
technocrats and capitalists, opportunities for the untrained segment of India’s 
citizens to pursue material and spiritual happiness are increasingly limited. 
These pressures and contradictions will then compel a new cycle of creativ-
ity, as young men with traditional educations find new ways to transcend the 
contradictions of daily life to avoid social death. As it has done in the past, 
the Fatehpuri Masjid will continue to provide the productive space for doing 
so, and it is this function that separates it from the state-controlled Mughal 
monuments.
Despite its imperial pedigree, the Fatehpuri Masjid remains a neighbor-
hood mosque, ordered by the community it serves and standing as a monu-
ment to its daily struggles: it mediates its memories, refracts its social and po-
litical movements into familiar religious terms, and reflects the temporal flows 
and material realities that order its life. In contrast to the Mughal monuments 
protected by the state, the Fatehpuri Masjid still operates as a homely, com-
forting, and recognizable space, what bell hooks calls a “homeplace,” a “space 
of care and nurturance in the face of brutal harsh reality.”6 As homeplaces, 
mosques have always given the Indian Muslim community a place to re-create 
itself and to critique and resist dominant society. They have provided the es-
sential differential space needed for the forging of visions of a new future, as 
well as for the remembrance of the beloved past. Such homeplaces are critical 
for the development of a strong society. But instead of promoting and protect-
ing them, the state’s strategy, since the era of British rule, has been to empty 
them of creative spatial practices in order to impose control. Mughal shrines, 
mosques, gardens, bazaars, and palaces, all once integral parts of the moral 
city, were fragmented and reordered by modern social and economic practices 
Fig 16: Heritage-Walk sign in front of the Fatehpuri Masjid, 2007. Photo by the author
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and signified by colonialism and secularism. With the exception of the twenty 
years during which it was in Hindu custody, the Fatehpuri Masjid has escaped 
this systematic process of separation and has remained a homeplace of the 
community. But it, too, might eventually be lost as new development schemes 
are introduced to integrate Old Delhi and its spaces into the commercial and 
touristic circuits of the greater city.
While the local community contemplates its future in the mosque, the 
Delhi Municipal Corporation Heritage Society, with the help of the Indian 
National Trust for Cultural Heritage, is busy finding ways to incorporate the 
Fatehpuri Masjid with the heritage monuments of the Red Fort and the Jama 
Masjid. The Master Plan for Delhi 2021, produced by the Delhi Development 
Authority and the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation, 
aims to unite the Fatehpuri Masjid with the other monuments through the 
beautification of Chandni Chowk. When this project is completed, the main 
corridor will be a raised pedestrian walkway enabling tourists to walk safely to 
the Fatehpuri Masjid from the Red Fort, passing shops and spending money 
on the way. Of all the groups that have taken an interest in the tourism and 
heritage potential of the mosque so far, only the Delhi Tourism and Transport 
Development Corporation has made any real attempt to integrate it as a site 
into the tourist circuit. At the entrance to the mosque, a black metal sign with 
ornate openwork corners is prominently displayed. The number “30” desig-
nates the mosque as a “Heritage Building” and as part of a self-guided heritage 
walk (figure 16). The sign also provides a brief history of the mosque’s found-
ing, form, and significance in colonial history: “To fight against the British-
ers the Namazies and Ulemas of this mosque actively participated under the 
leadership of Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar.” The list of precise dates, 
relevant actors, and climactic events signals the attempt to absorb the Fateh-
puri Masjid into the metanarrative of Indian national history and its ordering 
by the practices of heritage conservation.
However, as one looks at the mosque from Chandni Chowk, one cannot 
help but feel that the emblems of modern taxonomy and development prac-
tices are having difficulty adhering to this Mughal monument. The metal sign 
proclaiming it as a “Heritage Building” stands at an odd angle — probably the 
result of a collision with some passing conveyance — and the clock above the 
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main gate, which enters the field of vision as one recedes further along the 
dusty bazaar, is missing its hands, as if to inform passersby that time will not 
be marked here unless it is by the call to prayer of the muezzin (figure 17). 
Through centuries of war, colonial conquest, the Uprising of 1857, the assembly 
of 1877, independence, Partition, and nation building, the space of the Fateh-
puri Masjid has remained a homeplace for its community, helping it weather 
the cycles of change, face the contradictions of life in India today, and survive 
into the coming era.
Remembering that day at the Fatehpuri Masjid and my encounters with the 
students, the imam, and especially with Mr. Ahmad, I can say that here is one 
Mughal monument that functions as a differential space, a space of creative 
survival. At the end of this long and varied history of the production of the 
Mughal monument, this mosque allows us to remember that the impossible 
kernel of the Real lying at the bottom of these spaces does not have to be 
veiled, and that instead it is only when a community and a nation are able to 
face its truth that uncertainty can turn into hope and suffering into survival.
Fig 17: Main entrance to the Fatehpuri Masjid, 2007. Photo by the author
notes
Introduction
1. Gopal, Anatomy of a Confrontation; Rao, Ayodhya 6 December 1992; Noorani, 
The Babri Masjid Question, 1528–2003.
2. Communalism in India refers to social divisions based on the belief of religious 
difference and is often used to describe the religious tension between the Hindu and 
Muslim communities.
3. I am using the term spatial practice to designate the multiplicity of processes that 
occur at the monument to produce its meaning. I am therefore diverging from Henri 
Lefebvre’s more limited use of the term, which describes the material production of 
space. Michel de Certeau’s notion of spatial practice, as the everyday practices of  lived 
space, defined by multiform-resistant procedures, is closer to my use of the term. See 
Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 33; and Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 96.
4. After the destruction of the Babri Masjid in December of 1992, religious riots 
claimed two thousand lives, and in related communal riots in Gujarat in 2002 be-
tween one thousand and two thousand people, mostly Muslims, were killed.
5. Gopal, Anatomy of a Confrontation; Guha-Thakurta, Monuments, Objects, 
Histories, 268–303; Oza, “The Geography of Hindu Right-wing Violence in India”; 
Desai, Slouching towards Ayodhya.
6. Nandy, Trivedy, and Mayaram, Creating a Nationality; Engineer, Politics 
of Confrontation; Hansen, The Saffron Wave; Deshpande, “Communalising the 
Nation-Space.”
7. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”
8. This strategy of chronological ordering and synchronic framing is not neces-
sarily contradictory and can offer a robust understanding of how the meaning and 
function of monuments have changed with time and are adapted to the present con-
cerns of Indian society. Exemplifying this kind of strategy are Davis, Lives of Indian 
Images; Deshpande, Creative Pasts; and Thapar, Somanatha.
9. Gopal, Anatomy of a Confrontation, vii, 11.
10. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 95.
11. Ibid., 94.
12. Foucault, “Truth and Power,” 61.
13. Legg, “Beyond the European Province,” 267.
14. Mitchell, Colonising Egypt; Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial 
Urbanism; Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire.
15. Among these scholars is Stephen Legg, with his compelling examination of the 
colonial construction of New Delhi in relation to its double, Old Delhi. See Legg, 
180 | Notes to Chapter One
Spaces of Colonialism. Similarly, Swati Chattopadhyay’s examination of the urban 
planning of Calcutta is based not on the usual epistemological separation of the 
“Black Town” from the “White Town” but on their mutually constituting realities. 
Chattopadhyay, “Blurring Boundaries.”
16. Examples of such texts are, Amin, Event, Metaphor, Memory; Pandey, Remem-
bering Partition; and Haynes and Prakash, Contesting Power.
17. The fundamental process of identification in the imaginary is theorized by 
Jacques Lacan as the “mirror stage” and marks the subject’s first alienation from the 
natural order: “The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from 
insufficiency to anticipation — and which manufactures for the subject, caught up 
in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a 
fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic — and, 
lastly, to the assumption of the amour of an alienating identity, which will mark with 
its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development.” Lacan, Écrits, 4.
18. The fantasy of lack is derived from Lacan’s theory of the symbolic process of 
subjectivity as structured by the dialectic of desire, Lacan, Écrits, 310–17. See also 
Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 30–33.
19. Louis Althusser, a student of Lacan, identified this process of subjection to ide-
ology as “interpellation”: “I shall then suggest that ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in 
such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals (it recruits them all), or 
‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects (it transforms them all) by the very precise 
operation which I have called interpellation or hailing, and which can be imagined 
along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: ‘Hey, you 
there!’ ” Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays, 118.
20. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 60.
21. The song, called Babri Masjid (Masjid-e-Babri Hum khatakar hain), was up-
loaded to YouTube by a Pakistani student who collects taranay or Urdu songs that are 
militant and jihadist in nature. I do not know who wrote the song or if the student 
was Pakistani or Indian. The student calls himself Ugerwadi.




26. hooks, “Homeplace,” 41–49.
Chapter 1: Breathing New Life into Old Stones
1. By accepting the diwan, the British became the financial and judicial adminis-
trators of the Bengal territories for the Mughal Emperor.
2. Kalim, Divan-i Abu T.alib Kalim Hamadani, 208.
3. Lehmann, “Urdu Literature and Mughal Decline,” 126–27.
Notes to Chapter One | 181
4. Kanda, Masterpieces of Urdu Rubaiyat, 49.
5. Ibid., 39.
6. Mir, Kulliyat-i Mir, 131.
7. Schimmel, Pain and Grace, 14.
8. Sharma, “The City of Beauties in Indo-Persian Poetic Landscape,” 78.
9. Ibid.
10. Mirza Muhammad Rafi ‘Sauda,’ “Mukhammas on the Desolation of Shahjah-
anabad.” Never formally published, Frances W. Prichett offers an annotated transla-
tion of the poem that can be found under the link “Urdu/Hindi Language and Lit-
erature” on her Columbia University website: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/
pritchett/00fwp/#fwp (last accessed 3 November 2010).
11. Sauda writes: “Whatever holymen’s mosques there are are less valuable than 
mule posts / For seated there like asses are men, old and young / The mullah gives 
the call to prayer with his mouth shut.” Petievich, “Poetry of the Declining Mughals,” 
107.
12. Ibid.
13. As Lacan explains the point de capiton: “This point around which all concrete 
analysis of discourse must operate . . . the point at which the signified and the signi-
fier are knotted together, between the still floating mass of meanings that are actually 
circulating. . . . Everything radiates out from and is organized around this signifier, 
similar to these little lines of force that an upholstery button forms on the surface 
of a material. It’s the point of convergence that enables everything that happens in 
this discourse to be situated retroactively and prospectively.” Lacan, The Seminars of 
Jacques Lacan, 267–68.
14. Ahmad, Shahr-Ashob. The translation here is that of Frances W. Pritchett, 
available online at the website for her workshop, “What is a shahr-ashob?” It can be 
accessed in “Resources: Urdu/Hindi language and literature” found on her main 
webpage: http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00fwp/#fwp (last accessed 
29 October 2010).
15. Umar, Muslim Society in Northern India during the Eighteenth Century, 438–39.
16. Gilmartin, “Religious Leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab,” 
490.
17. For a discussion of the parallactic, as I am using it here, see Žižek, The Parallax 
View, 17–20.
18. Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India, 28–29.
19. For the ideological study of Hodges’s work, see Quilley and Bonehill, William 
Hodges, 1744–1797. For studies on Hodges’s forms and style, see Bann “Antiquarian-
ism, Visuality, and the Exotic Monument”; and Tillotson, The Artificial Empire.
20. Eaton, “Temple Desecration and Indo-Muslim States,” 264.
21. Hodges, Travels in India during the Years 1780–1783, 47.
182 | Notes to Chapter One
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 52.
24. Burke, “Speech (December 1, 1783),” 453.
25. Hodges’s view was thus in accord with Hastings’s representation of the Indian 
landscape as a negative sign of Mughal governmentality. As the latter claimed: “Sov-
ereignty in India implies nothing else; for I know not how we can form an estimate 
of its power but from its visible effects — and those are everywhere the same, from 
Kabul to Assam. The whole history of Asia is nothing more than precedents to prove 
the invariable exercise of arbitrary power. It will, no doubt, be most happy for the in-
habitants of Asia when the despotic institutes of  Jengheez Khan or Tamerlane shall 
give place to the liberal spirit of a British legislature. I shall be amply satisfied in my 
present prosecution, if I shall tend to hasten the approach of an event so beneficial to 
the great interests of mankind.” Warren Hastings, quoted in Davies, Strange Destiny, 
242–43.
26. Hodges, Travels in India during the Years 1780–1783, 59.
27. Morning Post, 30 April 1788, quoted in Stuebe, The Life and Works of William 
Hodges, 208.
28. Tillotson makes a similar point in Artificial Empire, 3.
29. Hodges, Travels in India during the Years 1780–1783, 61.
30. Ibid., 62.
31. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 104.
32. Haque, Glimpses of Mughal Society and Culture, 117.
33. Ibid., 118.
34. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 389.
35. Malleson, Life of Warren Hastings, First Governor-General of India, 451–52.
36. Certeau, The Writing of History, 4.






43. Certeau, The Writing of History, 4.
44. Ibid.
45. Mir, The Autobiography of the Eighteenth Century Mughal Poet, Mir Muham-
mad Taqi ‘Mir’ (1723–1810), 96–97.
46. Tillotson, Artificial Empire, 82.
47. Mills, “Knowledge, Gender, and Empire,” 42–46.
48. Suleri, The Rhetoric of English India, 85.
49. Ibid., 83.
Notes to Chapter Two | 183
50. Ibid., 93.
51. Parkes, Begums, Thugs, and Englishmen, 313.
52. Ibid.
53. An example of this sort of representation of Mughal Delhi is Thomas Met-
calfe’s, “Delhi Book,” which describes the monuments of the city. Illustrated by In-
dian artists, the book was produced for his daughters in 1844. The folios, now in the 
British Library, were published in facsimile in the book The Golden Calm. Metcalfe 
spent considerable time with the emperor, Bahadur Shah, as the agent of the governor 
general in Delhi from 1835 to 1853. Despite this proximity his descriptions never give 
the details of court life and culture. Instead, he limits himself to describing indi-
vidual structures of the palace, their form, decay, and if and when a historical event 
that led to the decline of the Mughals took place there. See Bayley and Metcalfe, The 
Golden Calm.
54. Parkes, Begums, Thugs, and Englishmen, 180.
55. Ibid., 182.
56. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 222.
57. Parkes, Begums, Thugs, and Englishmen, 183.
58. Ibid., 184.
59. Ibid., 184–85.
60. Das, A History of Indian Literature, 64.
61. Haque, Glimpses of Mughal Society and Culture, 47.
62. Akbarabadi, “Life Is But a Great and Varied Show,” in Abbas, The Life and 
Times of Nazir Akbarabadi, 71. Shamsur Rahman Faruqi and Frances W. Pritchett 
have also translated this poem as “The Vile World Carnival,” Annual of Urdu Studies, 
4 (1984), 25–35.
63. Abbas, The Life and Times of Nazir Akbarabadi, 149.
64. Ibid., 151.
65. Žižek, The Parallax View, 18.
Chapter 2: From Cunningham to Curzon




4. Gupta, Delhi between Two Empires, 1803–1931, 17.
5. Ibid.
6. Also known as the first war of Indian independence and the Sepoy Mutiny, the 
event will be referred to as “the Uprising” in this book.
7. Smith, The Oxford History of India, 665.
8. One son fled to Hyderabad, but he never assumed the title of a Mughal prince.
184 | Notes to Chapter Two
9. Smith, The Oxford History of India, 675.
10. Hutchins, The Illusion of Permanence, 73.
11. Kipling, “The Man Who Was,” 48.
12. Slavoj Žižek provides a useful description of the master-signifier: “Let us imag-
ine a confused situation of social disintegration, in which the cohesive power of ideol-
ogy loses its efficiency: in such a situation, the Master is the one who invents a new 
signifier, the famous ‘quilting point,’ which stabilizes the situation again and makes 
it readable. . . . The Master adds no new positive content — he merely adds a signifier 
which, all of a sudden, turns disorder into order, into ‘new harmony,’ as Rimbaud 
would have put it.” Žižek, The Parallax View, 37.
13. Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire, 27.
14. Lord Canning, minutes, 22 January 1862, Council on the Antiquities of Upper 
India, in Cunningham, Archaeological Survey of India Reports, i.
15. Kipling, Gunga Din and Other Favorite Poems, 52.
16. Ibid., iv.
17. Fergusson, History of Indian and Eastern Architecture, 104–8; and Mill, The 
History of British India, 3:458–59.
18. Mill, The History of British India, 1:12–13.
19. Fergusson, History of Modern Styles of Architecture, 494.
20. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 28.
21. Ibid.
22. Guha-Thakurta, Monuments, Objects, Histories, 12–15.
23. Ibid., 14.
24. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 220.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 135.
27. Cunningham, Archaeological Survey of India Reports, iv.
28. Imam, Sir Alexander Cunningham and the Beginnings of Indian Archaeology, 
204–9.
29. Roy, The Story of Indian Archaeology, 1784–1947, 57.
30. Ibid., 66.
31. British Library/Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections/India Office Records/P/ 
3218 Proceedings of the Revenue and Agricultural Department, Government of India, 
Archaeology, 1888 (Letter from Dr. J. Burgess, Dir. Gen. Arch. Survey of India to the 
Secretary to the Government of India, 16 March 1887).
32. Ibid.
33. Keith, “Indian Stone Carving,” 111.
34. British Library/Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections/India Office Records/P/ 
3218 Proceedings of the Revenue and Agricultural Department, Government of 
Notes to Chapter Two | 185
India, Archaeology, 1888 (Letter from Dr. J. Burgess, Dir. Gen. Arch. Survey of India 
to the Secretary to the Government of India, 16 March 1887).
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. British Library/Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections/India Office Records/P/2519 
Proceedings of the Home Department, Government of India, 1885 (Letter from 
Major J. B. Keith to the Secretary of the Government of India, 14 October 1885).
38. British Library/India Office Records/P/3218 Proceedings of the Revenue and 
Agricultural Department, Government of India, 1888 (Letter from Dr. J. Burgess 
to the Secretary of the Government of India, Home Department, 16 March 1887).
39. Führer, The Monumental Antiquities and Inscriptions in the North-Western 
Provinces and Oudh.
40. E. W. Smith, The Moghul Architecture of Fathpur-Sikri, 1:xii.
41. Cole, Fifty Years of Public Work of Sir Henry Cole, K. C. B., 138.
42. British Library/Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections/India Office Records/P/ 
1681/Proceedings of the Revenue and Agricultural Department, Government of  India, 
1882 (Letter from H. H. Cole to Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, 
Home Department, 27 March 1882).
43. H. H. Cole, Preservation of National Monuments, 4.
44. Arnold, India Revisited, 202, 204–5.
45. British Library/Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections/India Office Records/P/ 
1681 Proceedings of the Revenue and Agricultural Department, Government of  India, 
1882 (Letter from H. H. Cole to Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, 
Home Department, March 27, 1882).




50. In 1911 Curzon purchased Tattershall Castle and reputedly saved it from being 
removed to the United States by William Randolph Hearst. See New York Times, 
7 November 1911.
51. Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, 73.
52. Ibid., 76.
53. Curzon quoted ibid., 81.





186 | Notes to Chapter Three
59. Ibid.
60. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge, 78.
61. British Library/Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections/India Office Records/MSS 
EUR F111/620, George Curzon, “Indian Archaeology, 1899–1905,” Correspondence, 
Speeches, and Papers of Lord Curzon, 1906.
62. Curzon, “Ancient Monuments,” in Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal: 




66. Curzon, Lord Curzon in India, 183–84.
67. British Library/Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections/India Office Records/MSS 
EUR F111/620, George Curzon, “Indian Archaeology, 1899–1905,” Correspondence, 
Speeches and Papers of Lord Curzon.
68. Ibid.
69. Quoted in Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, 128.
70. Ibid.
71. Curzon, Speeches, 172.
72. Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, 336.
73. Linstrum, “The Sacred Past,” 1.
74. Ibid., 14.
75. Heber, Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India from Cal-
cutta to Bombay, 1824–25, 10.
76. Curzon, Lord Curzon in India, 199.
77. Linstrum, “The Sacred Past,” 15.
78. Curzon, Lord Curzon in India, 198–99.
79. Ruskin, The Seven Lamps of Architecture, 173.
80. Graham, The Land of the Lotus, 128.
81. Ibid.
82. Curzon, “Ancient Monuments,” in Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal: 
January to December 1899, 57.
83. Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny, 168.
84. Ibid., 169.
Chapter 3: Between Fantasy and Phantasmagoria
1. Curzon, Persia and the Persia Question, 4.
2. Curzon, Lord Curzon in India, 283.
3. Reynolds-Ball, The Tourist’s India, 1.
4. Ibid., 3.
5. Ibid., 2.
Notes to Chapter Four | 187
6. Ibid., 52.
7. Curzon, Lord Curzon in India, 35.
8. Kipling, Out of India, 8.
9. Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny, 172.
10. Ibid.











22. Ladd, Intimate Glimpses of Life in India, 99.
23. Kipling, Out of India, 15.
24. Scidmore, Winter India, 204.
25. Wyman, From Calcutta to the Snowy Range, 171–72.
26. Curzon, Lord Curzon in India, 41.
27. Graham, The Land of the Lotus, 126.
28. Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 123.
29. Goswami, “Englishness on the Imperial Circuit,” 54.
30. Gorra, “Questions of Travel,” 59.
31. Goswami, “Englishness on the Imperial Circuit,” 70.





37. Sen, “The Rise and Decadence of Art in India,” 601–2.
38. Rama Rau, Home to India, 151–52.
39. Ibid.
Chapter 4: Rebuilding Indian Muslim Space
1. Al-madinat al fazilah (the moral city, also translated as the virtuous city) is the 
name of the book by Arabic philosopher al-Farabi (c. 870–950). In it he describes the 
conditions for a well-governed city. Among these is a king or governor who provides 
care and protection for each part of the city, knowing that each part is integral to the 
188 | Notes to Chapter Four
health of the whole. Al-Farabi also posits that when a city and its parts are governed 
well and function together, the citizens are more inclined to act morally. See Adam-
son and Taylor, The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, 276–80.
2. Gandhi, Eight Lives, 22.
3. British Library, Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections, Persian Manuscript Col-
lection, Or. 1845, Sil Chand, Tafrih al-’ imarat (1825).
4. British Library, Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections, Persian Manuscript Col-
lection, Or. 1891, ‘Abd al-Karim Mushtak of Jhajjar, Mir’at Giti-numa (1850). Loosely 
translated, this poetic title means “Universal History.” Giti-numa refers to the mirror 
carried by Alexander the Great that showed him the history of all things.
5. Ibid., folio 16a. Shivaratri is a Hindu festival that honors and celebrates the god 
Shiva.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., folio 18a, 19b.
8. Mi’rat aftab-nama is a general history written by ‘Abd al-Rahman Shahnavaz 
Khan Dihlavi for the emperor Shah Alam. Its title translates to “sun-reflecting mirror.”
9. Nath, Monuments of Delhi, Historical Study, v.
10. Gupta, “From Architecture to Archaeology,” 58.
11. Ibid.




16. Gupta, “From Architecture to Archaeology,” 58.
17. Journal of the Archaeological Society of Delhi, 5 August 1852.
18. Metcalf also commissioned a book of monuments with written descriptions 
and illustrations called The Delhi Book preserved in the British Library.
19. Among the very few exceptions is the linguist and scholar Rajendralal Mitra 
(1824–1891) of the Asiatic Society, Calcutta.
20. Malik, “Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s Doctrines of Muslim Nationalism and Na-
tional Progress,” 226. Maktabs are elementary schools.
21. Ghalib, Urdu Letters of Mirza Asadu’ llah Khan Ghalib, 133.
22. Ibid., 134.
23. Oldenburg, The Making of Colonial Lucknow, 1856–1877, 36.
24. Ibid., 25.
25. Devji, “Gender and the Politics of Space,” 26.
26. Ghalib, Dastanbuy, 58.
27. Ibid., 67.
28. Delhi Archives/Chief Commissioner’s Office, File no. 238/Box 9/70, Corre-
Notes to Chapter Four | 189
spondence to the Secretary to Government from A. A. Roberts, offg Financial Com-
missioner for the Punjab, 22 November 1869.
29. Ibid.
30. Raikes, Notes on the Revolt in the North-Western Provinces of India, 78.
31. Delhi Archives/Chief Commissioner’s Office, File no. 238/Box 9/70, Major 
R. C. Lawrence, Military Secretary to Chief Commr., Punjab to Lieutt Coll E. C. 
Ommanney, Officiating Chief Engineer, Punjab, 14 December 1858.
32. Delhi Archives/Chief Commissioner’s Office, File no. 238/Box 9/70, Letter 
Secretary of the Government of India to the Secretary to the Government of Punjab, 
20 April 1860.
33. Delhi Archives/Chief Commissioner’s Office, File no. 238/Box 9/70, Letter to 
Secretary of Government, Punjab to the Commissioner and Superintendent Delhi 
Division, 3 February 1862.
34. Delhi Archives/Chief Commissioner’s Office, File no. 238/Box 9/70, “Abstract 
of Correspondence Referring to the Jama Musjid.”
35. Ibid.
36. Delhi Archives/Chief Commissioner’s Office, File no. 238/Box 9/70, Memo 
from Secretary of the Government Punjab, A. H. Diack to Commissioner and Super-
intendent, Delhi, 11 November 1862.
37. Delhi Archives/Chief Commissioner’s Office/File no. 196/Box 21/70.
38. Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victorian India,” 648–49.
39. Burke, The Annual Register, 89.
40. Hali, Hali’s Musaddas, 203.
41. Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, 38.
42. Delhi Archives/Deputy Commissioner’s Files/5/1909, “The Plaint of 16 Au-
gust 1909.”
43. Woodman, A Digest of Indian Law Cases, col. 136.
44. Delhi Archives/Deputy Commissioner’s Files/5/1909, “The Plaint.”
45. Ibid.
46. Delhi Archives/Deputy Commissioner’s Files/DC/5/1909, Letter to C. A. 
Barron, C. S., Deputy Commissioner, Delhi from Secretaries of the Managing Com-
mittee, Jama Masjid, Delhi, 3 August 1909.
47. Curzon Gazette (Delhi), September 1902, 2, quoted in Rashid, Wakf Admin-
istration in India, 20.
48. Delhi Commissioner’s Office, Files/DC/5/1909, Letter to C. A. Barron, C.S., 
Deputy Commissioner, Delhi from Secretaries of the Managing Committee, Jama 
Masjid, Delhi, 3 August 1909.
49. Rashid, Wakf Administration in India, 27.
50. Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964, 157.
190 | Notes to Chapter Four
51. Madina (Bijnor), 15 September 1913.
52. Madina (Bijnor), 8 December 1913.
53. Agha Rafiq, “Editorial Note,” Madina (Bijnor), 23 April 1913.
54. Madina (Bijnor), 8 July 1913.
55. Ibid.
56. “Terrible Incident of Kanpur,” Madina (Bijnor), 1 September 1913.
57. Minault, The Khalifat Movement, 47.
58. Delhi Commissioner’s Office, Files/DC/44/1912, to Mr. A. Meredith, Com-
missioner and Supervisor, Delhi Division from Major H. C. Beadon, Deputy Com-
missioner, 27 May 1912.
59. “Old Graves and Mosques of Delhi (1),” Hamdard (Delhi) 29 June 1913.
60. “Old Graves and Mosques of Delhi (2),” Hamdard (Delhi), 1 July 1913.
61. “An Issue of a Mosque,” Muslim (Delhi), 1 July 1922, 3.
62. Riaz, “Nations, Nation-State, and Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia,” 54.
63. Ibid.
64. Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, 180.
65. Misra, Identity and Religion, 125.
66. Quoted in ibid., 125n47.
67. Shah Waliullah, At-Tafhimat II, quoted in Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Sub-
continent, 157.
68. Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, 157.
69. Robinson, “The British Empire and Muslim Identity in South Asia.”
70. Pandey, The Colonial Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India.
71. Jalal, Self and Sovereignty, 40.
72. Hunter, The Indian Musalmans, 1872.
73. Hali, Hali’s Musaddas, 131.
74. Ibid.
75. This is the Urdu scholar Abdul Haq’s view, quoted in Shackel and Majeed, 
Hali’s Musaddas, 51.
76. Ibid., 53.
77. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan, and Islamic Identity, 75–76.
78. Schimmel, Islam in the Indian Subcontinent, 243.








Notes to Chapter Five | 191
87. Ibid., 1084.
88. Ibid.
89. Azad, India Wins Freedom, 144.
90. Gilmartin, “Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History,” 1087. Gilmartin is 
looking at the events of Partition in Punjab when he makes this observation.
91. Nile Green correctly argues that those Muslims living near Sufi shrines did not 
face the same loss of space and continue to the present day to identify with the territorial 
presence of these sites and their saints. Green, “Stories of Saints and Sultans,” 419–46.
Chapter 5: Tryst with Destiny
1. Rushdie, Midnight’s Children.
2. Proceedings on the Trial of Muhammad Bahadur Shah, 2.
3. Ali, Twilight in Delhi, 105–6.
4. Ibid., 106. It is interesting to note that Ali has the same distrust for the manag-
ing committee of the Jami Masjid as Haji Fazil-al-Rahman and Muhammad-ud-din, 




8. Wolpert, A New History of India, 337.
9. Jog, “Jai Hind, 1945–1947,” 196.
10. Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, 312.
11. Jog, “Jai Hind, 1945–1947,” 197.
12. It is important to note that not all Indians felt the optimism of the Congress 
Party and its supporters, nor did they read the choice of the Red Fort as the site for 
the proclamation of the new social order as appropriate. Some Muslims wrote to the 
Meerut daily Dawn expressing their disquiet over the choice of the Red Fort for the 
flag-raising ceremony. They saw the site as a historical monument to the greatness 
of Muslim rule, rather than as a symbol of the protosecular policy of the Mughals 
or as an important site of the independence struggles. For these Muslims, the Red 
Fort marked the terminus of Muslim culture and power in India, and when Nehru 
replaced the Union Jack with the Indian tricolor he was in their eyes merely signify-
ing the replacement of one mode of domination with another. The resistance to the 
dominant power of the secularist party could be seen evolving from the same historic 
moment and space that inaugurated a new nation. See Tan and Kudaisya, The After-
math of Partition in South Asia, 59–60.
13. Nehru, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, 2; hereafter cited as SWJN.
14. Ibid., 126.
15. Pandey, Remembering Partition, 123.
16. SWJN, 79.
192 | Notes to Chapter Six
17. Collins and Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, 383.
18. Gandhi, Eight Lives, 248–49.
19. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 90:79; hereafter cited as 
CWMG.
20. SWJN, 174.
21. Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, 95–115.
22. Ibid., 102.
23. Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism, 15.




28. Ibid., 241; 257–60.
29. Ibid., 268.
30. Ibid., 238.
31. Jaffrelot, Hindu Nationalism, 3.
32. Ibid.
33. Sangari, “A Narrative of Restoration,” 3.
34. Freitag, “Contesting in Public,” 215.








43. Sangari, “A Narrative of Restoration,” 17.
44. CWMG, 98:309.
45. Pandey, Remembering Partition, 144.
46. Ibid., 145.
47. Ibid.
Chapter 6: The Ethics of Monumentality
1. Adams, “History and Context,” 4.
2. Ibid., 5.
3. Nehru, The Discovery of India, 534.
4. Freitag, “Contesting in Public,” 214–15.
5. Butler, “The Force of Fantasy,” 199.
6. Ibid.
Notes to Chapter Six | 193
7. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 45.
8. Ibid.
9. Khan, The Great Partition, 181–82.
10. Samuel, Theatres of Memory, 205.
11. Adams, “History and Context,” 6.
12. India National Congress, Communications, 50.
13. Ibid., 69–70.
14. Rahman and Khan, “Domestic Tourism in India’s Five Year Plans,” 90.
15. National Institute of Design, Fatehpur Sikri.
16. Ibid., 15–20.
17. Ibid., 40.
18. “Stone Quarries Threaten Fatehpur Sikri,” Times of India, 3 September 2003.
19. Government of India, Planning Commission, Seventh Five Year Plan, 1985– 
90, 234.
20. Ibid.
21. Harkness and Sinha, “Taj Heritage Corridor,” 67.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 68.
24. Menon, “Book Reviews.”
25. Gahilote, “A Monumental Scandal.”
26. Ibid.
27. Mayawati was re-elected chief minister in 2007.
28. Baig, “Managing Cultural Significance.”
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. An example of this is the public interest litigation in 2003 of Rajeev Sethi et al., 
which sought to protect Delhi’s Red Fort from outmoded conservation techniques. 
The particulars of the case can be found in Seminar under the heading “Document.”
32. Harvey, “From Space to Place and Back Again,” 8.
33. Von Droste zu Hülshoff, “World Heritage and Development,” 1.
34. Ibid.
35. UNESCO, Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage World, WHC-03/27.COM/7B.Corr, 2003.
36. Ibid.
37. Government of India, Ministry of Culture, Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question, 
no. 1430, to be answered on 09.12.2004, World Heritage Properties in India; Govern-
ment of India, Ministry of Culture, Lok Sabha, Unstarred Question, no. 379, to be 
answered on 19.12.2005, Taj Corridor Project.
38. Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 365.
39. Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World, 158.
194 | Notes to Chapter Six
40. See section 38 of Wakf Act (1995) in Government of India, Ministry of Law, 
Acts of Parliament.
41. Debasish Roy Chowdhury “Tug-of-War over the Taj Mahal,” Asia Times, http:// 
www.atimes.com (last accessed 27 January 2008).
42. At the time of this writing Usman’s term as chairman has ended and the Sunni 
Waqf Board has ended without a decision by the Supreme Court over the case of 
ownership.
43. On 30 September 2010 the high court in Allahabad handed down a verdict on 
the demolition of the Babri Masjid and ordered a three-way division of the disputed 
land. Two parts would go to Hindus and one part to Muslims. The ruling sanctions 
the Hindu fundamentalists’ claims of the existence of a Ram temple and the violent 
act of destroying a Muslim place of worship.




47. The repeated occurrence of such attacks could be read as a symptom of the 
larger trauma that the state refuses to acknowledge. Instead, the antagonism under-
lying modern Indian reality lives on within the national unconscious, where it gives 
rise to social anxiety, hatred, and prejudice toward the nation’s Muslim other. More 
important, it reveals how the nation’s largest majority has been allowed to exist in 
substandard living conditions, made evident by statistical data on the income, educa-
tion, and social status of Indian Muslims made available in the widely disseminated 
Sarchar Committee Report of 2006. A PDF version of this report can be obtained at 
minorityaffairs.gov.in/newsite (last accessed 13 March 2009).
48. Chairman Usman, interview by the author, video recording, Lucknow, 12 
January 2007. The Shiv Mandir, or temple to the Hindu God Shiva, that the chair-
man refers to is an idea derived from a revisionist history written by P. N. Oak, which 
is now widely accepted as doctrine regarding Mughal architecture among Hindu 
nationalists. Oak himself is a Hindutva-inspired journalist and the president of the 
Institute for Rewriting Indian History. His texts share one basic thesis: Mughal and 
other Muslim monuments are wrongfully attributed, and their builders were actually 
Hindu royalty. His titles include the Taj Mahal Was a Rajput Palace (1965), reprinted 
as The Taj Mahal Is Tejo-Mahalaya: A Shiva Temple (1981) and reprinted a second 
time as The Taj Mahal Is a Temple Palace (1991). Who Says Akbar Was Great! (1968) 
and Delhi’s Red Fort Is Hindu Lalkot (1976) are among Oak’s other books claiming 
Hindu patronage of famous Mughal structures. A fellow member of the Institute 
for Rewriting Indian History, Hansraj Bhatia, completed the Hindutva canon on 
Mughal monuments with Fatehpur Sikri Is a Hindu City (1969) and Agra Fort Is a 
Hindu Building (1971).
Notes to Epilogue | 195
49. Deepshikha Ghosh, “BJP Activists on the Rampage at the Taj,” Indo-Asian 
News Service, 14 October 2001, http://www.rediff.com.
50. Chairman Usman, interview, 12 January 2007.
51. Balraj Puri, “Crucial Role of Urdu-Speaking Muslims,” Milli Gazette, 1–15 De-
cember 2004, 9.
52. Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 4.
53. Khan, Indian Muslims, 25.
54. Sikand, Muslims in India since 1947, 3.
55. Gyanendra Pandey makes a similar argument when he states that the fragment 
(the Muslim Indian community) perspective has the ability to reveal the contradic-
tions of social reality and should therefore be taken seriously: “Part of the importance 
of the fragmentary point of view lies in this: that it resists the drive for a shallow 
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Epilogue
1. Deputy Nazir Ahmad’s Bride’s Mirror of 1869 is revered as the first best-selling 
Urdu novel.
2. Ahmad Dehlavi, Vaqiat-i darul-hakumat-i Dihli, 1919.
3. Muslim Ahmad, interview with Santhi Kavuri-Bauer and Malik Faisal, Delhi, 
20 January 2007. All of Mr. Ahmad’s answers and statements are taken from this 
interview.
4. The imam did know that the Fatehpuri Masjid was the site of an important 
meeting of the ulema to discuss the part they would play the All-India Muslim 
League in 1918. 
5. See the video on YouTube, “Amitabh Bachchan Recites ‘India Poised’ Anthem” 
(last accessed 16 September 2010). 
6. hooks, Yearning, 42.
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